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Cover
The Greek philosopher Aristotle
(c. 384–322 BC), who by virtue of his
Nichomachean Ethics is arguably the
founder of ethics as a secular study, in
contradistinction to the more religiously
oriented moral philosophy of his teacher
Plato, and of Plato’s own mentor, Socrates.
Over 2,300 years later, ethics—as a
practical discipline as well as a scholarly
pursuit—remains a central concern of the
Naval War College. Our Summer/Autumn
issue collects, under the rubric “Legal and
Ethical Issues of IRAQI FREEDOM,” arti-
cles emerging from, and addressing key
issues of, the College’s fifteenth annual
Professional Ethics Conference, held in
November 2003.
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Following his graduation from the United States Naval
Academy in 1971, Rear Admiral Route completed a se-
ries of command and leadership assignments both
within the Navy and in the joint service arena. His
primary areas of expertise include surface warfare,
politico-military affairs, and resource management.
Rear Admiral Route has commanded the Navy Warfare
Development Command; Cruiser Destroyer Group 2
and the George Washington (CVN 73) Battle Group;
USS Lake Erie (CG 70); and USS Dewey (DDG 45).
Ashore in Washington, D.C., Rear Admiral Route
served as Director, Navy Programming Division (N80),
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; and in his first
flag assignment as Director, Politico-Military Affairs
Division (N52), Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations.
Other Pentagon assignments have included Executive
Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Man-
power and Reserve Affairs) for three Assistant Secre-
taries in two administrations, Long Range Planner and
Surface Ship Readiness analyst in CNO’s Program
Resource Appraisal Division (now N81), and Naval
Warfare Analyst in the Joint Analysis Directorate (now
part of J-8), Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
He holds a bachelor of science degree in Systems Engi-
neering from the U.S. Naval Academy, and a master of
science degree in Operations Research from the Naval
Postgraduate School. Selected for a Navy Federal Exec-
utive Fellowship, he completed a year-long assignment
as a Military Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations
in New York City and subsequently became a council
member in June 1998. Rear Admiral Route is also a
graduate of the Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course
and the Joint Force Air Component Commander
Courses at the Air War College, Maxwell Air Force
Base, Alabama.
Rear Admiral Route assumed duties as the fiftieth Pres-
ident of the Naval War College on 9 July 2003 while si-
multaneously maintaining his former position as
Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command
until 24 September 2003.
In ceremonies held in Spruance Hall on 12 August 2004,
Rear Admiral Route was relieved by Rear Admiral
Jacob L. Shuford as President of the Naval War College.
The “President’s Forum” of this issue is adapted from
his remarks on that occasion. Rear Admiral Route was
selected for promotion to vice admiral and now serves as
the Naval Inspector General.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
Nearly a dozen decades have passed since the Naval War Col-
lege’s first, informal, change of command, and the world has
changed in ways that even the forward thinkers at the College
could never have imagined.
THIS IS THE FIFTIETH TIME that command of the Naval War College
has been passed from one officer to another. The first occurred in
August 1886, when Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan assumed the presidency fol-
lowing Commodore Stephen B. Luce’s highly successful tour as the College’s
founding President. It is fascinating to wonder what may have been on Mahan’s
mind as he arrived on horseback in front of Founder’s Hall to begin his first day
as President.
This is yet another incredibly humbling reminder to me of the footsteps we
more recent Presidents have been walking in, in our service here at the College.
Looking back over our shoulders, we see such historical figures as Luce, Mahan,
Spruance, Stockdale, Turner, and all the others who have served as President of
this great institution. Their vision, their contributions to the College’s strategic
tradition, and their strong leadership still serve as our anchors to windward.
Nearly a dozen decades have passed since that first informal change of com-
mand, and the world has changed in ways that even the forward thinkers at the
Naval War College could never have imagined.
The nation’s citizens, and the Navy that protects them, have been on a great
journey during these many years. They have seen the horrors of war and the glo-
ries of peace. They have marked the closing of the nineteenth and twentieth cen-
turies, and they have watched as Americans left footprints on the moon. Six
generations of Naval War College graduates observed and assisted as the U.S.
Navy moved from the last vestiges of sailing ships into steam propulsion and
then nuclear-powered warships, and into an era of network-centric warfare,
FORCEnet, and adaptive force planning. It has indeed been an honor and a
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pleasure to be at the helm of this historic institution for a portion of this remark-
able journey.
I’d like to touch briefly on some recent remarkable events and activities:
• Over 1,050 students graduated from our resident and nonresident
programs. The class of 2004 was the largest in the College’s history, and it
reflected the renewed emphasis now being placed on obtaining professional
military education.
• The Mahan Scholars and the first two Halsey Groups completed a set of re-
search and analyses of significant strategic and operational challenges of
concern to the Navy and the Fleet. This year’s Halsey Groups, in particular,
achieved project success in the areas of ballistic missile defense and theater
antisubmarine warfare when the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) com-
mented at their outbrief, “This work puts the Naval War College at the center
of thinking and working operational challenges of direct concern to me.”
• Fifty-two of the world’s chiefs of naval operations and 120 other delegates
from around the world gathered in Newport for the Sixteenth International
Seapower Symposium. Hosted by Admiral Vern Clark, our CNO, it
represented a tremendous opportunity to encourage maritime security
cooperation with the leaders of the major navies in the world.
• The quality and relevance of our College of Naval Command and Staff and
our College of Distance Education programs were revalidated—and fully
accredited—by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, through the
Process for Accreditation of Joint Education visit.
• In order to improve access to our nonresident independent study program,
the College of Distance Education developed and fielded a new CD/ROM-
based version of the College’s Web-enabled intermediate-service-college
program.
• We presented the College’s Distinguished Graduate Leadership Award to
General Michael Hagee, USMC, the current Commandant of the Marine
Corps, who graduated from the Naval War College and the Naval
Command College in 1987.
• In conjunction with Brown University, we hosted a “Cold War at Sea”
conference that brought active-duty Russian officers and retired Soviet
Navy officers together with their American counterparts for frank—and
occasionally revealing—discussions of naval activities during the Cold War.
6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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• The International Law Department hosted a very successful and timely
conference entitled “International Law Challenges: Homeland Security and
Combating Terrorism.”
• The College’s annual ethics conference provided a great forum to discuss
the ethical and moral challenges that face our graduates as they one day
reenter the global war on terrorism, including the ongoing Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM. This conference took place last fall, even before news of potential
mistreatment of prisoners and other ethical issues began to break.
• For the fifth consecutive year, we commemorated the American victory at
the battle of Midway with a multifaceted educational program that
included a salute to six veterans of the battle who attended the celebration,
followed by a dinner dance under the stars, nearby on Dewey Field.
I have touched upon only a few of the major accomplishments of the College
in the past year. The greatest contribution, however, will come from the im-
proved leadership abilities of our graduates—to lead change and to make key
decisions in times of stress, and to be more effective in helping their superiors do
the same.
As proud as I am of the War College team’s recent accomplishments, I’m just
as proud—and really excited—about ongoing efforts that will serve this institu-
tion, the Navy, and our military well into the future. These include:
• Ongoing research, war gaming, and workshops for the CNO and the Navy
Staff, for Commander U.S. Fleet Forces Command and for Commander
Fifth Fleet, for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, for the Department of
Homeland Security, and for the Transportation Security Administration—
and for the Navy Warfare Development Command.
• A world’s ocean strategy—a maritime strategy writ large—for the Secretary
of the Navy and CNO.
• A pilot course for Joint Professional Military Education Phase II for our
senior students—a major step toward accelerating the number of fully
credentialed officers serving in critical senior assignments and increasing
their promotion opportunities.
• Our recently established collaboration efforts with the Carnegie Council on
Ethics and International Affairs in New York City, with the Council on
Foreign Relations in New York and Washington, D.C., and with the
Kuznetsov Naval Academy in St. Petersburg, Russia—all expanding
opportunities for research, enriching our curriculum, and furthering
P R E S I D E N T ’ S F O R U M 7
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mutual understanding between our military, our citizens, and the
international community.
• Our efforts to understand better the business side of graduate education.
We know that some in academia say “a university is not a business,” but we
understand we must compete for resources and deliver a return on our
Navy’s investment. Here at the College we are working to develop meaning-
ful metrics we can use to track our progress. Simple to state but hard to
do—we join other graduate institutions that seek to build a better business
case for graduate education.
• Along with other Echelon II commands throughout the Navy, those that
report directly to CNO, we have begun work in developing our Human
Capital Strategy, working on how we can more effectively conduct our
people business, trying to understand better what it means to consider
people as a source of competitive advantage for an organization, and to
determine better their value to us.
These are a few of the exciting things we have embarked on in the past few
months that hold much promise for future progress.
Finally, I want to say publicly one last time how much we value the contribu-
tions of the Naval War College Foundation—to our academic program, to our
physical plant and facilities, and to our student activities. The Foundation mem-
bers truly provide us the margin of excellence in everything we do. I thank them
for more than just their members’ financial support; these members are true
friends of the College, and many have become our personal friends during our
time in Newport. Thank you!
My family and I leave the College in the very capable hands of Admiral and
Mrs. Shuford. Admiral, I’m sure you will enjoy your return to Newport and the
College. This has been a remarkable year for Kip and me, and we will always have
a warm spot in our hearts for our many friends in Newport.
R. A. ROUTE
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
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12 August 2004: Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford, U.S. Navy (right), reports to the Chief of
Naval Operations, Admiral Vern Clark (left), that he has assumed command of the Naval
War College from Rear Admiral Ronald A. Route (center).
Photograph by PHC(AW/NAC) Robert Inverso
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Richard N. Haass is president of the Council on Foreign
Relations. He was previously Director of Policy Planning
for the Department of State, where he was a principal
adviser (with the rank of ambassador) to Secretary of
State Colin Powell. He received the State Department’s
Distinguished Honor Award for his work there. He has
also been Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the
Brookings Institution. The holder of a doctor of philosophy
degree from Oxford University, he has been awarded the
Presidential Citizens Medal (1991) and a Rhodes Scholar-
ship (1973). His recent publications, as author or editor, in-
clude The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States after the
Cold War (1998); Economic Sanctions and American
Diplomacy (1998); Intervention: The Use of Ameri-
can Military Force in the Post–Cold War World
(1999); and The Bureaucratic Entrepreneur: How to
Be Effective in Any Unruly Organization (1998).
These remarks were delivered to the faculty and student
body of the Naval War College, in Newport, Rhode Is-
land, during graduation ceremonies on 18 June 2004.
© 2004 by Richard N. Haass
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A PREMIUM ON GOOD JUDGMENT
Richard N. Haass
This is an institution with a great tradition, and I am honored to have beenasked to address you on this day—an honor made all the greater given the
distinguished individuals who preceded me in years past.
I will be characteristically blunt: you are departing the War College at a time
of considerable international turmoil. Ours is a time of war, or to be more pre-
cise, wars—a global war on terrorism, a war in Afghanistan, and a war in Iraq,
not to mention a conflict in Colombia and conflicts in several countries in Af-
rica. Those who predicted that the world after the end of the Cold War would be
tranquil were wrong, or at least premature. One result is that military force, par-
ticularly American military force, remains relevant, and then some.
But the role of military force is hardly obvious. As we have seen, advantage on
traditional battlefields does not equate to victory. To the contrary, one lesson
many individuals seem to have learned of late is that the one place not to chal-
lenge the United States is on traditional battlefields, where modern conventional
forces easily prevail. Instead, what we are seeing, what we can expect to see, is a
resort to nontraditional battlefields ranging from train stations to shopping
malls, and the use of nontraditional tactics and weapons—above all, terrorism
and weapons of mass destruction.
Coping with such nontraditional challenges will be difficult. I refer here not
simply to technical challenges but also to the intellectual. Take the U.S. decision
to go to war against Iraq. The traditional phase of battle proved relatively
one-sided, the subsequent phase anything but. Clearly, preemptive—or more
accurately, preventive—strikes are one thing, preemptive or preventive wars
quite another.
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Several months ago I first noted publicly that Iraq was a war of choice, not a
war of necessity. My purpose today is not to debate this assertion; much less is it
to take sides as to the correctness of the choice. I also do not intend to debate
whether the previous President Bush was right to go to war to liberate Kuwait—
or whether he was right to stop the war when he did and not to march on to
Baghdad.
Or consider for a moment some of the decisions confronting other govern-
ments. There is a heated debate in Israel over whether it should disengage unilat-
erally from Gaza and parts of the West Bank. Afghanistan’s leaders have to
decide whether, and if so, how, to challenge warlords; Colombia’s government
must tackle the difficult issue of what strategy to employ vis-à-vis the several in-
surgencies active in that country.
Again, my intention here is not to attempt to answer these or similarly com-
plex questions, any one of which could provide the basis for a commencement
address on its own. Rather, I want to raise the issue that is implicit in the debates
that surround all these questions—an issue that is explicit, I would think, in the
course of study you have just completed. How do you discover the wisdom when
confronted with a range of difficult alternatives? How do you exercise good
judgment?
This is important, for the decision to go to war against Iraq will surely not be
the only such decision in the course of your lives and careers. I would predict
that each and every person leaving the Naval War College today will be asked on
several occasions to make difficult choices, to offer analysis and advice, to make
decisions, on matters of war and peace. Some of the situations may resemble
Iraq, in the sense that the question at hand will be whether to attack a country
believed to be developing weapons of mass destruction. Other situations may
more closely resemble Bosnia or Kosovo, in which case the question will be what
to do in the face of ethnic cleansing or genocide. Still others of you will face
questions more pertinent to the particular circumstances of your assignment or
country, or both.
What is certain, though, is that each and every one of you will be confronted
repeatedly by complex choices for which there is no obvious right decision.
What this means is that there is a premium on demonstrating good judgment.
I know that many of you after graduating here will be returning to your own
countries. Let me thus hasten to add that there is nothing uniquely American
about what I am saying here today. It is not simply the obvious point, that Amer-
icans have no monopoly on good judgment, but also that Americans have no
monopoly on the need for it.
First things first. What constitutes good judgment? I would define it as the
ability to assess a situation as accurately and as objectively as possible, and to
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prescribe a response that is feasible and advances one’s interests at the lowest
possible level of costs, be they human, financial, or political.
Sometimes you will be asked to provide good judgment; on other occasions,
you will be on the receiving end of someone else’s judgment, and your challenge
will be to determine whether it is in fact good. Let me suggest that this may be
more difficult than it sounds; unlike pornography, you do not always recognize
good judgment—or bad judgment, for that matter—when you see it. Exercising
good judgment is never easy, but it can be particularly difficult when the issue is
foreign policy and national security. Invariably there is a matter of secrecy; you
rarely know everything, and even knowing what it is that you don’t know can
prove elusive. Language, physical distance, culture—all contribute to the
difficulties.
There is an additional factor that contributes to the challenge of exercising
good judgment. Systems analysis may tell you how many submarines or battle-
ships or aircraft carriers to buy, but it will not tell you whether and how to use
them. Equations do not exist for such inherently subjective assessments, which
are at the core of foreign policy and national security.
So, how does one exercise good judgment? Nothing is more fundamental
than good, old-fashioned assessment of likely costs and benefits inherent in a
possible course of action. One somehow doubts that those who predicted the
benefits of interrogation at the Abu Ghraib prison did a careful evaluation of the
likely costs. Any calculation of costs must also embrace opportunity costs, what
you must give up doing because of what you are doing. Resources dedicated to
one purpose can rarely be made immediately available to another.
But an absolute assessment of the costs and benefits of a proposed course of
action is not enough. You must be equally rigorous about the likely conse-
quences of alternatives. It is fairly easy to find fault with just about any option; it
is not so easy to weigh the relative strengths and weaknesses of multiple options.
It is essential that one option always be inaction. “Don’t just do something,
stand there” can, on occasion, be sage advice. On other occasions, such as when
the world sat on its collective hands as genocide overwhelmed Rwanda in 1994,
doing nothing can be the worst advice. The problem is figuring out what sort of
occasion you are presented with.
In considering costs and benefits, it is important to discriminate carefully be-
tween what is known and what is believed. We have had a powerful example of
just this recently, when many people, including your commencement speaker
today, concluded that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq possessed chemical and biological
weapons when, it appears, it did not.
Groupthink is a real risk in this regard. There is an inevitable tendency for
people who work together and who must continue to work together to begin to
H A A S S 1 3
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think alike. Assumptions have a way of sneaking into analysis. That is not neces-
sarily bad, but it can be, if the assumptions go unchallenged or are confused with
facts. The fact that there was not more response to indications prior to 9/11 of
possible terrorist attacks against the United States in part reflects a widely held
view at the time about the nature of the terrorist threat.
I also find it useful to ask what it would take to change your conclusion. Look
at the building blocks of the argument and identify what is the most critical
stone in the foundation. If something should happen to that item, it is a signal to
make sure that your original determination is still valid.
It is always a good idea to consider lessons from history that could prove rele-
vant. I expect that you are all familiar with George Santayana’s dictum that those
who ignore history are doomed to repeat it. But I recommend that you do not ig-
nore my corollary: Make sure the history is relevant. Not every diplomatic com-
promise constitutes another Munich; not every military undertaking that
encounters difficulty is another Vietnam.
Be careful about changing course. This is not an argument against changing
your mind sometime after you first decide. Rather, I am only suggesting that you
do so carefully. Midcourse corrections should be subject to scrutiny no less rig-
orous than that applied to original choices.
The importance of judging correctly goes up with the stakes. One problem is
that stakes tend to be at their highest amidst crises, and crises tend to be precisely
those times when you are most pressed by events and have less ability to think—
not to mention sleep—than is normally the case. Here, as elsewhere in life, you
need to struggle to make sure the urgent does not crowd out the important. You
can guard against some of these risks by turning to other people. If you have the
chance, work hard to create an environment in which those who challenge or-
thodoxy are rewarded, not penalized. Establish competing centers of thought;
the more important it is that you get something right, the more you can afford to
spend on making sure that you do.
One last point. On occasion, your judgment will clash with that of others. The
“other” can be a superior, a subordinate, or a colleague, a civilian, or someone
else in uniform. If experience is any guide, this can be difficult or worse when the
disagreement is with someone who happens to be your superior. As military
professionals, you are well versed in the most familiar dimension of loyalty, that
of accepting civilian authority, of recognizing rank and saluting once a decision
is made and an order given. But it is no less important to fulfill the second di-
mension of loyalty, speaking truth to power.
You may be thinking that all this is obvious, but as one who has spent the bulk
of his career in Washington, I would suggest otherwise. Indeed, Washington is a
town where too often people shy away from telling people what they need to
1 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Summer_Autumn 2004.vp
Tuesday, September 28, 2004 12:26:24 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
18
Naval War College Review, Vol. 57 [2004], No. 3, Art. 28
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol57/iss3/28
hear, falling back on what they want to hear. Or they just refuse to speak up. Acts
of omission can be no less significant than acts of commission.
Let me just say that I have few regrets in my professional life, but what few I do
possess stem mostly from the things I did not say—or didn’t say loud enough
and often enough—and from the things I did not do. Once you are confident of
your judgment, share it. If you question an assumption, challenge it. If you are
uncomfortable with a decision, voice it. I can think of no better ways for you to
serve your conscience and your country.
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Dr. Richard N. Haass, speaking at the Naval War College on 18 June 2004
Photograph by PHC(AW/NAC) Robert Inverso
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Summer_Autumn 2004.vp
Tuesday, September 28, 2004 12:26:25 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
20
Naval War College Review, Vol. 57 [2004], No. 3, Art. 28
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol57/iss3/28
A NOTE FROM THE EDITORS
The most disadvantageous peace is better than the most just war.
ERASMUS, ADAGIA, 1500
Few military professionals, or the states they serve, can in the present state ofthe world follow Erasmus to his logical conclusion—never to resort under any
circumstances to war. Even the most peaceable and democratic governments too
often face dilemmas in which, in light of information then at hand, the prospect
of war seems not the worst possible outcome. Military people, at least in states
where civilian control is firmly instituted, also do not have the decisive voice in
the matter.
Military leaders, like their civilian counterparts, find themselves on such is-
sues in the midst of numerous, pressing, and conflicting debates. Since the time
of Erasmus, and especially since the onset of the technological revolutions of the
nineteenth century, whole scholarly disciplines have grown up to determine the
aspects of the right or just use of force—legal, moral, ethical, philosophical. The
basic documents—treaties, charters, learned writings in numerous languages—
are abstruse and rarefied, seemingly far from the usual daily agendas. And yet
the underlying issues are also thrashed out, as a matter of the most direct and
personal urgency, in destroyer wardrooms, under canvas in the field, on flight
lines—just as in seminars, board rooms, and parliaments.
The Naval War College stands, and has always stood, at the intersection of
these debates and considerations; it regularly calls upon students, alumni, and
friends to examine these fundamental issues. To that end, the President of the
College has established a chair of leadership and ethics (occupied by Dr. Thomas
B. Grassey, former editor of the Naval War College Press, and of this journal).
The provost, Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr., invites speakers of diverse backgrounds and
convictions, some quite challenging to military ears—and also, as the dean of
Academics, offers such electives as “The Foundations of Moral Obligation” (es-
tablished in 1978 by Admiral James Stockdale). Finally, the Center for Naval
Warfare Studies has taken a leading role in organizing annual formal symposia,
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addressed by leading scholars and practitioners, and attended by the entire stu-
dent body, on the moral and ethical aspects of the military profession.
The fifteenth such conference occurred on 12–13 November 2003, a time
when those aspects were, as they remain, particularly cogent. By November, it
was clear that the remarkable efficiency and effectiveness of the military cam-
paign that toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq had not smoothly trans-
lated into the swift reconstitution of the Iraqi state, nor had it decisively set into
irreversible motion the reshaping of the Middle East along the stable and demo-
cratic lines that had been hoped for. Issues of ethics, morality, and the law of war
and armed combat presented themselves, then as now, with an urgency not
known since the Vietnam War, which had led the American military to reshape
itself as an all-volunteer, highly professional force.
It therefore seems wise to devote much of this present issue to this range of
questions as now posed within the U.S. national security communities, military
and civilian. We have not here simply reprinted addresses and panel remarks
from November; we, and the original speakers, have revised and edited exten-
sively to bring out the underlying arguments and issues. We have also drawn in a
relevant paper by an author (James P. Terry) who was not present at the confer-
ence, and have invited an analysis from an expert Naval War College faculty
scholar who was, Commander (and Dr.) Susan D. Fink.
It is in the nature of things that when issues of ethics, morality, and legality as-
sume a high profile, it is because things are not going well or because there is
deep community dissensus. A number of the essays presented here are quite
challenging and critical of fundamental decisions and actions. But all the au-
thors are highly qualified by training, position, and experience to advance their
respective viewpoints; and all offer resources, tools, and information that we be-
lieve will be invaluable to our readers as they—as, by definition, they must—
form their own views and choose their paths.
The Editors
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THE TROUBLE WITH MIXED MOTIVES
Debating the Political, Legal, and Moral Dimensions of Intervention
Commander Susan D. Fink, U.S. Navy
In the aftermath of the Iraq war and transfer to Iraqi authority, a bitter debatepersists over the motives for the war and the reasons for the transatlantic antipa-
thy it engendered. There are those who argue that moral talk coming out of the
White House represents a fig leaf for realpolitik, a change in tactics after the fail-
ure to find evidence of Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction. Why
had President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair, both known for
their moral personal philosophies and foreign policies, relied primarily on legal
and threat-based justifications?1 Why did they leave until the eleventh hour the
moral argument about Saddam’s brutish behavior toward the Iraqi people?
Does the timing of various justifications belie their validity?
The Iraq war, like the 1999 Kosovo campaign, was launched without a United
Nations Security Council resolution explicitly authorizing it. Some say this un-
hinged the international legal order, that all moral talk must be expunged from in-
tervention discourse to pave the way for a new legal
order, based solely on power and law.2 But the moral
dimension of the Iraq debate is far more pervasive
than these critics care to admit. In fact, it was integral to
the political and legal cases each nation made, whether
or not that nation supported the war. What is more, the
prominence of the moral dimension in policy is on the
rise, for better and for worse.
The transatlantic relationship is straining under
the disagreement about the authorization and justifi-
cation for the Iraq war, and those wishing to promote
Commander Fink is a member of the Naval War Col-
lege’s National Security Decision Making faculty. A
1986 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, she is a heli-
copter pilot and has served as detachment officer in
charge in Helicopter Combat Support Squadron 11
(HC-11), as well as on the staff of Commander in Chief,
Atlantic Fleet. Commander Fink has served as a White
House Fellow and has earned a master’s degree in na-
tional security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School
in Monterey, California, as well as a Ph.D. in interna-
tional relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Di-
plomacy, Tufts University.
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anti-American and anti-Western sentiment take advantage of the dispute. The
national motivations, indeed, were fundamentally mixed, and skeptics and sup-
porters alike see that as a problem. Yet motives in international politics are in-
variably mixed. Why then the rancor?
The reason is that there has been a shift in the normative landscape, a radical-
ization of moral, legal, and political arguments for and against war. What hap-
pened in the Iraq case cannot be fully explained by any one of these dimensions
alone.3 It is better to look at the way states authorize and justify the use of force,
satisfying domestic and international political requirements—how in this in-
stance Washington, London, Paris, and Bonn chose to justify their behavior
leading up to the Iraq war—using all three dimensions, and then test the accusa-
tions against them. By examining three contending imperatives within each
state’s thinking about intervention—imperatives of power, cooperation, and
human solidarity—it is possible to understand the decision each government
made.
Again, the truth about motives is not to be found in any one of these ways of
thinking—moral, legal, or political—but rather in the debate among them. This
approach denies us the ability to make satisfying judgments against one side or
the other in the Iraq debate. Yet a complete picture of what happened is not pos-
sible without it.
POWER, COOPERATION, AND MORAL SOLIDARITY
The “triptych” approach to understanding international behavior, and the same
set of three categories, by whatever names, have proven advantageous in the
past. Lecturing at the London School of Economics in the 1950s, Martin Wight
identified three traditions of international thought evident since the Renais-
sance: the Realists, Rationalists, and Revolutionists.4 Others have also found that
tracing the debate among the three traditions is essential to understanding the
most important questions of international politics. Hedley Bull called their re-
spective advocates Hobbesians, Grotians, and Kantians, and more recently Stewart
Patrick analyzed the way unilateral and multilateral means are used to achieve
nationalist, internationalist and collective objectives.5 Hereafter, we will call the
three traditions the “power,” “cooperative,” and “solidarity” approaches.
The power tradition sees the world as a system of states organized only by the
relative power they can wield. Force is the dominant mode of international in-
teraction, since no authority higher than the state exists to enforce national will,
laws, or norms. Its adherents take a positivist approach to international law, em-
phasizing what is rather than what ought to be. The power approach has both ag-
gressive and defensive forms. On the aggressive side, it is willing to impose
interests, or in some cases norms, through the use of force. Its more defensive
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variant favors the promotion of interest by noncoercive means, such as
multilateralism and international law.
The cooperative tradition, in contrast, sees an international society—more
than a system but not quite a state—underpinned by law and institutions, its
parts increasingly interdependent. From this perspective, international politics
are shaped less by international anarchy than by custom arising from habitual
interaction. Cooperation rather than conflict is the dominant mode of interna-
tional relations in this tradition. This approach recognizes the existence of inter-
national anarchy, on the one hand, but appreciates the value of universal norms
on the other. It seeks to reconcile the two by finding the “lesser evil” in policy de-
bates; it concerns itself with matters of law and justice, employs the just war doc-
trine, looks for the “law behind the law,” and seeks multilateral approaches to
diplomacy. There are realist and idealist variants of the cooperative approach; the
realist aspect tends to employ multilateral approaches for coercive purposes, while
its idealist counterpart sees multilateralism as a way of fostering shared norms.
The third tradition sees the world as one of moral solidarity—an interna-
tional community that should eventually become a state under a central author-
ity. This view sees the world as made up not so much of states or institutions as
of individuals and ideas in which domestic and international politics merge.
The moral solidarity view is only superficially about relations among states; it
focuses more on collective goals, such as human rights, the environment, labor
relations, and other matters it considers of importance to humankind. Inherent
in solidarism is mutual exclusivity of ideals, and adherents may promote their
ideal using evolutionary or revolutionary means. The evolutionary form focuses
on promoting universal ideals through noncoercive measures, while revolution-
ary adherents are willing to enforce their ideas, even by violent means.
Power-based thinking is attractive to states, which seek to protect and ad-
vance their own interests and security. Humanitarian intervention has chal-
lenged but has in turn been informed by this approach, producing such hybrids
as the “right to intervene” and the Bush administration’s doctrine of limited pre-
emption.6 Calculations of national interest remain central to the French and
German demand for multilateralism, just as they do to the American and British
war on terror. The persistence of the power approach is also partly explained by
the longevity of the “unipolar moment,” which brings about attempts to coun-
terweight the power of the United States as the sole remaining superpower.
The cooperative approach, nonetheless, has become increasingly embedded
in international politics since World War II. The number of international insti-
tutions has proliferated in recent years, growing by two-thirds from 1985 to
1999. Such regimes aspire to rein in national power and to harness the best of the
moral solidarity imperative by codifying its norms in law. The extensive resort
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to just war doctrine and the continued importance of seeking UN mandates,
such as in the Kosovo and Iraq episodes, are evidence of the persuasiveness of the
cooperative tradition.
An upswing of the solidarist thinking is evident in examining the Kosovo and
Iraq crises; the national decisions made in those cases cannot be explained
purely in terms of power calculations or the requirements of international law.
In the months before the Iraq campaign, the human solidarity imperative re-
mained even for states that did not focus on the humanitarian aspects of the
problem. States sought international legitimacy by casting in moral terms the
struggles between freedom and liberation and between multilateralism and
unilateralism.
Thus the rise of solidarist thinking, the institutionalization of cooperative
thought, and the persistence of power-based decision making will make the use
of force even more hotly debated in the future. In the Kosovo instance, decision
makers satisfied the demands of all three imperatives; where they do not, con-
sensus will be unlikely.
WHAT HAPPENED IN KOSOVO
In March 1999, NATO launched an aerial campaign over Serbia. Extensive diplo-
macy, including three Security Council resolutions and negotiations convened
under threat of coercion, had failed to resolve the crisis caused by “ethnic cleans-
ing” perpetrated against ethnic Albanians in the Serbian province of Kosovo.7 By
consulting all three traditions, each nation found a combination of political, le-
gal, and moral grounds that overcame resistance to the decision to intervene.
Germany and France initially demanded a UNSC mandate, insisting that
without it the action would be illegal under international law. They later re-
versed their positions, for different reasons. Germany was reacting to a tension
within the cooperativist tradition that pitted its post–World War II commit-
ment to international law and multilateralism against its strong wish to be a re-
sponsible, reliable international partner.8 The German position also revealed a
tension within solidarism: its left-leaning coalition government was torn be-
tween a tradition of pacifism and a desire to uphold human rights and humani-
tarianism. In the end, the commitments to reliable international partnership
and to humanitarian values overcame pacifism and insistence upon
multilateralism. The result was a watershed event:9 the German troops sent to
Kosovo were the first ordered to participate in offensive military operations in
fifty years—and the decision had been made without a UNSC mandate.10 The
German case, then, was essentially a tension between elements of the coopera-
tive and solidarist traditions, in which the moral component tipped the scales
toward intervention.
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France’s stance on authorization reflected a desire to bolster its position as a
veto-bearing member of the Security Council; it rested authority solely on the
authority of previous council resolutions.11 Yet it had to claim this legitimacy
without the resolution that it had previously insisted upon throughout the cri-
sis.12 This insistence reflected long-standing reservations about American domi-
nance of NATO and European security affairs, and France’s aspiration to a
leadership role on the continent.13 Throughout the crisis, French officials ex-
pressed concern about “a new American unilateralism.”14 To reverse his stance
on the UN mandate, President Jacques Chirac declared that “the humanitarian
situation constitutes a ground that can justify an exception to a rule, however
strong and firm it is.”15
France framed its arguments in just war terms—in particular, the fulfillment
of the principle of last resort and NATO’s just cause in the face of Milosevic’s
barbarous crimes and continued recalcitrance. The French justification was also
a moral one, not just because of humanitarian aims but in its sense of spreading
French values as universal norms, especially the “matter of human rights on our
continent.”16 The French approach was thus essentially a hybrid of power and
solidarist thinking, with multilateralism supporting both.
The British, for their part, claimed the existence of an “humanitarian excep-
tion” to the authority of the Security Council and cited previous resolutions as a
legal basis.17 The British justification represented a blend of strong cooperativist
and solidarist traditions. Prime Minister Tony Blair explained, “This is a just
war, based not on any territorial ambitions but on values. We cannot let the evil
of ethnic cleansing stand. . . . We have learned twice before in this century that
appeasement does not work. If we let an evil dictator range unchallenged, we
will have to spill infinitely more blood and treasure to stop him later.”18 Blair fur-
ther framed the crisis as a fight between the forces of order and “a disintegration
into chaos and disorder” in which “many regimes . . . are undemocratic and en-
gaged in barbarous acts.”19 Whereas the Germans saw tension between values
and interests, Britons accepted what Blair called a “subtle blend of mutual self
interest and moral purpose” in which “the spread of our values makes us safer.”20
The British approach was thus a harmony of cooperativist and solidarist
thinking.
The United States based its legal justification on previous Security Council
resolutions, the impending humanitarian emergency, and a threat to peace and
security in the region. In the debates within the U.S. government, justification
was framed in terms of the national interest. By the end of the 1990s, the admin-
istration believed it had exhausted congressional patience with requests for
troops where vital national interests were not at stake. In any case, interest-based
arguments resonated with the American people as well, as did emphasis on U.S.
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rather than UN authorization to act. The American case was thus essentially
power based, with moral claims and legal aspects adduced in support.
The three traditions, then, were clearly present in the decision making of each
of the four countries in 1999. All three dimensions had to be accommodated to
make consensus possible. The lesson of the Kosovo case is that diverging atti-
tudes can be reconciled if decision makers satisfy the demands of all three im-
peratives. It also points to an upswing in the power of the solidarist arguments,
which forcefully challenged both strictly power-based calculations of national
interest and cooperativist attachment to international law.
WHAT HAPPENED IN IRAQ
The Iraq case shows that the ethical dimension was influenced by two contend-
ing agendas for the future of international order. Even though the Americans
and British, on one side, and the French and Germans, on the other, differed on
justification and authorization, both viewed Iraq, as they had Kosovo, in the
context of a struggle between “civilization” and “barbarity.” Their visions of civ-
ilization, however, were sharply at variance. The American and British leaders
saw a struggle between human liberty and oppression, between democracy and
dictatorship; the French and Germans saw a contest between multilateralism and
unilateralism, between collective responsibility and superpower prerogative.21
Ethical determinations regarding authorization and justification were
shaped by these contending viewpoints, just as these lenses continue today to
color judgments on the decisions of early 2003. One such judgment is that im-
portant moral dimensions were not taken account of at the time; in particular,
there was insufficient frank discussion of the humanitarian costs of the alterna-
tives of war and of continued coercive diplomacy and containment.
The November 2002 vote on Security Council Resolution 1441 was viewed as a
referendum on war with Iraq. France insisted that its vote in favor of the resolution
was meant to “strengthen the role of the UN”;22 this insistence reflected France’s in-
terest in strengthening its own international position as a permanent member of the
Security Council. The United States and Britain saw UNSCR 1441 as fulfilling the
last-resort principle; France and Germany disagreed, countering that “the condi-
tions for using force against Iraq are not fulfilled.”23 The Germans insisted that “the
unity of the [UN Security] Council is of central importance” and, in light of that
imperative, argued for a continuation of containment, sanctions, and no-fly zones.24
Nonproliferation regimes had not, Berlin felt, been fully exploited; the Germans
held that “peaceful means have therefore not been exhausted,” that the Security
Council was “crucial to world order”in the future, and that war should be avoided.25
The German approach was thus cooperativist, but because it allowed no military
option at all, it was also solidarist, taking the form of an idealized multilateralism.
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President Chirac took a moral-exclusivist stance as well, on the necessary
source of authority for war. He maintained that the UN was “the only legitimate
framework for building peace, in Iraq and elsewhere” and that France would ad-
vance its principles through collective action.26 Other French officials, mean-
while, were arguing that adherence to international law was a moral obligation,
that only such law could legitimate the use of force, and that France must ad-
vance the idea of collective responsibility.27 At home, Jacques Chirac’s popular-
ity soared in proportion to the anti-American nature of his stance.28 Just as in
the Kosovo case, France’s position was thus a moralized power-based approach,
with the cooperative tradition in a supporting role.
The British, as they had in Kosovo, insisted upon a sound legal basis for inter-
vention in Iraq. The British attorney general declared that military action would
not violate international law, though other lawyers insisted on the opposite.29
The British people insisted on either proof of the existence of weapons of mass
destruction or issuance of a UN mandate.30 Politicians called for a separate Secu-
rity Council mandate for the reconstruction of Iraq, in order to avoid a postwar
occupation situation; the prime minister accordingly persuaded the Americans
to seek a second Security Council resolution for intervention. Yet the British
stance was as moral as it was legal. Echoing his approach in 1999, Blair couched
the threat as “disorder and chaos” that jeopardized other foreign policy aims
such as the alleviation of poverty, protection of the environment, and the pro-
motion of international health. The threat, he held, was embodied in states and
groups that “hate our way of life, our freedom, our democracy.”31 As in the
Kosovo case, the struggle was not with the people of the Iraqi nation but with
“barbarous rulers” who defied collective norms and laws.32 Thus the British ar-
gument, like the German position, was a combination of strong cooperative and
solidarity approaches.
The United States relied on previous Security Council resolutions to autho-
rize intervention—a cooperativist approach. This tradition was also apparent in
American just war arguments. Washington interpreted UNSCR 1441 and subse-
quent inspections as giving Saddam his last chance, beyond which lay force, the
last resort. Secretary Powell later recalled, “We gave diplomacy every chance. . . .
[W]e could wait no longer.”33 The power approach was also clearly evident in the
American case: “The United States of America has the sovereign authority to use
force in assuring its own national security.”34
Thus cooperative and power-based imperatives informed the way the United
States viewed authorization for war. However, the roles of both had their limits.
While legal advisers suggested that the American presence in Iraq was techni-
cally an occupation, the moral imperative of “liberation” was more important.
The president made Iraqi liberation the centerpiece of his 2003 Captive Nations
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Week address.35 Stating his case at the UN General Assembly before the war, the
president emphasized solidarity with the Iraqi people, who had, he said, “suf-
fered too long in silent captivity.” He explained, “Liberty for the Iraqi people is a
great moral cause, and a great strategic goal.”36 Finally, the whole approach was
couched as a great struggle for human liberty. The idea of liberation is central to
solidarist thinking.
In his well known June 2002 West Point graduation speech, the president
spoke of the American “commanders who [had] saved a civilization.”37 In his
speech at the war’s end, he likened the American posture to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
Four Freedoms, the Truman Doctrine, and Ronald Reagan’s “evil empire” doc-
trine.38 Clearly, Bush saw the state of the world as a struggle between the civilized
forces of democracy and human liberty, on one side, and the barbaric forces of
oppression on the other.39 The American position, like that of the French, was
thus a strongly solidarist version of the power-based approach. Like the German
and British, they had similar approaches but reached opposite conclusions on
intervention. Likewise the German and French reached the same conclusion
from different motives.
Decision makers did not reach agreement, as they had four years earlier, and
policy and diplomacy have suffered thereby. In particular, the Iraqi people and
the men and women of the coalition forces have lost the benefits that could have
accrued from increased international cooperation. But it is not too late.
A WAY AHEAD
The Kosovo crisis was a turning point for international politics, but was it a
death knell for the international legal order? Can states take steps to heal the
breach? The lesson of the collective Kosovo decision of the NATO nations was
that if the demands of three contending imperatives—the fundamental, under-
lying “mixed motives”—are met, diplomacy benefits and consensus emerges. In
2003, in contrast, decision makers on both sides of the intervention debate
showed disappointing unwillingness to recognize the lessons of the Kosovo
campaign, and in this sense Iraq was an opportunity lost. If the structural defi-
ciencies that exacerbate discord are addressed, however, cohesive policy is possi-
ble. Even before then, there are some practical steps that states can take.
Accept the Dilemma of Mixed Motives. Policy makers can resist temptations to
exploit seeming inconsistencies in policy to their political advantage. They can
instead ratchet down the rhetoric and accept, as Michael Walzer urges us, that
“the lives of foreigners don’t weigh that heavily in the scales of domestic decision
making. So we shall have to consider the moral significance of mixed motives.”40
In both the Kosovo and Iraq cases, there existed neither strictly realpolitik nor
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purely cooperative positions. Leaders can help publics recognize the dilemma of
diverging moral imperatives, just as they acknowledge contending interests and
varying, even conflicting, legal interpretations.
Make the Humanitarian and Human Rights Case. One of the casualties of the trend
toward polarization between the war on terror and the multilateral imperative
was the thorough discussion of humanitarian considerations. Justifications offered
before the Iraq intervention, and criticism of those justifications, did not bear out
the promise of what some human rights advocates had seen after the Kosovo in-
tervention as “the beginning of the new age of human rights enforcement.”41
The United States and Britain produced reports regarding Saddam Hussein’s
abuses but did not refer to them extensively. Human rights and humanitarian
officials were surprisingly absent from the debates.42 The French/German side
argued for disarmament rather than regime change, whereas the American/
British coalition called for the use of force. The human rights/humanitarian ar-
gument for the removal of Saddam Hussein but against the use of force was not
fully heard, and this was a missed opportunity. First, the suffering of the Iraqi
people, concealed for years by limited access, could have been more fully ex-
posed. Second, such arguments would have resonated with publics and citizens,
who deserved but did not see an open and careful weighing of the human costs
and benefits of either containment or military intervention.43 Finally, such an
argument, forcefully made, would have increased pressure on regional regimes
to censure Saddam Hussein.
Establish Criteria for Just War Decision Making. Just war criteria reemerged in
the 1990s as a framework for moral arguments about the use of force. In 2003, it
at least made the language of proper authority, just cause, and right intention
central in public pronouncements. In part, the ethic was popular with govern-
ments because it gave them general and persuasive norms to which to appeal,
rather than specific and possibly binding laws. That such words resonate with
publics, however, is no doubt the main reason leaders use them. Decision makers
should establish criteria applying just war principles to various situations such
as rogue states possessing WMD, reducing the temptation to wield just war doc-
trine solely as a political tool and thus enhancing its usefulness in general.
UNIVERSAL VALUES: MORAL TALK IS STATE PRACTICE
The moral dimension played an important role in the political and legal debates
about authorization and justification of intervention in Kosovo and Iraq. The
moral element was not merely “tacked on” or secondary; rather, it informed le-
gal and political considerations, overcoming objections to the use of force in
Kosovo and causing a standoff among NATO allies with regard to Iraq.
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The lesson is that of the three imperatives that influence international behav-
ior, the solidarist approach will be increasingly important in the decades ahead
but that laws and institutions have not caught up to the social reality. This is
nothing new. In the nineteenth century, the dominance of the power tradition
stimulated bilateral international relations and brought an institutionalized bal-
ance of power. In the twentieth century, the cooperative approach prevailed in
the aftermath of two world wars, and multilateralism and international institu-
tions proliferated. Entering the twenty-first century, the solidarist imperative is
on the rise, fostered by transnational movements, the democratization of infor-
mation technology, and other trends.44 Current political and legal structures are
inadequate to address this increasingly collective consciousness, on one hand,
and increasing transborder threats, state failure, and poverty on the other. The
legitimacy of unilateralism and multilateralism is no longer the issue; the need is
for a three-tiered diplomacy that integrates—by addressing simultaneously—
the persistence of power, the embedded nature of cooperation, and the
reemergence of the solidarist imperative.45
A way to begin is to identify and bolster the elements of the old order that na-
tions hold most dearly and in common. Norms of humanitarian intervention,
protection, and prevention of WMD proliferation have all been proposed as ripe
for codification, but states continue to resist engaging the matter.46 A decade af-
ter the Rwanda genocide, decision makers have yet to develop criteria for re-
sponding to such crises. In his address to the UN on 23 September 2003, Kofi
Annan lamented that the international community was “hesitant and tardy” in
engaging in “serious discussions of the best way to respond to threats of geno-
cide or other comparable massive violations of human rights.”47 With that task
still undone, leaders must now agree upon criteria for countering imminent
threats of rogue states and terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction.
Codification and criteria development will be a difficult process, but one well
worth the diplomatic toil.48
That said, nations should give existing universal values a chance. Western in-
tellectuals are often the quickest to question the universality of norms, such as
those in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They can do so only by ig-
noring the fact that the declaration had international authorship and offers in-
ternational benefits.49 Likewise, critics may continue to argue that the trend
away from United Nations mandates means that all talk of right and wrong
should be expunged from the law and replaced by state practice. The Kosovo and
Iraq decisions, however, show that moral talk is state practice. The reason is that,
despite significant legal and political disagreements surrounding authorization
and justification for forcible intervention, fundamental freedoms, to those who
do not yet possess them, remain more than rhetorical.
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JUS POST BELLUM
The Moral Responsibilities of Victors in War
Rear Admiral Louis V. Iasiello, Chaplain Corps, U.S. Navy
The dogmas of the past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occa-
sion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise to the occasion.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN
Coalition nations enjoyed swift and decisive military victories in OperationsDESERT STORM, ENDURING FREEDOM, and most recently, IRAQI FREEDOM.1
At first look, these decisive military victories should prove that in regard to
America’s application of military force, it is no longer a question of if its military
will win its major battles but of when and how:
The outcome of war used to be the overriding question. Nowadays, when it is West
vs. non-West, the vast disparity in economics, technology, materiel, training and or-
ganization virtually assures a Western victory. This assumed, the attention focuses on
very different matters, such as the duration of hostilities and the number of casualties.2
Unfortunately, the post-battle experiences of these same operations illustrate
the difficulty of achieving post bellum objectives and, in particular, the ultimate
goal of all just conflicts—the establishment of a just and lasting peace.
Two years have passed since the collapse of the re-
pressive Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Despite the
swift and decisive battlefield victories of Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM, some critics point to the fact
that less than half the country is under the firm con-
trol of the newly established Kabul government.3 In
Iraq, despite the swift defeat of the army, the subse-
quent collapse of the tyrannical government, and the
capture or death of many key military and political
leaders, many Iraqis still live in fear and do not enjoy
what coalition officials anticipated, the exhilaration
of liberation. Why has the post bellum phase of these
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conflicts proved such a challenge to the victors of battle? Perhaps the reason is, in
part, a failure to update and revise the just war theory, a theory that has survived
for millennia because it is “an historically conditioned theory,” one in a state of
perpetual transition.4 It is a theory that has been continually adapted to reflect
changes in civilizations, cultures, religions, politics, and even military strategy.
This article examines a relatively undeveloped aspect of just war theory, jus
post bellum, or the post-battle considerations of war. In an era when military vic-
tories on the battlefield are virtually assured for the United States and its allies,
we must recognize the critical nature of post bellum operations and devote more
attention to the development of a theory that will drive operational concerns in
the post-conflict stages of occupation, stabilization, restoration, and other as-
pects of nation building. Thorough planning for this sometimes neglected as-
pect of war may ultimately save thousands of combatant and noncombatant
lives, and quite possibly billions of dollars. The lessons of recent U.S. operations
and today’s geopolitical realities demand nothing less. Let us proceed to a review
of the traditional understanding of the theory of just war.
THE TRADITIONAL CATEGORIES OF JUST WAR THEORY
We want no war of conquest. War should never be entered upon until
every agency of peace has failed.
WILLIAM MCKINLEY
Humanity has long pondered the morality of war and the ethical conduct of
combatants in war. Moral persons who hold to the ethical and religious princi-
ple that killing is wrong view the unjustified taking of another human life as
murder. While most cultures hold to the principle that the taking of human life
is indeed wrong, the question must be asked whether any killing is ever justified.
Are there situations or conditions in which killing is required as a moral obliga-
tion? If killing is ever justifiable, what moral limits must be placed on it to ensure
that it remains justified throughout the conflict? Civilized persons, recognizing
the tragic nature of war and the various dicta prohibiting killing, question not
only whether war is just but also whether it is avoidable:
The standard poles of morality—good and evil—seem inadequate when we talk
about war, or perhaps too adequate: they are words that leap to mind, but they ob-
scure more than they illuminate about what actually happens in war. These words are
too certain; they allow too little room for the moral compromise at the very heart of
war—the brutal acts for the sake, one hopes, of a good outcome. And so, for the past
two thousand years at least, the Western vocabulary for the moral nature of war has
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revolved around the idea not of the “good” war but of the “just” war, a notion that
suggests reluctant duty to do battle and hints at the tactical advantages of having God
on one’s side.5
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Since ancient times, philosophers, theologians, statesmen, lawyers, and war-
riors have debated the nature of warfare and have struggled to define the ethical
boundaries of the justified use of force in conflict scenarios (jus ad bellum) as
well as the appropriate, just, humane, or legal parameters of ethical behavior in
war (jus in bello). This critical body of work is reflected in the sacred writings of
the world’s major religions, in the laws of ancient civilizations, in ecclesiastical
pronouncements, international law, and the treaties, agreements, and charters
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of organizations and conventions regulating the conduct of nations. It is also
found in the body of ethical reflection called the “just war tradition.”
Some of the morally defensible and historically accepted criteria or principles
for declaring war (a matter of jus ad bellum) include: just cause, right intention,
just authority, potentiality (potential for success), proportionality, last resort,
and, for some just war theorists, a formal declaration of war. Just wars are not
justified merely by utilitarian criteria; they are justified by their means and by
principles and virtues as well. The criteria presented by theorists are not to be
used as some sort of just war checkoff list or moral calculus, and they are not to
be viewed as justifications to wage war.
The second category of just war, jus in bello, addresses itself specifically to the
moral conduct of those who prosecute war. While the criteria applied to jus in bello
are not as numerous as those of jus ad bellum, they are just as vital to the attainment
of the ultimate goal of any just war (bellum justum)—the establishment of a just
peace. The major criteria of jus in bello include proportionality, discrimination, and
a continued focus on right intention. In the words of one military theorist, “The
centerpiece of military ethics should be the moral application of military force.”6
Taken together, the categories of jus ad bellum and jus in bello define what is tradi-
tionally considered the theory of just war. It is a theory that transcends creed, cul-
ture, and politics, an ever-evolving philosophy historically adapted and revised to
reflect the ever-changing geopolitical realities faced by those who apply its princi-
ples. Current events in Afghanistan and Iraq pose a new and challenging set of such
realities. Therefore, we must ask the question: Has the time come to expand the the-
ory of just war and to develop a third category—the post bellum dimension of war?
JUS POST BELLUM—AND THE EVOLUTION OF A THEORY
If one assumes for the moment—as [many] do—that the rubrics of the
just war theory are morally tenable, . . . then post-war behavior must
also come under moral scrutiny. If [we] are called upon to probe the
moral propriety of entering and conducting war by using the seven jus
ad bellum principles (which concern justification for using force) and
the two jus in bello principles (which apply to conduct in war), should
they not also be called upon to monitor the moral propriety of conduct-
ing a war through some set of jus post bellum principles?
MICHAEL J. SCHUCK
The global wars of the twentieth century illustrate the criticality of war-termination
policy and of operational planning for the post bellum stage of war. Consider the
apparent absence of a war-termination vision for the belligerents of the twenti-
eth century’s first global war:
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The definition of war aims proved divisive among and within nations. The French
demands were deceptively reasonable: they wanted the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine
that only a defeated Germany would yield; the English vowed to destroy Prussian
militarism and terminate the German threat to the European balance of power. Co-
lonial gains would be incidental rewards. Germany harbored the most ambitious war
aims—aims that would have, in fact, established her as the hegemonial power in Eu-
rope, hence, a world power in England’s place.7
Almost eleven million people died in the first global war, and at least twice as
many were wounded or injured. Although the war affected the hearts, minds,
and politics of most survivors, little was done to foster personal, familial, soci-
etal, or national healing or the rebuilding of defeated societies.
The Treaty of Versailles, signed on 28 June 1919, ended World War I. It di-
rected Germany to give up some of its most valuable territories, place the
Rhineland under an allied protectorate for fifteen years, and bear both occupa-
tion costs and painful postwar reparations. These agreements were to be moni-
tored under the presumably enlightened oversight of the newly created League
of Nations. This absence of postwar vision negated, for all practical purposes,
any hope of a just and lasting peace. Some would blame Europe’s subsequent
economic chaos and wounded nationalism, the birth of totalitarianism, and ul-
timately World War II itself on this lack of war-termination vision.
Both major categories of just war, jus ad bellum and jus in bello, include right
intention among their criteria. Within the context of going to war, right inten-
tion refers to the justice of the war itself (jus ad bellum). For example, Augustine
wrote that wars fought with the intention of achieving or restoring justice, or
otherwise doing good, produced good for both neighbor and enemy alike. In
this sense, right intention directs that war be waged with the intention of estab-
lishing good order (a just and lasting peace) or of correcting an unjust one. For
Augustine, right intention also meant the love of both neighbor and enemy
alike, and that war never be waged for reasons of hatred, anger, or revenge. Just
wars, then, are not waged to promote tyranny, oppression, or domination, or
conducted for a nation-state’s economic or political gain: “True religion looks
upon as peaceful those wars that are waged not for motives of aggrandizement,
or cruelty, but with the object of securing peace, of punishing evil-doers, and of
uplifting the good.”8
Throughout the centuries, other conditions or intentions have been used to
justify war. For example, wars have been waged to stop or punish aggressors or to
reestablish civil order. Offensive operations have been justified as preemptions
of anticipated unjust uses of force and as interventions to stop genocide or other
grave injustices. It has been argued that these are just intentions and that just
war theory should accommodate the concept of just intervention and, quite
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possibly, just preemption. Professor J. Bryan Hehir has suggested that today’s
political climate demands we move from a presumption against the use of force
to a presumption for justice, and he cites injustices in Rwanda, Somalia, and
Bosnia as examples of why the presumptions must change.9 Certainly these in-
terventions appear to have been motivated by concern for the welfare of others
and therefore have been in the spirit of right, or just, intention.
When applied to the second major category of just war, jus in bello, right in-
tention relates to just behavior in war—the tactical, operational, and strategic
decisions made for and by combatants. Commanders must continually weigh
the principles of discrimination and proportionality against the demands of
military necessity. In 1863 Francis Lieber defined military necessity as “those
measures . . . indispensable to securing the ends or goals of war.”10 Military ne-
cessity, then, refers to actions that must be taken if military objectives are to be
achieved; jus in bello demands these goals be achieved with minimal loss of life
and resources. Decisions made by operational commanders directly impact the
lives of their troops, the lives of the enemy and of noncombatants in the theater
of war; these decisions and the behavior of belligerents will ultimately enhance
or lessen the likelihood of a just peace. In the United States, combat personnel
receive, at a minimum, limited training in the principles of just warfare, the just
war tradition, and military standards of conduct and core values, and before
combat they are familiarized with rules of engagement for that specific opera-
tion. This type of ethical orientation will ordinarily enable warriors to remain
morally focused and righteous in their intentions, even in the fog of war and un-
der the psychological pressures of combat.
From war’s inception (jus ad bellum) and throughout its prosecution (jus in
bello), the goal of all should be the establishment of a just and lasting peace.
Therefore, the long-term consequences of even a justified use of force require
that just intention extend into the post bellum stage, thus demanding our consid-
eration of a third category of just war theory (jus post bellum).
As recent events in Afghanistan and Iraq attest, nations must fight wars with a
war-termination vision and plan carefully for the post-conflict phase. Doing so,
or failing to do so, may make or break efforts to restore order, heal hostilities,
and rebuild societies. Nations must recognize the sensitive nature of postwar
operations and train their troops to participate in these operations—including
facilitating, when appropriate, an honorable surrender, rebuilding infrastruc-
ture, reestablishing societal institutions, restoring the environment, providing
for post bellum justice and the rule of law, and building a spirit of reconciliation
and cooperation with former enemies.
Post bellum activities should be guided by both legal and moral precepts.
There are two primary sources that address the legal conduct and activities of a
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victorious armed force in the postwar phase of occupation: the Fourth Geneva
Convention of 1949 (concerning the protection of civilian persons in time of
war, articles 47–79), and the Hague Convention IV of 1907 (respecting the laws
and customs of war on land, articles 42–56). Are there also moral precepts to
guide the post bellum activities of victors, and if there are, what principles or po-
tential criteria should set the moral parameters of behavior in the post-combat
phase of war? Seven come to mind: a healing mind-set, just restoration, safe-
guards for the innocent, respect for the environment, post bellum justice, the
transition of warriors, and the study of the lessons of war. Let us use these poten-
tial criteria as departure points for our discussion of jus post bellum.
A HEALING MIND-SET
Defeat carries with it a trauma that is experienced on many levels: personal, fa-
milial, communal, societal, and national, even international. However justifi-
able a war might be, however many other avenues of statecraft were tried and
failed, any use of deadly force will ultimately result in the death of both guilty
and innocent alike, and the destruction of property. It would be constructive if
both the victors and the defeated entered this post-conflict phase in a spirit of
regret, conciliation, humility, and possibly contrition. Such a mind-set may fur-
ther the healing of a nation’s trauma and thus enhance efforts to seal a just peace.
The post bellum period usually begins with a cease-fire, armistice, or surren-
der; if the terms and circumstances are just, they may help a former enemy move
beyond the devastation of the present to eventual healing and success post
bellum. We have just such an example in American history, the surrender of
General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia in the waning weeks of the
Civil War. General Ulysses S. Grant, commander of the Union armies, offered
Lee an instrument of surrender reflecting a spirit of conciliation and regret.
General Lee remarked that the terms of the surrender would go far toward heal-
ing both the defeated and the victors.11 At the direction of General Grant, Union
troops extended to the defeated Confederate soldiers every military courtesy
and respect. Grant reminded the victorious troops, “Gentlemen, the war is over;
the rebels are our countrymen again.”12 In the final proceedings at Appomattox
Court House, officers on both sides of the conflict displayed a poise, insight, and
grace that became legendary:
On 12 April [1865] came the formal laying down of arms. Two Union brigades were
drawn up on each side of the road near Appomattox Court House. At the right of the
line, mounted, was Major General Joshua L. Chamberlain, former colonel of the 20th
Maine, chosen by Grant for this honorable post since he had fought nobly in the last
campaign. At the head of the tattered, mud-caked Confederate column rode General
[John B.] Gordon, one of Jackson’s old captains. . . . As the column approached the
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Union lines, a bugle spoke; General Chamberlain had given the order “Carry
Arms”—the marching salute. General Gordon raised his downcast eyes when he
heard the familiar snap and rattle of the muskets, gave Chamberlain the cavalryman’s
sword salute, and passed the word to his own men, “Carry Arms!” In complete, awed
silence the Confederate column passed at the salute; then, in perfect order, the men
stacked arms and cartridge boxes and laid down their flags. At that final symbol of
defeat, many broke ranks and, sobbing, pressed the beloved colors to their lips. Gen-
eral Gordon, with moist eyes, addressed the men from horseback, urging them to de-
part in peace, to obey the laws and work for the future of a reunited nation.13
Grant and his officers understood the significance of an honorable surrender
and, therefore, the moral responsibilities of victors in the first phase of a post
bellum environment. Grant’s enlightened leadership inspired Federal soldiers to
conduct themselves toward their defeated countrymen with respect and humil-
ity. Powerful gestures such as allowing Robert E. Lee to retain possession of his
sword and horse translated into healing in the midst of a powerful defeat.
More than two thousand years ago, Plato urged Greeks not to construct mon-
uments to honor the victors of war. In doing so he displayed extraordinary in-
sight into the post bellum psyche. He apparently understood the dynamics of a
constructive post bellum environment, fearing that such public observances
might fuel hard feelings and thus impede the healing progress. Perhaps celebra-
tions meant to convey the profound thanks of a grateful nation to its troops
might translate into the unintended consequence of prolonging hostilities or
fueling insurgencies. Plato further recommended that enemies “[fight] as those
who intend someday to be reconciled.” He offered specific examples of what not
to do if a just and lasting peace is the final objective:
They will not devastate Hellas, nor will they burn houses, [nor] suppose that the
whole population of a city—men, women, and children—are equally their enemies,
for they know that the guilt of war is always confined to a few persons and that the
many are their friends. And for all these reasons they will be unwilling to waste their
lands and raze their houses; their enmity to them will only last until the many inno-
cent sufferers have compelled the guilty few to give satisfaction.14
The fact that this guidance was offered for Greeks fighting Greeks should in no
way diminish the force of his argument.
Victorious soldiers sometimes return from combat with mixed emotions,
and oftentimes with a spirit of regret and sadness, and rarely do they leave with a
high level of job satisfaction. Few feel that they may now return to life as usual.
Warriors can carry the weight of combat on their shoulders for months, years, or
even for life. Mind-sets reflecting humility, regret, and perhaps contrition ac-
knowledge this ambivalence and may actually ease a warrior’s transition to
peacetime existence.
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American military personnel are well prepared to fight wars and fulfill their
responsibilities as warriors, but perhaps less so for their potential involvement
in the highly sensitive and specialized post bellum environment. Operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq illustrate that it is not sufficient to train only specialized
units (military police or civil affairs teams) for their critical role in the post
bellum. All warriors should be trained for these post bellum operations.
JUST RESTORATION
Our goal is nothing less than the transformation of Iraq into a func-
tioning, stable state that poses no threat to its own citizens or its neigh-
bors and serves the interests of the Iraqi people.
DAVID MORRIS
War often leads to the dissolution of established governments and civil order,
and the destruction of critical elements of a society’s infrastructure, and this dis-
solution or destruction may result in the post bellum suffering or death of many
in the defeated society. Victors have a moral obligation to ensure the security
and stabilization of a defeated nation. Whenever practical and possible, they
must provide the essentials of life (food, clothing, shelter, medicine, etc.) to
those without them and repair or rebuild infrastructure essential to a vulnerable
population’s health and welfare. Let us describe these rebuilding initiatives as
just restoration.
Although every post bellum scenario presents its own unique operational
challenges and every defeated society its own indigenous needs, it may be help-
ful to consider a model for just restoration that reflects factors common to most
post bellum scenarios. While each post bellum operation must be crafted to ad-
dress the specific challenges generated by a particular conflict, most scenarios
appear to progress through three general, yet interrelated, stages: protectorship,
partnership, and ownership.
Phase One: Protectorship
The first phase of a just restoration is marked by a victor’s efforts to provide im-
mediate security for both the occupying forces and the defeated society. In this
post bellum phase victors ordinarily establish a condition resembling a historical
protectorship. Great care must be taken to provide both security and life support
to all, and special attention must be afforded a society’s most vulnerable groups:
children, the elderly, women, displaced persons, and the infirm. Many of these at-
risk groups will be totally dependent on others for food, water, medicine, shelter,
and, of course, their security. Once an acceptable level of security is provided,
distribution points should be established to dispense relief supplies and register
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refugees. The occupying force should also guard against mob violence and acts
of retribution, and protect even the most notorious of suspected criminals. Pub-
lic utilities critical to the sustenance of life may need repair or reconstruction,
and attention must be given to identifying, neutralizing, and removing unex-
ploded ordnance, mines, chemicals, and other materiel that may threaten the
lives of innocents.
While victors retain primary responsibility for the planning and execution of
this protectorship stage, a conscientious effort must be made to include mem-
bers of the defeated society in the process. This involvement might accelerate the
healing process and instill a sense of trust and confidence at this critical stage of
occupation.
Phase Two: Partnership
A just conflict should result in material and social prosperity for all the
people in a region and, most importantly, it should lead to proper sys-
tems of government by consent. These should not be imposed from out-
side, but should take account of a people’s tradition and culture.
NAZIR-ALI
In the second phase of restoration, all sides work together to rebuild the defeated
society. By the time the transition to Phase Two takes place, occupying forces
should have established meaningful relationships and, as a result, should enjoy
some meaningful degree of trust and goodwill among the local peoples. Occu-
piers should take care to identify credible partners in this post bellum phase,
partners with the expertise, experience, and credibility necessary to contribute
to the process. Both sides should take great care not to compromise partners and
all must avoid all semblance of collaboration.
Phase Two recognizes that the military and its civilian partners must build
and share a common vision for the reconstruction of the nation and work to-
gether to prosecute an execution plan approved by all. All sides must cooperate
to distribute quality-of-life essentials to those with the greatest needs and work
together to repair or rebuild public utilities or other such facilities destroyed by
war. They must work to provide critical services such as basic police and fire pro-
tection and other emergency services. As schools, civic centers, and places of
worship are repaired, reconstructed, and reopened, the once-traumatized soci-
ety gains a sense of normality. Farmers will need assistance as they plant and
harvest crops or prepare livestock for market. The partners now move to begin
the more daunting tasks of restoration: rebuilding the economy, establishing a
credible judicial system, and reestablishing transportation and communications
systems to reconnect and reunite the country.
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All these efforts will ideally result in a sense of prewar normalcy; it will also
reassure those occupied that the military presence is indeed temporary and will
continue only as long as absolutely necessary. Everyone should anticipate some
level of tension at this phase, and tensions should be identified and dealt with
before they escalate into crises and subsequent violence. Throughout this period
of post bellum activity, military commanders must walk a fine line as they con-
tinue to balance the demands of force protection against the necessity of creative
engagement and humanitarian outreach to their former enemies.
Attention turns now to the daunting challenge of establishing an interim po-
litical authority, one with sufficient skill and credibility to enhance stability, pro-
vide national direction and vision, and give voice to members of the society.
When these goals are achieved, the occupied society will perceive that it now
plays a substantial role in its own reconstruction and destiny as it moves to the
third and final phase of occupation.
Phase Three: Ownership
“Government for and by the people,” it has been said, “is a central re-
quirement to jus post bellum.”
MICHAEL WALZER
The national security advisor, Dr. Condoleezza Rice, has recognized the ultimate
goal of any post bellum occupation: “Let me state that the goal of everyone, the
coalition and the international community, should be to return sovereignty to
the Iraqi people as soon as possible.”15 Phase Three marks the final stage in the
just restoration of a nation—the return of its sovereignty and reentry into the
community of nations. In this period, all aspects of political, economic, and so-
cial life are returned to the control of the indigenous population. Interim politi-
cal authorities are eventually replaced by elected officials, and these political
figures assume full responsibility for security, critical infrastructure, and nation
building. Just restoration is complete when full sovereignty is returned to a once-
defeated people and former enemies become allies.
SAFEGUARDING THE INNOCENT
The percentage of noncombatants affected by warfare has risen since the eigh-
teenth century, and the number of noncombatant casualties rose significantly
throughout the last century’s wars. Some analysts claim that by the end of that
bloody century a frightening proportion (70–90 percent) of all the victims of
war were noncombatants. Of particular note is war’s impact on children: “Al-
though they do not start the wars, children experience the negative conse-
quences of conflict as their lives are disrupted, shattered, or lost.”16
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Children in war zones suffer the direct and indirect consequences of conflict;
they lose family, friends, life-support mechanisms, and a sense of normality.
Young lives are at least temporarily, if not permanently, disrupted as war takes its
physical and emotional toll on these innocents. The victors in war should focus
special attention on children in the post bellum phase of war. Of equal impor-
tance is the direction of post bellum care to other at-risk groups and those who
cannot easily care for themselves, most notably the sick, the elderly, and some
groups of women.
Armed conflict sometimes leads to the displacement of peoples and the cre-
ation of waves of human refugees. When persons are forced to flee homes, vil-
lages, or country, these individuals become especially vulnerable. Children and
women become targets for rape, sexual exploitation, prostitution, slavery, and,
quite possibly, forced conscription into guerrilla groups, terrorist organizations,
insurgent militias, or regular armies. At times, children and elderly refugees are
denied life-sustaining resources like food, water, clothing, medicine, and shelter;
as a result, many die in disproportionate numbers. Basic resources become even
scarcer if, in post bellum times, more influential or powerful segments of a soci-
ety appropriate these items for themselves.
Children and other noncombatants are also vulnerable to the unintended ef-
fects of military technology, proving wars kill even after the fighting ends. For
example, some munitions contain depleted uranium, and while these rounds
prove extremely effective in piercing armored vehicles, critics claim they remain
hazardous to humans long after the battle ends. According to some scientists,
residue from these depleted uranium rounds ultimately releases uranium oxide
into the air; this poisonous by-product may cause stillbirths, childhood diseases,
cancers, birth defects, and other such conditions.
Armies have long used toxic chemical agents to provide for their security or to
clear foliage in order to conduct operations. These defoliating agents, although
effective in the short term, may degrade the health of all who come in contact
with them and may ultimately render local ecosystems unusable for years. It is
therefore imperative that those exposed to the dangers of these agents receive
special care and attention in the post bellum stage of any war.
RESPECT FOR THE ENVIRONMENT
While some progress has been made in protecting the environment in war, the
issue still begs our attention in post bellum planning. All sides in a conflict
should assume responsibility for the protection of the environment in war, and
they should be held accountable for both the treatment of the environment dur-
ing hostilities and the subsequent restoration of the environment after the fight-
ing has ended.
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The jus in bello criterion of discrimination directs that warriors discriminate
combatants from noncombatants, and that they make a conscious effort to min-
imize the impact of war on these innocents. For example, noncombatants may
never be directly targeted in any combat operation. Most Western combatants
understand that it is their military duty and moral responsibility to respect the
rights of noncombatants and to shield them, whenever and wherever possible,
from the effects of war. Many would willingly put their own lives in danger to
uphold this principle. Unfortunately, the principle is rarely applied to the envi-
ronment. Sonja Boelaert-Suominen has written that there is no commonly ac-
cepted definition of the concept of environment in international law.17 The
environment, therefore, is largely unprotected and highly vulnerable, quite of-
ten both a target and a victim of war. This undefined status may be indicative of
the fact that the environment still needs to be sheltered, whenever and wherever
possible, from the impact of war.
More than two millennia ago, Rome fought a series of its longest and bloodi-
est wars against the Carthaginians in the Punic Wars (264–41, 218–202, and
149–46 BC). At the conclusion of the last Punic war, Romans conquered and
then destroyed the city of Carthage itself. Its men were killed, women and chil-
dren were sold as slaves, and salt was sown into its fertile farmlands. Historians
believe that it took the land more than a century to recover from this wanton act
of ecological destruction.
Historical incidents of environmental destruction are not restricted to the
scorched-earth tactics of the wars of antiquity. In the last century, defoliating
agents were used extensively in the Pacific campaigns of World War II, and
Agent Orange was the defoliant of choice in Vietnam. While these agents may
have served tactical needs and saved friendly lives in the short run, in the long
run they have been blamed for catastrophic environmental damage, and for im-
pairing the health and quality of life of both combatants and noncombatants for
generations to come.
More recently, the oil-well fires of the Gulf wars, the targeting of biological/
chemical weapons stockpiles, and the sicknesses reputedly associated with
uranium-tipped munitions all highlight the vulnerable state of the environ-
ment in war. People rely upon the environment from a personal, agricultural,
industrial, and even recreational perspective. Further, the environment has a di-
rect relationship to personal well-being and, for some, it represents a critical
component of their personal or corporate spirituality. The environment is there-
fore tied to the totality of the person’s spiritual, mental, and physical health.
In early 2002 the government of Afghanistan and a special United Nations
commission studied the impact of decades of continuous war on the Afghan
people, their national resources, and their environment. The UN Environmental
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Program reported that Afghanistan’s ecological damage resulting from war was
so extensive its restoration would likely not be completed for generations to
come.
All sides in a war have a responsibility to protect the environment whenever
and wherever possible. Naval doctrine addresses this issue prescriptively:
The commander has . . . an obligation to avoid unnecessary damage to the environ-
ment to the extent that it is practicable to do so consistent with mission accomplish-
ment. To that end, and so far as military requirements permit, methods or means of
warfare should be employed with due regard to the protection and preservation of
the natural environment. Destruction of the natural environment not necessitated by
mission accomplishment and carried out wantonly is prohibited.18
Naval commanders appear to have significant latitude in regard to decisions
impacting the environment. Therefore, careful consideration must be given to
the morality of using the environment as a means of waging war. For example, is
it moral to destroy dams to flood an area, to defoliate a jungle to target fighters,
or to target nuclear power plants in order to achieve military objectives? These
are all questions that warrant future discussion.
While all must applaud the Navy’s initiative to include an environmental clause
in the Commander’s Handbook, the discretion given to commanders in regard to
the destruction of the environment is still broad in scope, and the publication
never addresses post bellum responsibilities.
Belligerents should be held accountable for the destruction or adverse treat-
ment of the environment both during and after the conflict, and both the victors
and the defeated should share the responsibility of restoring the battlefield to its
pre-battle condition and then of making the environment safe for human habi-
tation as soon as possible in the post bellum stage.
POST BELLUM JUSTICE
If reconciliation is an essential of post bellum healing and the establishment of a
just peace, is it better to offer alleged criminals amnesty or immunity from pros-
ecution or to try them in tribunals or courts of law?
The prosecution of suspected war criminals and political regimes should be
treated as a critical dimension of any successful post bellum dynamic to further
post bellum healing.19 Why? If just war is prosecuted for the sake of justice—that
is, it is waged to do justice and right the wrongs done by one group to another—
it follows that justice must be done at every level.20
Individuals accused of alleged crimes must be held accountable for their ac-
tions in the post-conflict stage of war. One author has suggested that the
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nonprosecution of crimes is tantamount to condoning evil and has likened it to
ignoring a dangerous cancer or infection.21 Holding people accountable for their
behavior in war facilitates the reconciliation process:
The establishment of lasting peace is better served by the doing of justice in the wake
of war. . . . If the morally weak, the preferentially wicked, the cynically self-styled
brute are responsible for the harm caused by their part in planning, directing, carry-
ing out, advocating, or tolerating crimes against humanity, war crimes, and atroci-
ties, then it follows by moral reasoning that they may be held criminally liable for
punishment for the infliction of that harm.22
Should the prosecution of such justice be left to the victors, or handled by an
international organization like the World Court? Some believe that the more in-
ternational in nature the orchestration, administration, and prosecution of jus-
tice, the more the potential for real justice and not a victor’s justice, and the more
probable the acceptance of the tribunal’s judgments by both the defeated nation
and the world community at large. Keeping the mechanism of enforcement and
regulation of post bellum justice in the hands of the victors may ultimately com-
promise the success of any efforts at post bellum justice.
Let me suggest two broad principles to guide jus post bellum justice. First, jus-
tice is rarely served by ignoring injustice; in fact, such neglect may compromise
any potential to establish a just and lasting peace. Second, the prosecution of
post-conflict justice is, in most cases, better left to an international group or or-
ganization, not the victors themselves. This latter principle may also apply to the
detainment or imprisonment of suspected war criminals.
WARRIOR TRANSITION
People fight wars in the name of nations. The uniform appearance of
uniformed soldiers metaphorically displays the truth. It is not qua hu-
man being, thinker, rational agent, or sentient creature that a soldier
kills an enemy soldier. Rather, soldiers kill soldiers in the same way in
which they deactivate enemy mines and destroy storage and weapons
facilities. . . . Soldiers act as weapons against enemy soldiers, who are
also acting as weapons. Soldiers qua soldiers are the tools of the leaders
of nations.
LAURIE CALHOUN
Contrary to Calhoun’s depiction, combatants are not amoral agents or ma-
chines, nor are they mere weapons to be placed in combat against the enemy’s
weapons of war.23 Warriors are persons—they are body-mind-spirit. They are
complex moral agents who must live and fight within the context of military
protocol and duty; warriors are rarely the unthinking weapons or tools of
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nation-states. Combatants must operate under orders, but an important dimen-
sion of their professional duty is to study and weigh the legality of those orders
against the rules or laws of war and then formulate the proper responses, proce-
dures, or tactics for fulfilling or challenging those orders.
Combatants are human beings who operate with reason and usually with
moral direction, people who are rarely so focused or intent on completing the
mission (military necessity) that they factor out human emotions like empathy
and sympathy, even in sometimes brutal conditions of combat. While warriors
submit to the authority of their superiors, they never submit so completely that
they surrender or forfeit their moral personhood, legal responsibilities, or per-
sonal sense of honor. In fact, the character and motivation of the combatant
often factor most significantly in the outcome of a military operation. It is to
the point that warriors are soldiers, marines, sailors, and airmen who must kill
when legally ordered to do so but must live with those decisions for the rest of
their lives.
While Augustine is usually associated with the formulation of the just war
theory as we know it, he was also a pastor, and as such he was just as concerned
with war’s impact on people as he was with defining the parameters of a just war.
In his monumental work The City of God, Augustine addressed a believer’s dual
responsibilities to the city of God and the city of men; it was his opinion that as
believers and as citizens persons must fulfill the obligations of both. One mod-
ern scholar has observed, “Politics, Christian or otherwise, is the art of compro-
mise.”24 In The City of God, Augustine raised compromise to an art form and
reminded readers that living in both cities creates obligations and tensions that
may remain unresolved long after decisions are made. Like other citizens, war-
riors live in both the city of men and the city of God; their obligations as com-
batants and believers may create tensions, and these tensions are never more
pronounced than in combat. Augustine viewed war as both a consequence and a
remedy for sin. Therefore, whenever he referred to war, he did so with a sense of
regret and sadness. He expressed concern about the impact of wars and espe-
cially their impact on those who fought in them. This case is eloquently stated in
his letter to Faustus the Manichean:
What is the evil in war? Is it the death of some who will soon die in any case, that
others may live in peaceful subjection? This is mere cowardly dislike, not any reli-
gious feeling. The real evils in war are love of violence, revengeful cruelty, fierce and
implacable enmity, wild resistance, . . . the lust of power, and such like; it is generally
to punish these things, when force is required to inflict the punishment, that, in obe-
dience to God or some lawful authority, good men undertake such wars, when they
find themselves in such position as regards the conduct of human affairs, that right
conduct requires them to act, or to make others act, in this way.25
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Augustine reminds us that wars are devastating to both noncombatants and
combatants alike, and deadly conflicts may leave emotional scars that last a life-
time. Modern society has ascribed many titles to this emotional scarring: com-
bat stress or fatigue, battle trauma, and most recently, post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD). The reality is that wars inflict wounds that are visible, and oth-
ers, perhaps more numerous, that are invisible. This leads, then, to our final cri-
terion. Nations that wage war have a responsibility to those who fight in wars, to
their families, and to society at large. In the post bellum phase of war, belligerents
have a moral responsibility to address and heal the wounds of war. Augustine
was concerned that in the midst of the chaos of war people might lose their hu-
man focus. In expressing this concern, he displays the heart and sensitivity of a
military chaplain; chaplains understand from firsthand experience that in the
chaos and uncertainty of war, one of the unstated yet critically important mis-
sions of a chaplain is to help warriors retain their humanity and deal with their
visible and invisible wounds post bellum.
This criterion addresses a nation’s moral obligation to heal the visible and in-
visible wounds of its warriors by adequately preparing them for their inevitable
return and reentry into the society. When warriors return to their society they
must be physically and emotionally equipped to handle life outside the war
zone; it is, therefore, the military’s obligation to ensure that every combatant
transitions from a hostile-fire environment to the normalcy of life in garrison, at
home, and in the society.
The Marine Corps takes this criterion seriously, affording its Marines and
sailors returning from combat the benefit of a warrior transition program, spe-
cifically those programs offered through the Navy’s “Chaplains Religious En-
richment Development Operation” (CREDO). Further, the Commandant
directs that every Marine, every sailor serving with Marines, and when appro-
priate, family members receive such training before return and reentry into civil-
ian society. While combat operations still raged in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM,
General Michael Hagee, thirty-fourth Commandant of the Marine Corps, is-
sued the following order in his White Letter 03-03:
5 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
Then the Lord will guide you always
and give you plenty even on the parched land.
He will renew your strength and you shall be like a watered garden,
like a spring whose water never fails.
The ancient ruins shall be rebuilt for your sake,
and the foundations from ages past you shall raise up.
“Repairer of the breach” they shall call you,
“returner of ruined homesteads.”
ISAIAH 58: 11–12
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Summer_Autumn 2004.vp
Tuesday, September 28, 2004 12:26:29 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
54
Naval War College Review, Vol. 57 [2004], No. 3, Art. 28
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol57/iss3/28
With deployments in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation
Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the return of our Marines and their reunion with loved ones is
marked by significant combat experience. This experience complicates the challenges
Marines must face in the return and reunion process. To ease the transition from
battlefield to home, our returning Marines and their loved ones require adequate
preparation and supportive services to ensure their welfare. It is imperative that all
service members returning from OEF/OIF deployment receive comprehensive return
and reunion services.26
With the issuance of this White Letter the Commandant officially initiated
USMC warrior transition programs and recognized the Corps’ responsibility to
transition Marines from a combat environment to the relative normality of life
in garrison. These proactive programs ensure that those returning from war are
physically, emotionally, and spiritually equipped to handle the responsibilities
of citizenship outside the combat environment.
THE LESSONS OF WAR
Nations that wage war have a moral responsibility to study their decision to use
force, and the way force was used in the conduct of war. Military personnel have
long understood the importance of lessons learned on and off the battlefield.
Each service has its own mechanisms for collecting lessons learned after every
war, every military operation other than war, and most major military exercises.
Exploring the lessons learned may help nations avert future conflict and build a
culture of peace. Warriors benefit from the experience of others who have been
tried and tested in battle; their study of the action and decisions of others facing
the fog and inhumanity of war may help them retain a moral and humane focus
when they are called to serve in war.
Current geopolitical realities make it plain that the time has come to establish
and develop a new major category of just war—jus post bellum. Just war theorists
will eventually benefit greatly from an in-depth study of lessons learned in Af-
ghanistan and Iraq, and specifically the post bellum dimension of these complex
operations. Outlining the moral guidelines or criteria for this dimension of war-
fare may ultimately save lives and enhance chances to secure a just and lasting
peace for all.
NOTE S
1. The epigraph is taken from Lincoln’s second
annual to Congress, 1 December 1862.
2. Daniel Pipes, “War’s New Face,” New York
Post, 16 April 2003, available at www
.danielpipes.org/article/1060, p. 1.
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A LEGAL APPRAISAL OF MILITARY ACTION IN IRAQ
James P. Terry
The determination by the George W. Bush administration to enter Iraq andremove the regime of Saddam Hussein from power in early 2003 followed
twelve years of Iraqi violations of United Nations Security Council resolutions.
Prior to the decision by the United States and its coalition partners to intervene
in Iraq with military force, Saddam Hussein had done everything possible to
avoid complying with the will of the international community. Of the
twenty-six demands made by the Security Council since 1990, Iraq had com-
plied with only three. Equally significant, the regime’s repression of the Iraqi
people continued.
The 2 October 2002 joint resolution of Congress authorizing the use of all
means, including force, to bring Iraq into compliance was merely one of a series
of actions by Congress to address Baghdad’s noncompliance with its interna-
tional obligations.1 In 1998, for example, Congress
passed a similar resolution declaring that Iraq’s con-
tinuing weapons of mass destruction programs
threatened vital U.S. interests as well as international
peace and security; declaring Iraq to be “in material
breach of its international obligations”; and urging
President Clinton “to take all appropriate action, in
accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws of
the United States, to bring Iraq into compliance with
its international obligations.”2
These congressional and UN Security Council res-
olutions were not the only outcries for change. In the
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Iraq Liberation Act, passed in 1998, lawmakers expressed the sense of Congress
that it should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the
Iraqi regime from power and to promote the emergence of a democratic govern-
ment to replace that regime.3 The reasons for this strong congressional reaction to
the Hussein regime rested not solely on Iraqi defiance of United Nations resolu-
tions but also on Saddam Hussein’s repression of the Iraqi people, his support for
international terrorism, and his refusal to account for Gulf War prisoners or to
return stolen property to Kuwait following the 1990–91 conflict, as well as the
Baathist regime’s efforts to circumvent economic sanctions.
FRAMEWORK AND CONTEXT
This article examines these Iraqi violations in the context of contemporary in-
ternational law standards justifying intervention. More significantly, it examines
the right of states to enforce mandates issued by the Security Council and to re-
dress violations of its edicts when the Council, as a body, refuses to do so. This is
precisely what occurred when the Baathist regime refused to comply fully with
the requirements of UN Security Council Resolution 1441.4 Finally, the article
examines the independent authority available to states, such as the right to inter-
vene to address a threat to international peace and security under Article 51 of
the Charter and to invoke the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, when the
Security Council cannot or will not act although its edicts have been clearly
violated.
The intervention by the United States and its coalition partners in Iraq in
March 2003 must be viewed as a significant historical precedent in the relation-
ship of a major power to the Security Council. Previously, in 1998 in Kosovo, the
United States and a coalition largely made up of NATO partners had intervened
to rescue and protect the threatened Albanian population from Serb aggression
without specific Security Council approval. While the military action in Kosovo
could arguably be justified as a humanitarian intervention, the coalition entry
into Iraq in 2003 was justified on the basis of repeated violations of UN Security
Council resolutions under Chapter VII (authorizing all necessary means) and of
the threat to international peace and security in the region and the world com-
munity posed by the Saddam Hussein regime as a result thereof.5 As President
Bush stated to the UN General Assembly on 12 September 2002:
Twelve years ago, Iraq invaded Kuwait without provocation. And the regime’s forces
were poised to continue their march to seize other countries and their resources. Had
Saddam Hussein been appeased instead of stopped, he would have endangered the
peace and stability of the world. Yet the aggression was stopped—by the might of co-
alition forces and the will of the United Nations.
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To suspend hostilities, to spare himself, Iraq’s dictator accepted a series of commit-
ments. The terms were clear, to him and to all. And he agreed to prove he is comply-
ing with every one of those obligations.
He has proven instead only his contempt for the United Nations, and for all his
pledges. By breaking every pledge—by his deceptions, and by his cruelties—Saddam
Hussein has made the case against himself. . . .
The conduct of the Iraqi regime is a threat to the authority of the United Nations,
and a threat to peace. Iraq has answered a decade of U.N. demands with a decade of
defiance. All the world now faces a test, and the United Nations a difficult and defin-
ing moment. Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced, or cast
aside without consequence? Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its found-
ing, or will it be irrelevant?6
Thus, the intervention in Iraq must be viewed through a different lens than
either our intervention in Afghanistan, where we responded to a direct attack on
America, or our intervention in Kosovo, where the coalition responded to a
solely humanitarian crisis.7 In Iraq, the coalition led by the United States and the
United Kingdom was responding to an attack on the very effectiveness of the
United Nations security system, by seeking redress for repeated violations of Se-
curity Council resolutions. If not addressed directly, these violations would have
done irreparable harm to the minimum world order system represented by Arti-
cle 2(4) and Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, to the peace and security
of the region, and to the well-being of the Iraqi people.8
ANALYSIS OF IRAQI VIOLATIONS OF SECURITY COUNCIL
MANDATES
Prior to intervention on 19 March 2003 and the inception of Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM, the regime of Saddam Hussein had repeatedly violated sixteen UN Se-
curity Council resolutions (UNSCRs) designed to place sharp controls on the
regime’s activities and to ensure that Iraq did not pose a threat to international
peace and security.9 These violations spanned a period of more than twelve years
and were first addressed in Security Council resolutions arising from the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.
In UNSCR 678, passed in the fall of 1990, UN member states were authorized
“to use all necessary means” to redress the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.10 Resolution
686 (1991) placed requirements on Iraq to return all prisoners, restore all prop-
erty seized, and accept liability for all damages arising from its illegal invasion of
Kuwait.11 The most significant of the early resolutions addressing Iraqi viola-
tions, UNSCR 687 (the cease-fire resolution of 3 April 1991), required that Iraq
“unconditionally accept” the destruction, removal, or neutralization “under
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international supervision” of all “chemical and biological weapons and all
stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components”; it further re-
quired that Iraq declare fully its weapons of mass destruction programs, not
“use, develop, construct or acquire” any weapon of mass destruction, and reaf-
firm its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.12 This instru-
ment was followed by UNSCR 688 (1991), which “condemn[ed]” Iraq’s
repression of its civilian population, “the consequences of which threaten inter-
national peace and security,” and demanded that this repression cease.13
In UNSCR 707 (1991), the Security Council “condemn[ed]” Iraq’s “serious
violation” of UNSCR 687 and further “condemn[ed]” Iraq’s noncompliance
with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its obligations under
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This resolution required that Iraq halt nu-
clear activities of all kinds, and it mandated that Baghdad make a full and com-
plete disclosure of all aspects of its weapons of mass destruction and missile
programs.14 When Iraq did not comply, the Council passed UNSCR 715 (1991)
mandating that Iraq cooperate fully with UN and IAEA inspectors.15
In 1994, Saddam Hussein’s regime began military deployments designed to
threaten Kuwait once again. The Security Council passed UNSCR 949 (1994)
condemning these military deployments and directing Iraq not to utilize its
military or other forces in a hostile manner so as to threaten its neighbors or UN
operations in Iraq.16
Within two years, it was apparent that Saddam Hussein was again acquiring
unauthorized weapons components. In response, the Security Council passed
UNSCRs 1051 and 1060 (1996). In UNSCR 1051, the Council demanded that
Iraq report to the UN and IAEA shipments of dual-use items related to weapons
of mass destruction.17 It also required Iraq to cooperate fully with UN and IAEA
inspectors and to allow them immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access.
This was followed by UNSCR 1060, which “deplored” Iraq’s refusal to allow access
to UN inspectors and Iraq’s “clear violations” of previous UN resolutions.18
In 1997, with access for inspectors still effectively denied, the Security Coun-
cil passed UNSCR 1115, which “condemn[ed] repeated refusal of Iraqi officials
to allow access” to UN officials. The Council charged that these actions consti-
tuted a “clear and flagrant violation” of UNSCRs 687, 707, 715, and 1060.19 In
UNSCR 1134 (1997) the Security Council repeated its demands contained in
UNSCR 1115.20 When Iraqi actions threatened the safety of UN personnel in late
1997, the Council “condemn[ed] the continued violations by Iraq” of previous
UN resolutions, including its “implicit threat to the safety of aircraft operated by
UN inspectors and its tampering with UN inspector monitoring equipment.”21
The Iraqi lack of cooperation with the inspection regime continued in 1998,
and in March the Security Council passed UNSCR 1154, which stated that any
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violation would have the “severest consequences for Iraq.”22 On 5 August 1998,
the Baathist regime suspended all cooperation with UN and IAEA inspectors.
This led to Security Council condemnation in UNSCR 1194 (1998), and the
claim that Iraqi actions constituted “a totally unacceptable contravention” of its
obligations under UNSCRs 687, 707, 715, and 1060.23 On 31 October 1998 the
Iraqis made their August suspension permanent and ceased cooperation with
UN inspectors. The Council, in UNSCR 1205, “condemn[ed]” this decision and
described it as a “flagrant violation” of UNSCR 687 and other resolutions.24
In 1999, frustrated by the continued lack of Iraqi cooperation, the Security
Council passed UNSCR 1284, which created the United Nations Monitoring,
Verification, and Inspections Commission (UNMOVIC) to replace the previous
weapons inspection team, the United Nations Special Commission
(UNSCOM), which had been in existence since 1991. In creating this new entity,
the Council stated (in Resolution 1284) that Iraq must allow UNMOVIC “im-
mediate, unconditional and unrestricted access” to Iraqi officials and facilities.25
This concern with Iraqi weapons was reemphasized in UNSCR 1382 (2001),
where the Council reaffirmed the obligation of all states to prevent the sale or
supply to Iraq of weapons or any other military equipment.26
Finally, in UNSCR 1441 (2002) under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Secu-
rity Council stated that it was “determined to secure full compliance with its de-
cisions.”27 The Council “decide[d] that Iraq ha[d] been and remain[ed] in
material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions . . ., [d]ecide[d] . . .
to afford Iraq . . . a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obliga-
tions,” and “decide[d] that false statements or omissions in the declarations sub-
mitted . . . shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq’s obligations and will
be reported to the Council for assessment.”28
Equally disturbing, during the period represented by the preceding resolu-
tions Saddam Hussein had repeatedly circumvented UN economic sanctions.
Further, he refused to allow weapons inspectors to oversee the demolition of his
weapons of mass destruction; failed to destroy all of his ballistic missiles with a
range greater than 150 kilometers; failed to stop support for terrorism or pre-
vent terrorist organizations from operating within Iraq; failed to help account
for missing Kuwaitis; refused to return stolen Kuwaiti property and bear finan-
cial responsibility for damage from the first Gulf War; and continued his repres-
sion of the Iraqi people.29
In addition to the legally binding UNSCRs, the Security Council also issued at
least thirty statements from its president regarding Saddam Hussein’s continued
violations of these resolutions.30 Following the thirty days allowed in Resolution
1441 for an Iraqi response to the unanimous adoption of UNSCR 1441, Secre-
tary of State Colin Powell addressed the unresponsiveness of the Iraqi regime in
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detailed remarks to the Security Council on 7 March 2003, in which he docu-
mented Baghdad’s failure to meet the requirements of UNSCR 1441:
Iraq’s current behavior, like the behavior chronicled in Dr. Blix’s document, reveals
its strategic decision to continue to delay, to deceive, to try to throw us off the trail,
to make it more difficult, to hope that the will of the international community will be
fractured, that we will go off in different directions, that we will get bored with the
task, that we will remove the pressure, we will remove the force. And we know what
has happened when that has been done in the past. We know that the Iraqis are still
not volunteering information and, when they do, what they are giving is often partial
and misleading. We know that when confronted with facts, the Iraqis are still chang-
ing their story to explain those facts—but not enough to give us the truth. So has the
strategic decision been made to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction by the
leadership in Baghdad? My judgment, I think our judgment, has to be clearly not.31
CONFRONTING UN SECURITY COUNCIL INACTION
When President Bush secured broad bipartisan support for the Joint Resolution
to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq on 2 October
2002, few imagined that the Security Council would not ultimately follow suit.32
After all, American leaders had obtained unanimous support in the Council for
UNSCR 1441, which all but delivered an ultimatum. Secretary Powell clearly de-
fined the burden of Council membership in his 7 March 2003 address:
Security Council membership carries heavy responsibilities. We must not walk away.
We must not find ourselves here this coming November with the pressure removed
and with Iraq once again marching down the merry path to weapons of mass de-
struction, threatening the region, threatening the world.
If we fail to meet our responsibilities, the credibility of this Council and its ability to
deal with all the critical challenges we face will suffer. As we sit here, let us not forget
the horror still going on in Iraq, with a spare moment to remember the suffering
Iraqi people whose treasure is being spent on these kinds of programs and not for
their own benefit; people who are being beaten, brutalized and robbed by Saddam
Hussein and his regime.
Colleagues, now is the time for the Council to send a clear message to Saddam that
we have not been taken in by his transparent tactics. Nobody wants war, but it is
clear that the limited progress we have seen, the slight substantive changes we have
seen, come from the presence of a large military force—nations who are willing to
put their young men and women in harm’s way in order to rid the world of these
dangerous weapons.
It doesn’t come simply from resolutions. It doesn’t come simply from inspectors. It
comes from the will of this Council, the unified will of this Council and the willingness
to use force, if it comes to that, to make sure that we achieve the disarmament of Iraq.
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Now is the time for the Council to tell Saddam Hussein that the clock has not been
stopped by his stratagems and his machinations. We believe that the resolution that
has been put forward for action by this Council is appropriate and, in the very near
future, we should bring it before this Council for a vote.33
The draft Security Council resolution Secretary Powell spoke of in his address
to the Council was opposed by Russia and France and thus never was formally
proposed for a vote within that body. The provisional draft of 7 March 2003,
brought under Chapter VII of the Charter, stated that the Council was deter-
mined to secure full compliance with its decisions and to restore international
peace and security in the area.34 It further stated
that Iraq will have failed to take the final opportunity afforded by resolution 1441
(2002) unless, on or before 17 March 2003, the Council concludes that Iraq has dem-
onstrated full, unconditional, immediate and active cooperation in accordance with
its disarmament obligations under resolution 1441 (2002) and previous relevant res-
olutions, and is yielding possession to UNMOVIC and the AEIA [sic] of all weapons,
weapon delivery and support systems and structures, prohibited by resolution 687
(1991) and all subsequent relevant resolutions, and all information regarding prior
destruction of such items.35
When the Council did not agree to the proposed resolution, President Bush,
with the support of the United Kingdom, Spain, and more than forty other na-
tions, directed U.S. forces, in a coalition with the British, to enter Iraq on 19
March and remove the regime of Saddam Hussein.36 This decision came only af-
ter President Bush had determined that reliance by the United States on further
diplomatic or other peaceful means alone would not lead to enforcement of all
relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq, and his
further determination that the Security Council, despite the Iraqi noncompli-
ance with UNSCR 1441, would not act.
Not surprisingly, on 22 May 2003, after the United States and Great Britain
had freed the region from the threat posed by the Baathist regime in Iraq and the
Iraqi people from the repression of Saddam Hussein, the Security Council
passed UNSCR 1483 by a vote of 14–0.37 This resolution recognized the United
States and the United Kingdom as the “authority” in Iraq pending establishment
of an independent democratic Iraqi government, and it affirmed “the need for
accountability for crimes and atrocities committed by the previous Iraqi re-
gime.” Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (and expressly recognizing
that the situation in Iraq “continues to constitute a threat to international peace
and security”), the Security Council further:
4. Call[ed] upon the Authority, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations
and other relevant international law, to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people
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through the effective administration of the territory, including in particular working
toward the restoration of conditions of security and stability and the creation of con-
ditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future.38
ANALYSIS OF THE LAWFULNESS OF THE USE OF FORCE IN IRAQ
In light of the failure of the Council to act to enforce UNSCR 1441 and all pre-
ceding relevant resolutions with respect to Iraq, it is important to consider
whether this inaction in the face of prior commitment authorizes any individual
state or coalition of member states to enforce demands upon a member state by
the Security Council. In the case of the United States, not only had President
Bush persuasively argued his case before the United Nations on 12 February
2003, but Congress had likewise endorsed the use of force by the president in its
2 October 2002 joint resolution.39 In that resolution, Congress identified both
the threat to the United States and to international peace and security, and the
need for humanitarian intervention:
Whereas Iraq both poses a continuing threat to the national security of the United
States and international peace and security in the Persian Gulf region and remains in
material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations by, among other
things, continuing to possess and develop a significant chemical and biological weap-
ons capability, actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability, and supporting and
harboring terrorist organizations;
Whereas Iraq persists in violating resolutions of the United Nations Security Council
by continuing to engage in brutal repression of its civilian population thereby threat-
ening international peace and security in the region, by refusing to release, repatriate,
or account for non-Iraqi citizens wrongfully detained by Iraq, including an American
serviceman, and by failing to return property wrongfully seized by Iraq from Kuwait.40
While the main responsibility for maintaining peace and security in the UN
system is lodged with the fifteen-member Security Council, its effectiveness as
an instrument of collective action has often been neutralized when the support
of all permanent members, required by Article 27(3), for such a decision is not
forthcoming.41 This was in March 1999, when the Chinese and Russian delegates
refused to support a draft Security Council resolution authorizing NATO-led
forces to intervene in the Kosovo crisis, despite the support of twelve of the fifteen
Council members. The situation arose again in March 2003, when the Russian and
French delegates refused to support the coalition-led intervention in Iraq.
It was precisely this concern that led legal experts to debate, long prior to the
Kosovo and Iraq crises, criteria that would respond to Council inaction in the
face of obvious violations of Charter principles. In 1974, Professor Richard
Lillich of the University of Virginia, distressed at the inability of the Security
Council to function in matters requiring the unanimous approval of the
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permanent members for Chapter VII (“all necessary means”) operations, ar-
gued that the most important task confronting international lawyers was to clar-
ify the various criteria by which the legitimacy of a state’s use of force for ends
supportive of Charter principles could be judged.42
In Iraq, as in Kosovo, the coalition’s use of military force to prevent the con-
tinuation of the myriad abuses outlined in UNSCR 1441 was consistent with
state practice that has established the lawfulness of intervention when carefully
circumscribed by the parameters outlined in Article 2(4). Articles 39 to 51 of the
Charter establish a framework for collective security based on the use of military
force and provide the Security Council with authority for enforcement.43 De-
spite these powers, the reluctance of certain Council members in the case of
Kosovo in 1998 and Iraq in 2003 left the organization on the sidelines at a time
when, according to the Charter, its possibilities should have been used to the
maximum. Evidence of partisanship and division among Council members, and
especially among the Permanent Five, may explain the sidetracking of the Secu-
rity Council. Nevertheless, we should take such matters with the utmost serious-
ness and ask ourselves what can be done to restore the Council to the position of
influence it was given in the Charter.
In fact, Chapter VII makes extensive provision for collective action by the or-
ganization “to maintain or restore international peace and security” when a
threat to the peace or an act of aggression has occurred.44 Under Chapter VII it is
the Council that must decide whether in any particular instance a threat to the
peace exists; whether aggression has been committed and, if so, by whom; and fi-
nally, what, if any, collective steps by the world organization would best remedy
the situation. With the exception of UN-sanctioned action in the defense of Ku-
wait in 1990, however, it has never been possible to invoke these collective en-
forcement provisions. Even in Korea, the potential veto of the Soviet
ambassador obliged the organization to turn to the General Assembly for the
necessary authority under Articles 11, 14, 18, and 24 of the Charter.45
The scarcity of actions brought under the collective-action provisions of
Chapter VII does not in any way suggest a more peaceful world than the Char-
ter’s framers envisioned. By 1970, some twenty-five years after the United Na-
tions came into existence, Professor Thomas Franck had already recorded more
than one hundred outbreaks of hostility between states.46 The total is now easily
double that number. In response, and as the Chapter VII collective-action provi-
sions have been marked by their lack of visibility, increasing use has been made
by states, including the United States, of Articles 51, 52, and 53, which set out the
rights of states themselves, under certain exceptional circumstances, to resort to
the use of force outside the UN’s collective-action framework. In fact, it is fair to
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say that today the exceptions have overwhelmed the rule and transformed the
system.
This was certainly the case in Iraq in 2003. The Security Council had repeat-
edly condemned Iraqi actions that had resulted in violations of international
peace and security.47 It is important to note that after the United States and Great
Britain successfully intervened in March 2003—both to eliminate the threat to
international peace described in numerous Security Council resolutions and to
eliminate the violations of international human rights law described in UNSCR
1441 (2002) and preceding Council statements—the Council quickly passed
UNSCR 1483, unanimously recognizing the coalition as the appropriate “au-
thority” in Iraq pending establishment of a lawful government. The incongruity
of the refusal of the Security Council to support the coalition intervention when
it directly supported the repeated demands the Council previously made of Iraq,
and then to support unanimously a resolution recognizing the intervenors as
the legitimate “authority” in Iraq, is obvious.
An equally significant credibility gap exists between the noninterventionist
policy resulting from a divided Council and fulfillment of the humanitarian
principles of the UN Charter with respect to Iraq. The two main purposes of the
Charter as a whole are the maintenance of peace and security and the protection
of human rights.48 Article 2(4), the provision relevant to both these purposes,
prohibits “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations” (emphasis supplied). The Iraq intervention clearly re-
flected the humanitarian purposes stated in myriad United Nations resolutions.
I would further argue that this intervention not only did not violate but actu-
ally supported the other requirements in Article 2(4), in that it did not signifi-
cantly affect, other than in a positive way, the “territorial integrity” or “political
independence” of the state against which it was directed. The territorial integrity
of Iraq remains undisturbed. Under the Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein
there was no political independence, at least not for the people of Iraq. Nor did
political independence exist for the regime. Heavily sanctioned by the UN for re-
peated violations of international law, its economy was increasingly restricted,
and the only international intercourse available to the Baathist leaders was with
other rogue nations.
This argument is even more attractive legally when one studies the actual lan-
guage of the UN Charter. While the instrument is admittedly best known for the
articles that create a minimum world order system—as represented by Article
2(4) (prohibition on the use of force), Article 51 (exception for self-defense),
and Articles 39–51 of Chapter VII (addressing Security Council responsibili-
ties), there is certainly an equal emphasis on protection of human rights. The
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preamble, in fact, focuses on the rights of individuals vice the rights of nations
when it states that the purpose of the Charter is
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime
has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and
women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which jus-
tice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of interna-
tional law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of
life in larger freedom.
Article 1(3) reinforces this language by stating that a principal purpose of the
organization is “to achieve international co-operation in solving international
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental free-
doms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.” Article 55
emphasizes the need to promote “universal respect for, and observance of, hu-
man rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion.” The Economic and Social Council established in Article
61 provides the means by which the humanitarian objectives set forth in Article
55 are to be addressed and then reported to the Security Council for action.
International law requires that the community of nations first consider all
means short of force to address threats to international peace and security.
A NEW PARADIGM
The Iraqi intervention reflects an uneasy recognition that the Charter system is
inadequate to address certain of the security and humanitarian crises that may
come before the UN, if unanimity among the five permanent members of the
Security Council continues to be a requirement. Only the United States and
United Kingdom among the Permanent Five on the Security Council were will-
ing to support an enforcement resolution in the case of Iraq. Nevertheless, some
forty nations found that authorization of the Security Council was not neces-
sary in Iraq since the action was supportive of, rather than contrary to, the values
represented in Article 2(4).
The March 2003 intervention in Iraq thus obliges us to examine once again
the law relating to intervention in the case of violations of international peace
and security and of human rights. We must attempt to reconcile Charter values
on the one hand and required procedures on the other. Iraq is especially appro-
priate for consideration, since the widespread violations of its international ob-
ligations were condemned in unanimity by the Council in numerous UN
resolutions. Additionally, however, the human rights violations attributed to the
Baathist regime in Baghdad met all the requirements under pre-Charter law for
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humanitarian intervention. Specifically, the horrendous crimes against both
Kurds in the north and Sunnis in the south were widely recognized and little dis-
puted. The intervention had as its sole purpose to redress the threat to interna-
tional peace and security and to end the human rights abuses. There was no
intention other than that of restoring political independence to the Iraqi people
and the Iraqi nation. The territorial integrity of the nation remains intact.
Professor Louis Henkin suggests the likely result of such interventions, unless
the unanimity requirement can be separated from Security Council decisions,
will be the establishment of precedent whereby states or collectives, confident
that the Security Council will acquiesce in their decision to intervene, will shift
the burden of the veto. Instead of seeking authorization in advance by resolution
subject to veto, in this view, states or collectives will act and then challenge the
Council to terminate the action. A permanent member favoring the interven-
tion could frustrate the adoption of such a resolution.49
Henkin argues that this situation may already obtain. He suggests subsequent
Security Council ratification as occurred in Kosovo with UNSCR 1244, and by
extension in Iraq with UNSCR 1483, effectively ratified what earlier might have
constituted unilateral action questionable as a matter of law.50 The actions of the
Security Council in adopting UNSC Resolution 1483 and endorsing the author-
ity of the coalition during the transition to an independent Iraq clearly reflect
steps toward a change in the law. While it is unlikely there will be a formal change
in the Charter, the Council action supports an interpretation of law such that in-
tervention consistent with Charter values (i.e., when neither the territorial in-
tegrity nor the political independence of the target state is impacted in a way that
would other than support the values represented by Article 2[4]) will be en-
dorsed, not condemned. The international community must not be allowed to
excuse its failure to act with pre-Charter references to principles of
nonintervention and sovereign immunity and to the Charter requirement for
Security Council approval by the Permanent Five, when the lack of approval is
contrary to the values for which the Charter stands.
NOTE S
1. Public Law 107-243, Authorization for Use of
Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, 2 Oc-
tober 2002.
2. Public Law 105-235.
3. Public Law 105-338, Iraq Liberation Act, 31
October 1998.
4. United Nations Security Council Resolution
[hereafter UNSCR] 1441, 8 November 2002.
Resolution 1441, in paragraph 3, placed the
burden on Iraq to provide full disclosure,
within thirty days, of all its WMD programs,
ballistic missiles, and other delivery systems,
including the precise locations of all such
components.
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5. For Kosovo, see James P. Terry, “Rethinking
Humanitarian Intervention After Kosovo:
Legal Reality and Political Pragmatism,” Mili-
tary Law Review (Fall 2003).
6. Statement of President Bush before the
United Nations General Assembly, Septem-
ber 12, 2002, available at www
.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/
20020912-1.html.
7. See statement of Christopher Greenwood on
behalf of the United Kingdom: “There is a
right to humanitarian intervention when a
government—or the factions in a civil war—
create a human tragedy of such magnitude
that it creates a threat to international peace.
In such a case, if the Security Council does
not take military action, then other states
have a right to do so. It is from this state
practice that the right of humanitarian inter-
vention on which NATO now relies has
emerged.” “Yes, But Is It Legal?” Observer, 28
March 1999, p. 2.
8. Article 2(4) prohibits the use of force by
states, while Chapter VII, and specifically Ar-
ticle 51 within Chapter VII, provides the one
exception for states and states acting collec-
tively to respond to breaches of the peace
when necessary in national self-defense.
9. See UNSCR 678, 29 November 1990; UNSCR
686, 22 March 1991; UNSCR 687, 3 April
1991; UNSCR 688, 5 April 1991; UNSCR 707,
15 August 1991; UNSCR 715, 11 October
1991; UNSCR 949, 15 October 1994; UNSCR
1051, 27 March 1996; UNSCR 1060, 12 June
1996; UNSCR 1115, 21 June 1997; UNSCR
1134, 23 October 1997; UNSCR 1137, 12 No-
vember 1997; UNSCR 1154, 2 March 1998;
UNSCR 1194, 9 September 1998; UNSCR
1205, 5 November 1998; UNSCR 1284, 17
December 1999.
10. UNSCR 678, 29 November 1990, also re-
quired that Iraq comply fully with UNSCR
660 (regarding Iraq’s illegal invasion of Ku-
wait “and all subsequent relevant
resolutions”).
11. UNSCR 686, 2 March 1991.
12. UNSCR 687 also required Iraq not to commit
or support terrorism, or allow terrorist orga-
nizations to operate in Iraq, and it reiterated
the requirements respecting the return of
seized Kuwaiti property and persons ad-
dressed in UNSCR 686.
13. UNSCR 688, 5 April 1991, further obligated
Iraq to allow immediate access to interna-
tional humanitarian organizations to those in
need of assistance.
14. UNSCR 707, 15 August 1991, additionally re-
quired that Iraq allow immediate, uncondi-
tional, and unrestricted access to UN and
IAEA inspectors and that it cease attempts to
conceal or move weapons of mass destruction
and related materials and facilities.
15. UNSCR 715, 11 October 1991.
16. UNSCR 949, 15 October 1994, also reiterated
that Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weap-
ons inspectors, and that it must not enhance
its military capability in southern Iraq.
17. UNSCR 1051, 27 March 1996.
18. UNSCR 1060, 12 June 1996. It reiterated
UNSCR 1051’s requirement to cooperate and
provide unrestricted access.
19. UNSCR 1115, 21 June 1997, further required
that Iraq give immediate, unconditional, and
unrestricted access to Iraqi officials whom
UN inspectors wanted to interview.
20. UNSCR 1134, 23 October 1997.
21. UNSCR 1137, 12 November 1997. This reso-
lution reaffirmed Iraq’s responsibility to en-
sure the safety of UN inspectors.
22. UNSCR 1154, 2 March 1998.
23. UNSCR 1194, 9 September 1998.
24. UNSCR 1205, 5 November 1998, also required,
once again, that Iraq provide “immediate,
complete and unconditional cooperation”
with UN and IAEA inspectors.
25. UNSCR 1284, 17 December 1999, further
provided that Iraq must fulfill its commit-
ment to return Gulf War prisoners and called
upon Iraq to distribute humanitarian goods
and medical supplies to its people and to ad-
dress the needs of vulnerable Iraqis without
discrimination.
26. UNSCR 1382, 29 November 2001.
27. UNSCR 1441, 8 November 2002.
28. Ibid.
29. UNSCR 1441 addressed each of these contin-
uing violations.
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30. See UN Security Council Presidential State-
ments of 28 June 1991; 5 February, 19 Febru-
ary, 28 February, 6 March, 11 March, 12
March, 10 April, 17 June, 6 July, 2 September,
23 November, and 24 November 1992; 8 Jan-
uary, 11 January, 18 June, 28 June, and 23
November 1993; 8 October, 18 March, 14
June, 23 August, and 30 December 1996; 13
June, 29 October, 13 November, 3 December,
and 22 December 1997; 14 January and 14
May 1998.
31. Remarks of Secretary of State Colin L. Powell
before the UN Security Council, 7 March
2003, U.S. Department of State Document
2003/256.
32. Public Law 107-243.
33. Remarks of Colin L. Powell, 7 March 2003.
34. Draft resolution of 7 March 2003, S/2003/
215. The United States was joined in sponsor-
ship by Spain and the United Kingdom.
35. Ibid.
36. The nations indicating support for the U.S.-
British intervention, in addition to Spain,
were Italy, Australia, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Romania, Poland, Ukraine, Hungary, Bul-
garia, Slovakia, the Dominican Republic, El
Salvador, Honduras, Latvia, Lithuania, Fin-
land, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan, Moldova, the Philippines, Korea,
Thailand, Singapore, Mongolia, Fiji, Tonga,
Argentina, Nicaragua, and Nepal. The re-
maining nations are not listed by their
request.
37. UNSCR 1483, 22 May 2003.
38. Ibid.
39. For the UN address, see Statement of Presi-
dent Bush, 12 September 2002. For the joint
resolution, see Public Law 107-243.
40. Public Law 107-243.
41. Article 23 of the Charter provides that the
Republic of China, Russia, France, Great Brit-
ain, and the United States are permanent
members of the Security Council.
42. See Richard Lillich, “Humanitarian Interven-
tion: A Reply to Dr. Brownlee and a Plan for
Constructive Alternatives,” in National Secu-
rity Law, ed. John N. Moore (Durham, N.C.:
Carolina Academic Press, 1990), pp. 152–53.
43. Articles 39–51 constitute Chapter VII of the
UN Charter and provide the authority for the
Council to direct intervention to restore in-
ternational peace and security.
44. See Article 39, UN Charter.
45. For the defense of Kuwait, see UNSCR 678
(1990). For Korea, see UNGA [UN General
Assembly] 377(V) (1950).
46. Thomas Franck, “Who Killed Article 2(4)?
Or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of
Force of States,” American Journal of Interna-
tional Law 64 (1970), pp. 810–11.
47. See note 9, above, and UNSCR 1441 (2002).
48. See discussion in Moore, ed., National Secu-
rity Law, pp. 148–49.
49. Louis Henkin, “Editorial Comments: NATO’s
Kosovo Intervention: Kosovo and the Law of
Humanitarian Intervention,” American Jour-
nal of International Law 93 (1999), p. 827.
50. Ibid.
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PRINCIPIA LEVIATHAN
The Moral Duties of American Hegemony
Neta C. Crawford
War is the realm of danger; therefore courage is the soldier’s first
requirement. Courage is of two kinds: courage in the face of personal
danger, and courage to accept responsibility, either before the tribunal
of some outside power or before the court of one’s own conscience.
CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR
The moral duties of the United States in Iraq cannot be separated from thelarger question of the security requirements of the United States and its
larger moral duties as the world’s preeminent military and economic power.
Moreover, even after the United States leaves Iraq these questions will not disap-
pear, not least because it may find itself occupying more states in its war on ter-
ror and against rogue states. If the United States does not act responsibly in Iraq,
its credibility and ability to mobilize international
support and cooperation in the war on terror will be
compromised. However, answers to neither of these
questions—the security requirements of the United
States and its larger moral duties—are obvious. Presi-
dent George W. Bush told West Point graduates in
June 2002 that “America has no empire to extend or
utopia to establish.”1 Yet the Bush administration and
a substantial number of Americans believe that the
United States is and should be a great imperial power,
upholding the banner of moral virtue and righteous
purpose through military force if necessary. In this
view, America’s “goals on the path to progress are
clear: political and economic freedom, peaceful rela-
tions with other states, and respect for human dig-
nity.”2 The Department of Defense’s Quadrennial
Defense Review of 2001 stated that the goal of U.S.
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strategy is to maintain or improve the “long term military preeminence” of the
United States.3 President Bush has said that “America has, and intends to keep,
military strengths beyond challenge.”4 Consider also what William Kristol, the
editor of the conservative Weekly Standard, said on Fox News in spring 2003:
“We need to err on the side of being strong. And if people want to say we are an
imperial power, fine.”5 The national security strategy declares that it is “based on
a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and
our national interests. The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just
safer but better.”6 Thus, the moral purpose and awesome power of the United
States are to coalesce in a Pax Americana envisioned by the Bush administration
and its supporters.
Thomas Hobbes’s mythic Leviathan was a metaphor for the role of the state
in an anarchic context—the great power to overawe all others and create the
peace necessary for the development of an ordered civil society. Without effec-
tive government, Hobbes suggests, we could not sleep at night. In a sense the
Bush administration is supposing that without American hegemony, a Pax
Americana imposed by the U.S. Leviathan, none of us will be able to sleep at
night. Although it is far from omnipotent—the United States cannot overawe all
other states—the new American empire does have the potential to realize some
of its ambitions. What should the ambitions of an aspiring Leviathan be, and
how should the United States attempt to realize them?
Most great empires have claimed a moral mission while simultaneously as-
serting the primacy of their security interests. What would happen if we made
normative questions explicit and asked them first? Does a hegemon, in this case
the world’s sole superpower, have moral obligations that are on par with its secu-
rity interests? If so, what are those moral obligations? How ought they be limited
or shaped by practical concerns?
Those who talk of moral duties may be branded as impractical and impru-
dent idealists—or worse, as utopians. President Carter suffered such a fate in
1980 as a result of his emphasis on human rights. President George W. Bush’s
emphasis on morality and global transformation may put him at similar politi-
cal risk. Another risk of talking about moral missions is that of being branded as
cultural imperialists and compared pejoratively to the bearers of the nineteenth-
century colonial civilizing mission.
So to ask what the moral responsibilities of the United States are in Iraq is to
risk both charges—utopianism and paternalism. But before we can assess the
specific moral responsibilities of the United States in Iraq, we must, of course,
ask whether any state has moral duties. Those two questions lead us to a third
set, putting U.S. moral responsibility to Iraq in the larger context of the nation’s
moral responsibilities in the world today: What principles should the world’s
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sole superpower live by and promote? Does morality clash with prudence and
pragmatism? What is “the rightful place” of the great power?
DOES ANY STATE HAVE MORAL OBLIGATIONS?
The traditional realist view is that morality has no place in foreign policy, be-
cause morality is not a quality of the actors of world politics. Realists argue that
even if we want states to be moral we can only expect them to act, like individu-
als, in their self-interest. Nor does the structure of world politics allow for moral
action. The anarchic nature of world politics—a war of all against all—means
that states have to provide for their own security against constant threats; no
state can prudently afford to be moral. Thus, in this view, to speak of interna-
tional morality is to be naive at best and a hypocrite at worst; as the Athenians
say in the Melian dialogue, “The standard of justice depends on the quality of
power to compel.”7
The godfather of twentieth-century realism, Hans Morgenthau, goes even
farther, arguing that no prudent state should or would allow morality to guide
its foreign policy: “There can be no political morality without prudence; that is,
without consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral action.”8
He also argued that even if there is a tiny bit of room for morality in some area of
a state’s global interactions, international morality may interfere with its moral
obligation to its own citizens; just as individuals may have only a duty to pre-
serve themselves, states are obliged to preserve the lives of their own soldiers and
people first.9 Morgenthau thought it political folly for a state to claim that its
view of morality was the world’s sole moral perspective and then base its foreign
policy on that vision.
In this respect, the list of moral duties for realist hegemons would likely have
only one item—to maintain hegemony. Realists go so far as to suggest that those
who proclaim moral purpose are either deluding themselves or attempting to
use morality as a fig leaf for their interests. Those who look for morality in for-
eign policy or to act on it, Morgenthau suggests, are imprudent, even foolish. For
example, Morgenthau said, “It is futile to search for an abstract principle which
would allow us to distinguish in a concrete case between legitimate and illegiti-
mate intervention.”10 Morality and ideology cannot be the guides to foreign pol-
icy: “All nations will continue to be guided in their decisions to intervene and
their choice of means of intervention by what they regard as their respective na-
tional interests.”11
Liberals have criticized realist views of morality in world politics on several
grounds. First, they argue that morality is already woven throughout the foreign
policy behavior of states and that this can be seen in, for example, the (admit-
tedly imperfect) adherence of states to laws of war, as well as in the provision of
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foreign aid. Second, liberals hold that the realist objections to ethics in interna-
tional politics are unconvincing. Specifically, in this view, the structure of world
politics is not so anarchic as realists suppose; actors, including powerful states,
have moral interests as well as material ones; and morality is prudent. To do
good brings its own reward—people trust you. You do not have to spend your
resources coercing others; they will want to work with you.12
Because foreign policy is thoroughly imbued with morality in this view, the
liberal list of the moral responsibilities of states would be large. Emphasizing the
poverty, disease, and lack of educational opportunity in the poor areas of the
world, liberals would put foreign assistance, the principles of just war, and the
promotion of democratic values and human rights at the top of their foreign
agenda. They argue that to help others is not only right but increases one’s own
security.
In some ways, then, the foreign policy rhetoric of the Bush administration is
liberal, which is why many compare President Bush to Woodrow Wilson, and
why Bush himself seems to have an affinity for that president.13 As the president
said in May 2003 at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, in New London, Connecti-
cut, “We . . . stand for the values that defeat violence, and the hope that over-
comes hatred. . . . Because America loves peace, America will always work and
sacrifice for the expansion of freedom.” The president went on, “President
Woodrow Wilson said, ‘America has a spiritual energy in her which no other na-
tion can contribute to the liberation of mankind.’ In this new century, we must
apply that energy to the good of people everywhere.”14 Beyond liberal and realist
perspectives, other scholars—poststructuralists and feminists—have proposed
a reconceptualization of international ethics.15 Specifically, they question the
national/international divide, arguing that moral boundaries that coincide with
geopolitical ones are arbitrary, to say the least. Morality does not end at the bor-
der. Further, these theorists propose that there is a responsibility to others, in
particular a duty to develop empathy with others and to treat them with care.
But beyond this general injunction, poststructuralist and feminist scholars of
international ethics argue, against the view of liberals, that moral duties do not
naturally flow from Western values. Particularly mindful of the history of slav-
ery, colonialism, and intervention—each of which was justified in its day in the
name of supposedly universal Western values—these scholars suggest that any
ethical relationship must be an equal one.16 Most poststructuralists and femi-
nists would agree with the moral duties that liberals want to promote, but they
suggest that those duties can be accomplished less paternalistically. In other
words, they stress the process of politics as much as the outcome.
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In a sense, these debates illustrate the opposite but equally worrisome dan-
gers of moral indifference and moralistic excess and evangelism. The United
States cannot afford either.
I make two assumptions. First, whether we like it or not, morality is always
part of a state’s foreign policy; it is certainly on the agenda of the current admin-
istration. Even those who say morality is irrelevant and want to pursue only state
interests are making a normative choice. The questions are the explicitness of
the moral mission, whether it is good, and how these moral aspirations and du-
ties are to be accomplished.
The second assumption is that the United States is hegemonic. It is the
world’s sole superpower, and its official military doctrine, as outlined in the
Quadrennial Defense Review of September 2001, is the maintenance of preemi-
nence.17 As the national security strategy says, “Our forces will be strong enough
to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of
surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States.”18
If one is willing to accept, for the moment at least, those assumptions—the
centrality of morality and of American preeminence—there follow the further
questions we have noted: What are the moral responsibilities of the United
States with respect to Iraq? Second, what are the moral responsibilities of the
United States as the world’s sole superpower? Third, are U.S. goals undermined
or enhanced by the pursuit of a moral foreign policy agenda?
I address these questions in turn.
U.S. RESPONSIBILITIES IN IRAQ
How could we begin to know what the moral responsibilities of the United
States are with respect to Iraq?19 There are many senses of the word “responsibil-
ity,” and each has a moral element. We can be responsible in a causal or historical
sense, if our past behavior was the cause of a present condition. (For example,
the rapid and profuse emission of carbon dioxide by humans may be responsible
for a global rise in temperature and the melting of portions of the polar ice
caps.) In this causal sense the United States might be considered responsible for
some of the conditions in contemporary Iraq. This is not to say that Iraqis gener-
ally, and the Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein in particular, bear no causal re-
sponsibility for the damage done—far from it. Hussein was a vicious despot, and
we must hope that he is fairly tried, convicted, and punished for his crimes. Nor
is focusing upon the role of the United States in Iraq prior to March 2003 to ig-
nore the role of other states in Iraq’s politics; the British occupation of Iraq in
the early twentieth century left its mark, establishing the domination of both the
Sunnis and the military in Iraqi politics.20
C R A W F O R D 7 1
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Summer_Autumn 2004.vp
Tuesday, September 28, 2004 12:26:31 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
75
War College: Summer/Autumn 2004 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2004
Still, in pursuit of its own interests, the United States acted in and on Iraq sev-
eral times in the last twenty years—the 1980s, the sanctions period, and the re-
cent war—and even the earlier interventions were not without effects that are
relevant today. It is widely known, though sometimes forgotten, that the United
States supported Saddam Hussein’s Baathist regime during the 1980s. Some of
the worst atrocities of Iraq were committed during this period, when Iraq was at
war with Iran and fought at the same time both to suppress the Kurdish inde-
pendence movement in the north and to maintain its totalitarian hold in the rest
of Iraq. It was then, for example, that the regime used chemical weapons on its
own people and on Iranians. Nonetheless, during the 1980s the United States
helped Iraq acquire weapons and supplied it military intelligence for use in the
war against Iran.
During the sanctions period following the 1991 Gulf War to remove Iraq
from Kuwait, the Iraqi infrastructure, already stressed by more than a decade of
neglect and war-related damage, was further damaged. Indeed, it was explicit
U.S. policy to use sanctions to make sure that Iraq’s infrastructure did not re-
cover; resources supplied to Iraq might be used for military mobilization or to
build weapons of mass destruction. Whatever we think of the effectiveness of the
sanctions policy of constraining and containing the Iraqi regime, certainly the
Iraqi people suffered an overall decline in their standard of living and in such ba-
sic indicators of health as infant and maternal mortality. Of course, Saddam’s
own policies in those years also hurt the average Iraqi, who will not soon forget
how the regime’s elites enriched themselves during the sanctions period.
The United States is also partly responsible for the effects of war on Iraq. The
war in 1991 was described as a response to Iraqi aggression, and many aspects of
it were justifiable according to the traditional sense of just war theory. Yet there
were unfortunate lapses on the part of the U.S. military. For example, the dis-
tinction between noncombatants and combatants was blurred by the strategy of
massive aerial bombardment. Further, some retreating Iraqi soldiers, no longer
fighting, were killed on the so-called highway of death (the exact figures are dis-
puted). The increasingly aggressive enforcement of the no-fly zones in the north
and south of Iraq later in the decade was also a form of war against Iraq, one that
not only targeted Iraq’s military infrastructure but sometimes harmed noncom-
batants. Similarly, in early 2003—while major combat was mercifully brief, and
the coalition took great pains, for which it should be applauded, to avoid harm-
ing civilians and basic infrastructure—the U.S.-led war on Iraq did do damage.
Data on how many noncombatants, or even Iraqi combatants, were injured or
killed is apparently not available through U.S. government sources. However, re-
cent estimates suggest that despite extensive use of precision guided weapons
(about 68 percent), about 30 percent of fatalities in the war were among
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noncombatants.21 Moreover, the security of Iraq was so badly handled immedi-
ately afterward that massive looting may have done more damage to Iraq’s infra-
structure than the war itself. In other words, despite the best intentions of the
United States, American policies and behavior have hurt Iraq and individual
Iraqis.
It would be inaccurate to argue that the United States bears sole causal re-
sponsibility for the condition of Iraq today; it does not. Iraq was the aggressor in
its wars against Iran and Kuwait. It was the Baath regime’s criminality and bru-
tality that caused sanctions to hurt the average Iraqi far more than the leader-
ship. Just before the most recent war Saddam Hussein released criminals from
prison, who did great damage after the conflict ended. Even if it is true that dur-
ing the 1980s the United States helped Iraq with intelligence and the acquisition
of chemical and biological weapons, it was the Iraqis who used them. In other
words, there is more than one historically culpable actor here. But the fact that
the Iraqis in power did wrong does not allow us to forget the United States may
have acted in ways that turned out badly or were simply wrong. The United
States bears some measure of causal responsibility.
There are other senses of responsibility. One might be responsible in the
sense of having the duty to provide for the care and well-being of others who
cannot take care of themselves, especially if we are partly responsible for that in-
capacity. One can also take responsibility as part of a division of labor among
equals—that is, taking on a duty where others also have duties. To be responsible
is to be accountable for our behavior to another—perhaps to Iraqis, to Ameri-
can citizens, or to the international community as it is constituted in the United
Nations General Assembly and Security Council. To be responsible is to be reli-
able and dependable, to be competent in completing the tasks and meeting the
goals to which one has committed oneself. In all these senses—of accountability,
reliability, the causal responsibility of action and consequence, the moral obliga-
tion of the strong to help the less well off, and the duty to follow through on bur-
dens undertaken in equal partnership—the United States has obligations to Iraq.22
LEGAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES TO IRAQ
What are the legal obligations of the United States with respect to Iraq? The most
pressing of them are the obligations, under relevant international treaties and
UN resolutions, of the United States as an occupying power in Iraq. These famil-
iar legal obligations bear directly on the question of moral responsibility.
First, the United States, having entered Iraq through war, is an occupying
power under the Hague Regulations of 1907 and the Fourth Geneva Convention
of 1949. The declarations of the Bush administration (although it prefers to
speak of “liberation”), as well as the language of the relevant UN resolutions,
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recognize the United States as an occupier.23 Occupying powers have certain du-
ties under international law. Specifically, an occupier must not annex the occu-
pied territory; the occupation must be temporary; an occupier must maintain
law and order in the occupied territory;24 and an occupier must secure the basic
human needs of the population.25 Further, both the Hague Regulations and the
Geneva Convention require occupiers to respect the laws of the state they have
occupied, changing them only insofar as is necessary to provide good order.26
Occupiers are also required to manage the resources of the occupied state so as
to prevent waste or misuse; any profits that accrue may be used to pay for the
costs of local administration.27
The occupation of Iraq is unusual in comparison to other recent occupations,
though not entirely unique. In Germany and Japan after World War II, for exam-
ple, the entire governing apparatus of the occupied states did not disappear.
Even though both states had been devastated by bombing and the Allies con-
ducted limited purges and war crimes tribunals, both countries still had well de-
veloped and functional bureaucracies after the war. In Iraq, on the other hand,
the state melted away, or was destroyed or (like the police and military) dis-
banded by the coalition military and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).
The Iraqi bureaucracy was effectively nonexistent when the CPA began the task
of occupation and reconstruction. Moreover, state assets had been looted in the
immediate aftermath of the fighting.
The Iraqi case, in fact, illustrates how the goals of occupation have changed.
No longer do occupiers restore or establish monarchies or authoritarian states as
they had in decades past. In the 1990s in Kosovo, East Timor, and Bosnia, the oc-
cupiers, to the extent that the international peacekeepers can be so described,
worked to establish and protect democracy. In East Timor they even participated
in writing a new constitution. In Iraq, the goals of occupation also include de-
mocratization. Specifically, UN Security Council Resolution 1511 states that the
role of the CPA will “cease when an internationally recognized representative
government established by the people of Iraq is sworn in and assumes the re-
sponsibilities of the Authority”—language that presumes the goal of representa-
tive government.
But there is a contradiction between previous international law and the UN
resolutions giving the CPA certain powers in Iraq. UN Security Council Resolu-
tion 1483 of May 2003 and Resolution 1511 of October 2003 envision a sweep-
ing change of Iraqi politics toward representative government—which Iraq has
never had (except under the northern no-fly zone)—whereas the resolutions
also require the CPA to abide by the Hague Regulations and the Geneva Conven-
tions, which oblige an occupier to respect preexisting laws and forms of
government.
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How should these conflicting responsibilities be resolved? The determination
to respect Iraqi sovereignty and self-determination is certainly laudable, but so
is the desire to bring representative government to Iraq. Moreover, this is only
the latest in a series of cases over the past decade showing how the principles of
sovereignty and self-determination are clashing with the trend to promote dem-
ocratic governments and free market capitalism. Of course, the exercise of the
vote in free elections is not the only important sign of a democracy. Without the
rule of law, a free press, an educated and engaged citizenry, and a thriving civil
society, democracy does not work well, if it can work at all.
The United States and the Coalition Provisional Authority may well argue
that they are justified in remaking Iraq, even if its ambitions seem to violate the
letter and spirit of international law. Advocates of sweeping change would argue
that the United States is both morally and practically required to reshape Iraq’s
government wholly, because of the present lack of a functioning state bureau-
cracy and government services, the danger that the Baathists may return or ex-
tremists may take power, and the shift that began early in the post–Cold War era
toward promoting democracy in postconflict settings. Yet the norm of self-
determination and minimal intervention after war is important, and it does
conflict with the nation-building effort.
This ostensible conflict of international law should probably be interpreted
to suggest that the coalition’s license to remake Iraq, if it has a license at all, is a
relatively narrow one. The United States should not engage in a wholesale re-
structuring of Iraq’s political institutions. That should be the job of Iraqis. In-
stead, the United States should concentrate on its other obligations under
international law—specifically, to provide order and basic needs for Iraqis while
they are under occupation. We should also help Iraq rebuild its infrastructure—
not just because we destroyed much of it or allowed it to be looted, but also be-
cause we supported Saddam in the past, because our sanctions were so devastat-
ing, and because our most recent war was certainly not authorized by the UN
and may arguably have been illegal.
I cannot agree that the liberation of Iraq (the ends) justifies the means in this
case. But, as many have said, the United States is now in Iraq and must shoulder
its responsibilities, which must include a relatively quick exit so that Iraqis can
take up their own governance. The United States has moved to do so, but it can-
not be seen to be completely orchestrating the transfer of power. Iraqis must
own and direct the process. Yet even with the U.S. handover of nominal author-
ity to Iraqis in June 2004, its obligations did not end. Iraqis will need and indeed
deserve some measure of assistance for some years to come. The shape of that as-
sistance and its duration should be decided in full consultation with Iraqis—and
not simply those Iraqi leaders the United States hand-picks for leadership.
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INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY INCREASES
INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY
The legal obligations of an occupying power do not depend on whether the oc-
cupation is legal or illegal. Many members of the United Nations consider the
U.S.-led war against Iraq illegitimate and question the legitimacy and motiva-
tion of the American effort to remake Iraq. Indeed, perceived illegitimacy of the
war and the occupation has impeded the financial and military support the
United States wants from its allies.
One way around this perception of illegitimacy, and also the clash already dis-
cussed between democratization and the limited rights of an occupier to remake
a sovereign state, is to change the structure of legal accountability. At this writ-
ing, the Coalition Provisional Authority and its administrator, Paul Bremer,
have supreme authority in Iraq. The United States and the CPA essentially an-
swer to no one, except indirectly to the American taxpayers. Iraqis have only a
token or nominal role and no one to appeal to when they disagree with U.S. or
CPA policies. Under the currently operative UN Security Council resolutions,
the CPA has provided only a patchwork of procedures, and minimal transpar-
ency and accountability.
Legitimacy and accountability to Iraqis might be greatly enhanced if the oc-
cupation were institutionalized under United Nations authority. The United
States has wanted the mantle of UN legitimacy but has not been willing to cede
any of its own authority to the United Nations. But there is a model of UN trustee-
ship that might work, if the United States would subject itself to oversight and
accountability. There are provisions in the UN Charter, in Chapters XII and XIII,
for states administering territories to place them under UN trusteeship. The co-
alition might declare its administration of Iraq a form of international trustee-
ship and place the CPA under the authority of the UN Trusteeship Council or an
ad hoc council on transitional administration.28 In that way the United States
and the CPA would become accountable both to the council and indirectly to
other nations, as well as to the Iraqi people.29 The United States would remain re-
sponsible for the security of Iraq but under international oversight. The func-
tional equivalent of the Trusteeship Council would hear reports required of the
CPA as trustee; it would also receive petitions and testimony from Iraqis. In turn,
the council would be required to report to the General Assembly on the progress
of the CPA in the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of
Iraq, respect for human rights, and equal treatment and justice for Iraqi citizens.
Placing Iraq under UN trusteeship would have been a novel solution but not
without legal difficulties.30 A modified form of UN trusteeship would have to be
agreed to, of course, by all parties. Still, it would go some way toward bringing
the United States, as an occupying power, back into the framework of
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international law, and UN supervision of the CPA occupation would help to
promote accountability in Iraq’s occupation and decrease the sense—and to
some extent the reality—of crony capitalism in Iraq’s reconstruction. It would
also lessen the perception that the structure of government essentially reflects
a deal between the United States and a small group of unelected, American-
selected Iraqis. The trusteeship relationship would have to be for a limited time
(say, six to eight months), during which the political priority should be the de-
velopment of local institutions of governance and security. The Iraq Governing
Council must become a representative institution in the short term and then be
replaced by an elected assembly. Increasing the openness of the process is vital to
enhancing the quality of the final structure of Iraq’s government and increasing
the perceived legitimacy of the process among Iraqis and international observ-
ers. The interim constitution signed in March 2004 by members of the Iraq Gov-
erning Council must not be seen to be solely a creature of U.S. making. Because
the transition to an Iraqi interim administration in June 2004 was seen as both
undemocratic and orchestrated by the United States to suit its interests in con-
trolling Iraq after the transition, the United States has again fallen short of its
obligations to Iraq. The way to at least in part ameliorate this situation is by sup-
porting those Iraqis who favor democratic institutions and practices, regardless
of whether they pledge 100 percent fealty to the United States.
Other specific steps include building up security forces to promote the stabil-
ity and good order that the United States is obliged to provide as an occupying
power. General Eric Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army from 1999 until
August 2003, argued prior to the conclusion of the war that the United States
would need more troops to occupy Iraq. Securing Iraq may require at least a
hundred thousand more troops, in addition to the 150,000 or so that were there in
late 2003, to guard ammunition dumps, patrol the borders, and provide security
at sensitive facilities, such as oil pipelines, and Iraq’s other crucial infrastructure.31
It is a clear obligation of the United States as an occupier to provide security, the
sine qua non of all else in Iraq. The United States fails to meet its legal and moral
responsibilities to Iraq as long as it fails to do so.
THE MORAL DUTIES OF THE HEGEMON
But the United States is not concerned only with Iraq; it has global aspirations
and, some argue, global responsibilities. Does the United States have particular
moral burdens as the world’s sole superpower? The Bush administration, like
the Clinton and first Bush administrations, argues that the United States does in
fact have great moral responsibilities and duties. Indeed, these post–Cold War
presidents are hardly unique; nearly every American president in the twentieth
century claimed that the United States has a moral obligation to the world. In his
C R A W F O R D 7 7
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Summer_Autumn 2004.vp
Tuesday, September 28, 2004 12:26:32 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
81
War College: Summer/Autumn 2004 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2004
famous June 2002 West Point address, in which he unveiled his preemptive war
doctrine, President Bush also laid out a strong moral position and agenda:
Some worry that it is somehow undiplomatic or impolite to speak the language of
right and wrong. I disagree. Different circumstances require different methods, but
not different moralities. . . .
Moral truth is the same in every culture, in every time and in every place. Targeting
innocent civilians for murder is always and everywhere wrong. Brutality against
women is always and everywhere wrong.
There can be no neutrality between justice and cruelty, between the innocent and the
guilty. We are in a conflict between good and evil, and America will call evil by its
name.
. . . As we defend the peace, we also have an historic opportunity to preserve the
peace. We have our best chance since the rise of the nation state in the 17th century
to build a world where the great powers compete in peace instead of prepare for war.
. . . America stands for more than the absence of war. We have a great opportunity to
extend a just peace, by replacing poverty, repression, and resentment around the
world with hope for a better day. . . . America has a greater objective than controlling
threats and containing resentment. We will work for a just and peaceful world be-
yond the war on terror.32
In his 2003 State of the Union address, President Bush said, “Americans are a
free people, who know that freedom is the right of every person and the future of
every nation. The liberty we prize is not America’s gift to the world; it is God’s
gift to humanity.”33 Further, as the president told the American Enterprise Insti-
tute in February 2003 during the buildup to the war in Iraq, “We meet here dur-
ing a crucial period in the history of our nation, and of the civilized world. Part of
that history was written by others; the rest will be written by us.”34 Here utopian-
ism slides into omnipotence—the United States will write a new global history.
Further, economics has become a matter of moral certitude and high moral
stakes for the Bush administration. The national security strategy argues that
“the concept of ‘free trade’ arose as a moral principle even before it became a pil-
lar of economics.”35 Indeed, freedom is defined in economic terms. “If you can
make something that others value, you should be able to sell it to them. If others
make something that you value, you should be able to buy it. This is real free-
dom, the freedom for a person—or a nation to make a living.”36
The strategy articulates economic development in terms of a moral mission.
“A world where some live in comfort and plenty, while half of the human race
lives on less than $2 a day, is neither just nor stable. Including all of the world’s
poor in an expanding circle of development—and opportunity—is a moral im-
perative and one of the top priorities of U.S. international policy” (page 21). The
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irony, of course, is that the United States has one of the lowest rates of foreign aid
among developed countries. Freedom in this case is the freedom to follow the
American free market formula. Thus, the administration says, “We have a moral
obligation to measure the success of our development assistance by whether it is
delivering results” (page 22).
This sense of a great moral mission to remake the world—“the rest will be
written by us”—is part of the strategy to combat terrorism. Bush’s remarks May
2003 at the Coast Guard Academy show the causal links the administration
draws between this moral vision and U.S. security:
We find our greatest security in the advance of human freedom. Free societies look to
the possibilities of the future, instead of feeding old resentments and bitterness. Free
countries build wealth and prosperity for their people in an atmosphere of stability
and order, instead of seeking weapons of mass murder and attacking their neighbors.
Because America loves peace, America will always work and sacrifice for the expan-
sion of freedom. . . . These goals—advancing against disease, hunger and poverty—
will bring greater security to our country. They are also the moral purpose of Ameri-
can influence. They set an agenda for our government, and they give idealistic citi-
zens a great cause to serve.37
The moral mission also goes hand in hand with the new preemptive war doc-
trine. The administration sees a seamless global web of U.S. interests and vulner-
abilities. In the words of the new National Security Strategy, “Today, the
distinction between domestic and foreign affairs is diminishing. In a globalized
world, events beyond America’s borders have a greater impact inside them.”38
Specifically, as the perception of American economic and political interests has
enlarged—has become more global—so has the sense of U.S. vulnerability. The
2001 Quadrennial Defense Review emphasized that “the United States has inter-
ests, responsibilities, and commitments that span the world. As a global power
with an open society, the United States is affected by trends, events and influ-
ences that originate from beyond its borders.”39 This is an understanding of the
United States as a global power with global interests and vulnerabilities. In this
view of a global American self, it is understood to be legitimate to intervene ev-
erywhere in “self ” defense.
The post-9/11 context of terrorism creates a sense in which the state is always
under threat. Terrorism, understood as war, expands the concepts and practice
of war temporally and conceptually, in part because “the threat of terrorist at-
tack is terrorism.”40 Counterterrorism, conceived of primarily as war, similarly
explodes the limits on war, because, as Secretary Rumsfeld repeatedly empha-
sizes about terrorism, “There is no way to defend everywhere at every time
against every technique. Therefore you simply have to go after them.”41 The
global self is always under threat, because terrorists are potentially always ready
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to strike. The possible targets of terrorism must be in a constant state of mobili-
zation and preparedness, and thus the conceptual and political lines between
war and peace tend to become blurred. The contemporary counterterror con-
text thus lacks distinct “battlefields” and “fronts,” while the speed of events and
technologies places great pressure on leaders for immediate decision making.
“Our security will require . . . a military that must be ready to strike at a mo-
ment’s notice in any dark corner of the world. And our security will require all
Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive ac-
tion when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives.”42
The world appears so uncertain and dangerous to the Bush administration—
the “international system . . . has become more fluid and unpredictable,” a “geo-
political setting that is increasingly complex and unpredictable”—that it is con-
vinced that the United States must prepare for every possible future military
contingency with a military capability.43 The administration seeks to “shape the
strategic landscape” and “promote stability” because it is so troubled by
unpredictability.
The Bush administration has also redefined its view of threats in line with its
understanding of the globalization of technologies that might conceivably be
used to produce weapons of mass destruction. In the past, it took years and tre-
mendous resources to mount a threat to the United States or to regional stability.
This meant that defenses could be mobilized. The administration believes that
the diffusion of technological capacity has changed that truism. The 2002 Na-
tional Security Strategy argues, “We must adapt the concept of imminent threat
to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries.”44 The president says,
“The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and tech-
nology.”45 Further, as the president’s national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice,
has argued, “new technology requires new thinking about when a threat actually
becomes ‘imminent.’ So as a matter of common sense, the United States must be
prepared to take action, when necessary, before threats have fully materialized.”46
As the counterproliferation and preemptive/preventive-war doctrines attest,
the administration assumes that “possession” of weapons or efforts to acquire
them is tantamount to intent to use these forces offensively against the United
States. The goal of preeminence and the adoption of “capabilities-based” plan-
ning underscore this fear of any other state having anything approaching the
level of U.S. military power. If this is the understanding of the threat and the
strategic context, imminent threat is not the threshold any longer for action;
mortal threats requiring response are always imminent. In other words, the dif-
ference in terms of time between a distant threat that one might be able to deter
or defend against and an immediate or imminent threat to which the only pru-
dent response is preemption has telescoped and even collapsed. The distinction
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between a potential adversary and a likely one also collapses in this view of the
world. If this is really the view of the administration, it has not been disingenu-
ous in labeling the Bush doctrine as “preemptive”; it sees little if any difference
between the present and the possible future.
In other words, the Bush administration appears to believe that because of
globalization (understood as political and economic interdependence as well as
the diffusion of high technology), the United States cannot afford to let the rest
of the world run itself as it pleases. That freedom is simply too dangerous. Free
market democracies are more peaceful and prosperous, it argues—and prosper-
ity decreases the attractiveness of terrorist action and the ideologies of terrorists.
Thus, the moral mission proclaimed so loudly by the Bush administration is
tightly linked to U.S. security objectives. I cannot but agree that many of the ad-
ministration’s objectives are laudable. If the goals are laudable and also promote
American interests, why indeed should not the administration set about remak-
ing the world in the image of the United States? Is not the “rightful place” of the
United States, the world’s most powerful nation, in front, calling the shots?
There are at least two reasons—both ethical and prudential—why the United
States should nonetheless refrain from acting hegemonically. First, if the admin-
istration truly believes in democracy and self-determination, it must not ignore
the agency of others as free and equal participants in the achievement of their
own aspirations. There is ample evidence that the current administration does
not in fact trust others to be the architects of their own destinies. An example of
this paternalism can be found in the liberation and subsequent governance of
Iraq under the Coalition Provisional Authority. American soldiers pulled down
the statue of Saddam. The Iraqis did not, ultimately, do the deed; we rushed in to
do it for them. The United States then handpicked the interim Iraqi government,
severely constrained its powers, and has (at this writing) tried to sideline calls for
an immediate direct election.
Second, the United States should not set about remaking the world because
it does not have all the answers. Local solutions sometimes are not only seen to
be more legitimate but are better than the ones the United States might try to
impose unilaterally or through international institutions. Indeed, in its self-
righteousness the administration ignores how its own behavior sometimes
harms the life chances of individuals in the rest of the globe and works against
the values it claims to want to promote. One cannot urge others to respect inter-
national law, abide by democratic norms, and behave peacefully in the world if
one’s own behavior sometimes undermines those very values.
There is a third reason why the United States should not attempt to remake
the world. The surest way to create resistance is to tell others how they should
run their affairs. The Declaration of Independence is a litany of the ways in
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which imperialism breeds resentment. For this reason alone, many of the Bush
policies are neither prudent nor effective; they are, in fact, counterproductive to
U.S. interests.
PRINCIPIA LEVIATHAN
What would be a better way to promote the democratic values we all want to see
develop in the world? A moral foreign and military policy would, first of all, en-
tail a discussion within the United States and the international community of
the U.S. role in the world. That means that American leaders should not do all
the talking but instead a good deal more listening.
Second, the United States needs to develop a sustainable grand strategy to
promote democracy and human rights in a nonpaternalistic and respectful way.
A sustainable foreign policy must also, of course, deal with the global challenges
of terrorism, energy, and global environmental change. These challenges are
linked, in the sense that the United States needs a sustainable energy policy that
will in the long run get the United States out of the Middle East and out of the
business of supporting despots who promise access to oil. Simply proclaiming
that despots should change their spots does not accomplish that goal. The hu-
man rights of those in civil society who are working to create democracy from
below should be protected, and resources should be channeled to those with
truly democratic visions and programs. Support for human rights obviously in-
cludes ensuring that prisoners of war and detainees receive due process and are
not tortured. Further, as a global superpower, the United States should take up
the maxim of “first do no harm,” which means decreasing support to dictators
and authoritarian regimes around the globe and increasing support for leaders
who promote human rights.
Third, a more moral foreign policy would be more multilateral, a step toward
developing the rule of law rather than the rule of force. The assumption in some
quarters in Washington seems to be that the United States belongs on top,
alone—there is hardly another way to take the meaning of “preeminence.” Yet
there are costs to going it alone, beyond the financial burdens of trying to re-
shape the world on the back of the U.S. treasury. The nascent institu-
tionalization of the rule of law is jeopardized when one state takes it upon itself
to be rule maker, rule breaker, judge, jury, and occasionally executioner. We are
all better off in a stable world of rules that all expect others to abide by. This
means adhering to negotiated and binding solutions to problems that range
from arms control to the environment and trade.
Specifically, the American policy on the nonproliferation of weapons of mass
destruction would be advanced if the United States were itself seriously bound
by arms control. In other words, until the United States develops a more
8 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Summer_Autumn 2004.vp
Tuesday, September 28, 2004 12:26:33 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
86
Naval War College Review, Vol. 57 [2004], No. 3, Art. 28
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol57/iss3/28
nuanced nonproliferation policy that entails dealing with its own nuclear forces,
it will find it hard to get others to forgo their own weapons of mass destruction.
That means in particular that the United States should return to serious nuclear
arms control. The Bush administration has abrogated the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty and refuses to submit the Comprehensive Test Ban treaty for ratification.
The administration has signed one major arms control treaty, the May 2002 nu-
clear arms reduction treaty between the United States and Russia. The New York
Times characterized that agreement as “the most dramatic nuclear arms cut in
decades,” yet there is less here than meets the eye.47 The Strategic Offensive Re-
ductions Treaty (SORT) actually eliminates few weapons—the total number of
U.S. nuclear weapons would go from 10,600 to ten thousand. Rather, it takes
four thousand nuclear weapons off alert—at some indeterminate point within
the next decade—and puts them in storage. The majority of the American nu-
clear weapons covered by the treaty will not be dismantled. Instead, they will be
available for redeployment when the treaty expires—the day after it becomes ef-
fective, ten years after it was signed. Further, the Nonproliferation Treaty will be-
come essentially ineffective if the United States refuses to live up to its
obligations (under article 6) to reduce and eliminate its nuclear forces.
In addition, the United States should reconsider its stance on treaties that the
majority of the world’s nations have found useful for security, the global envi-
ronment, and the promotion of the rule of law. Specifically, the United States
should accede to the antipersonnel land-mine treaty, join the International
Criminal Court, and ratify the Kyoto Protocol even if none of these treaties is
perfect from an American perspective. In some cases, perfect is the enemy of
good enough. It is unreasonable for the United States to expect cooperation on
the war on terror or on global trade if it impedes international cooperation in
other spheres. The manifest unfairness of U.S. policy only creates resentment
and gives cover to scofflaws. How is it fair, for example, that just 5 percent of the
world’s population produces over 25 percent of the world’s greenhouse gases?
Fourth, the United States should adopt a security policy in line with inter-
national law and the just war tradition. Specifically, it should renounce the
preemptive-war doctrine, which is illegal and imprudent. Preemptive war is
seen by others as preventive war, because of the broad way in which the United
States has defined its interests and its threats. In defending the preemptive doc-
trine, Condoleezza Rice once referred to Daniel Webster’s “famous defense of an-
ticipatory self-defense.”48 But Rice missed Webster’s point. He sought precisely
to limit the resort to preemption, even in the name of self-defense. Preemption,
after all, initiates violent conflict, so it must meet demanding strictures. By
drawing a sharp line between legitimate preemption and illegitimate aggression
Webster sought to avoid what he called “bloody and exasperated war.”
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It is worth recalling Webster’s argument in detail. In December 1837 British mili-
tary forces based in Canada learned that a private American ship, the Caroline, was
ferrying arms, recruits, and supplies from Buffalo, New York, to a group of
anti-British rebels on Navy Island, in the Niagara River upstream of the falls on the
Canadian side of the border. On the night of 29 December, a British and Canadian
force set out to destroy the ship. They did not find the Caroline at the island but
tracked it down in American waters. While most aboard slept, the troops boarded
the ship, attacked the crew and passengers, and set the vessel on fire. They then
towed the Caroline into the current and released it to drift toward Niagara Falls,
where it broke up and sank. Most on board escaped, but one man was apparently ex-
ecuted, and several others remained unaccounted for and were presumed dead.
In a letter to Daniel Webster, then secretary of state, the British ambassador,
Henry Fox, defended the incursion into U.S. territory and the raid on the Caro-
line. British forces had simply acted in self-defense, he said, protecting themselves
against “unprovoked attack” with preemptive force.49 In his eloquent reply
Webster rejected that argument and articulated a set of demanding criteria for a
“necessity of self-defense”—in particular, for legitimate preemptive force. Pre-
emption, Webster said, is justified only in response to an imminent threat; more-
over, the force must be necessary for self-defense and can be deployed only after
nonlethal measures and attempts to dissuade the adversary have failed. Further-
more, a preemptive attack must be limited to the immediate threat and must dis-
criminate between the armed and unarmed, the innocent and guilty. The British
attack on the Caroline, Webster argued, failed miserably by these standards:
It will be for that Government [the British] to show a necessity of self-defence, in-
stant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation. It
will be for it to show, also, that the local authorities of Canada,—even supposing the
necessity of the moment authorized them to enter the territories of the United States
at all,—did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act, justified by the necessity
of self-defense, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it. It must
be shown that admonition or remonstrance to the persons on board the “Caroline”
was impracticable, or would have been unavailing; it must be shown that daylight
could not be waited for; that there could be no attempt at discrimination between the
innocent and the guilty; that it would not have been enough to seize and detain the
vessel; but that there was a necessity, present and inevitable, for attacking her in the
darkness of night, while moored to the shore, and while unarmed men were asleep
on board, killing some and wound[ing] others, and then drawing her into the cur-
rent above the cataract, setting her on fire, and, careless to know whether there might
not be in her the innocent with the guilty, or the living with the dead, committing
her to a fate that fills the imagination with horror. A necessity for all this the govern-
ment of the United States cannot believe to have existed.
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Webster concluded that “if such things [as the attack on the Caroline] be allowed
to occur, they must lead to bloody and exasperated war.”50
The present administration argues, of course, that we do not live in Daniel
Webster’s world, in which “terrorists” seek “martyrdom” and leaders of “rogue
states” are often risk prone and willing to sacrifice the lives of their people; in
which preparations to attack the United States are often not visible (terrorists
may use “weapons of mass destruction” that “can be easily concealed, delivered
covertly, and used without warning”); and in which attacks may be devastating.
For these reasons we need to revise our understanding of when a threat is “im-
minent”—“We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities
and objectives of today’s adversaries.”51 The United States cannot wait, in this
view, for a “smoking gun” if the smoke comes in the form of a mushroom cloud.
I do not dispute the administration’s moral premise, that the right to self-
defense sometimes permits preemption. The problem is that the preemption
doctrine has collapsed the distinction between imminent (immediate) and po-
tential future threats. It assumes that grave threats are now always imminent. Yet
such a view is both inaccurate and ultimately dangerous. In postulating that we
are always in grave danger of immediate assault, we lose precisely the time we
need to distinguish between potential threats and likely ones; we also may tend
to strike first, without much evidence. Further, in assuming that the world is one
of imminent and grave peril (immanent threat), the United States deemphasizes
diplomacy, arms control, and negotiation, turning instead to the use of force be-
cause it assumes there is little or no time for these measures. In fact, however, the
presumption of imminent threat makes us less secure. Even in the new security
environment, distinctions between short and long-term threats and between
different sorts of potential adversaries remain fundamental. Denying the impor-
tance of these distinctions, as the administration sometimes does, is morally un-
acceptable and will lead to greater instability. As Bismarck said in 1875, “I would
. . . never advise Your Majesty to declare war forthwith, simply because it ap-
peared that our opponent would begin hostilities in the near future. One can
never anticipate the ways of divine providence securely enough for that.”52
Finally, the United States should modify its counterproliferation doctrine.
Threatening the use of nuclear weapons or conventional war to counter the de-
velopment or possession of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons by others
only spurs others to get those weapons in order to deter the United States itself
from attack. Some potential proliferators may be cowed in the short run into re-
linquishing their weapons programs, but other states are likely to accelerate
their attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction.
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AN ETHICAL APPROACH CAN YIELD A MORE SECURE
UNITED STATES
The United States can pursue its security interests and an ethical foreign policy
at the same time. In fact, the present administration has tried to do so, by infus-
ing its foreign policy with a moral mission. The problem has been that its moral-
ism has been a narrow one of promoting American interests and values
regardless of how its behavior affects others, on the assumption that what is
good for the United States is good for the rest of the world. Indeed, the Pax
Americana pursued since the 9/11 attacks has been dangerous, although in
many ways no great departure from the agendas of recent administrations. First,
it has institutionalized fear in U.S. foreign policy, although American vulnera-
bility is actually little different from what it used to be. Of course, the 11 Septem-
ber terrorist attacks were devastating, but U.S. vulnerability to attack is
essentially the same or perhaps lower primarily because the United States has in-
creased its vigilance in the wake of those attacks. Fear and an understandable
sense of righteous injury and indignation have led to a frantic urgency to make
the globe safe. Nearly blinded by fear, the administration apparently believes (at
least, some of its members do) that the United States can do no wrong and that
the ends of global peace on U.S. terms justify any means. The administration can-
not see outside the logic of ever-expanding force and military preeminence. Its
fear and moral certainty combined with its awesome power have created a deadly
cocktail.
It may be no exaggeration to suggest that the U.S. war against Iraq in 2003—
not the 9/11 attacks—will prove to have been the turning point in American for-
eign policy and in global history. Immediately after the campaign, a survey of in-
ternational opinion in twenty countries by the Pew Research Center for the
People and the Press found that the United States was seen unfavorably in thir-
teen of those countries. In the seven countries surveyed where support remained
above 50 percent, it had declined. The center’s director observed, “The war has
widened the rift between Americans and Western Europeans, further inflamed
the Muslim world, softened support for the war on terrorism, and significantly
weakened global support for the pillars of the post–World War II era—the U.N.
and the North Atlantic alliance.”53 The failure to honor promises to secure Iraq
immediately, to feed and fight simultaneously, tarnished the luster of U.S. om-
nipotence. The subsequent failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq,
and ultimately the revelation that there had almost certainly been none to
find—after the Pentagon had said it knew where those weapons were—is seen as
a sign of falseness on the part of the United States and has deeply undermined
American credibility.
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The aspiring leviathan is not all-powerful; the United States cannot create a
global Pax Americana through brute force or by ideological aversion to the rule
of law and multilateral institutions. Contrary to the president’s argument in
February 2003 the rest of global history will not, in other words, be written solely
by the United States. All empires face limits and ultimately fall. But even so, the
U.S. effort to dominate world politics, to impose a Pax Americana, will do much
to create the common historical consciousness of shared concerns of the kind
that constitutes a new global historical epoch. Just as in the 1960s, when the U.S.
space program culminated in the nationalist act of planting an American flag on
the moon, the country’s aspirations and actions today will, ironically, catalyze
and cement a global perspective. The United States can in fact pursue a moral
policy in Iraq and in the rest of the world. Indeed, the integration of ethical rea-
soning with prudence is the most promising route to success in both the war on
terror and the promotion of democracy and stability in Iraq and elsewhere.
The U.S. government has assumed a high level of moralism, and many of its
goals are laudable. But the administration’s moralism should not be mistaken
for an ethical foreign policy. Anyone can say, and even sincerely believe, that
what he or she does is good for themselves and for others. The mark of an ethical
foreign policy is that it conforms with the highest principles of international law,
the bedrock principle of which is respect for the autonomy of others; that the
majority of the world agrees that action taken pursuant to that policy is just; and
that implementation of the policy does not contradict its purposes. Ultimately,
if the United States will not be bound by principles or laws that it champions, it
has not acted ethically. In this respect, the policies of the Bush administration in
Iraq and elsewhere have much farther to go.
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NEW RULES FOR WAR?
Joel Rosenthal
In launching a campaign to disarm and liberate Iraq, the United States hascrossed, some say hurdled across, two thresholds—one strategic, the other dip-
lomatic. Strategically, the United States delivered on its promise to act in self-
defense, absent an actual or even imminent armed attack, against threats from
weapons of mass destruction. Diplomatically, the United States demonstrated
its willingness to act decisively and unilaterally, if nec-
essary, in the face of strong opposition from its allies.
Some saw these crossings as courageous leadership, but
others saw them as reckless. My purpose is not to re-
hearse the familiar pros and cons of preemption and
unilateralism but rather to suggest that a fuller, moral
accounting is needed of these concepts and some of the
side issues they raise—thus the question mark in the ti-
tle of this article.
My answer is that we do not need new rules, as
some have suggested. The old rules are fine. They give
us all the normative guidance we need. But that said,
these old rules and the principles they instantiate do
need to be considered in light of new circumstances—
specifically the challenge presented by a nonstate actor
with an avowed goal of violating just about any rule that
we hold dear. With that in mind, it is imperative to re-
view our record of the past year and to “think forward.”
Dr. Rosenthal is the president of the Carnegie Council
on Ethics and International Affairs in New York. The
Council is an independent, nonpartisan, and nonprofit
organization formed to promote understanding of the
values and conditions that ensure peaceful relations
among nations. He received his Ph.D. from Yale Uni-
versity in 1988. He is the editor of the journal Ethics &
International Affairs and of the collection Ethics and
International Affairs: A Reader (2d ed., 1995); he is the
author of Righteous Realists (1991) and also of a num-
ber of articles including the “Ethics” entry in Bruce W.
Jentleson et al., Encyclopedia of U.S. Foreign Rela-
tions (1996). Dr. Rosenthal was the charter author and
first chairman of the International Ethics section of the
International Studies Association. He is an adjunct pro-
fessor in the Department of Politics at New York
University.
This article is adapted from an address to the Naval
War College’s fifteenth annual Professional Ethics Con-
ference in November 2003.
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In pursuing this war on terrorism from Afghanistan to Iraq and in shadowy
places less often mentioned, what have Americans gained? What have we lost as a
country that likes to think of itself as a moral nation? Do we have sufficient nor-
mative or ethical guideposts to direct us as we move forward in this new war
against terrorists? What areas might need more work, more reflection, even
some rethinking? My perspective may differ from what members of the military
and national security communities usually hear. My world is one of ethicists,
philosophers, students, diplomats, journalists, business executives, and leaders
of nongovernmental organizations—only occasionally military officers. But the
questions raised in my world desperately need the perspective that military ex-
periences and point of view can offer.
This is what my world tells me. That moral climate for the use of military
force is defined by two factors. The first is radical asymmetry in political, eco-
nomic, and military power between the United States and the rest of the world;
the second is a robust resort to moralism, high moral rhetoric, and the moral
motivation that accompanies ideological struggle. These overarching factors,
asymmetry and moralism, dominate our political discourse and frame our un-
derstanding of the challenges we are facing. From them emerge six specific is-
sues of real ethical concern. Just war principles and current law of armed conflict
help to address them, but both sources leave a good deal of room for interpreta-
tion. Ultimately, these six issues require moral reasoning and reflection.
• “War” as the model for the struggle against terrorism
• The relevance of the concepts of prevention, preemption, and deterrence
• The combatant/noncombatant distinction in the Iraq conflict
• “Shock and awe”
• Hidden costs of the war in Iraq and the war on terrorism
• Postconflict responsibilities in Iraq.
ASYMMETRY AND MORALISM
There is a tendency to think that everything changed on 11 September 2001, that
as of 8:48 AM Eastern Daylight Time, the old rules no longer applied. Let me offer
a different interpretation. For all that indeed did change on that day, it may be
more important that so much remained the same. From 1991 to 2001, American-
led interventions from the Persian Gulf to the Balkans confirmed that in both
geopolitical and strictly military terms, American power far outstripped that of
any rival. This nation, while drawing down from Cold War levels, was still devel-
oping its capacity to deliver lethal force around the world.
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Now there was some debate about how this power should be projected, and it
even rose to the level of presidential politics in the year 2000. Candidate George
W. Bush’s foreign policy platform was dismissive of nation building and highly
critical of the platform of his opponent, Al Gore, of “forward engagement,” em-
phasizing as it did the need to create the conditions of a stable world order by
committing resources to address a variety of emerging global issues.
Yet for all of this debate on the margins, the unshakable fact remains that the
decade 1991 to 2001 was characterized by a United States that was feeling its way
regarding how to use its military power and newfound technological capability
in a world transformed by the end of the Cold War, a world without the Soviet
Union. What is more, it became apparent during this decade that “soft” and
“hard” power advantages enjoyed by the United States might actually lower the
threshold for the use of military force. Long-range bombing with precision-
guided munitions was making the use of force more accurate, more lethal, and
much cheaper. By “cheaper” I do not mean cost per weapon but efficiency in
terms of doing more with fewer personnel and less equipment. Perhaps most
important of all, war was becoming less expensive in terms of casualties. The
specter of low casualties, even no casualties, seemed to make war a palatable op-
tion in ways previously unknown. We do it because we can. The costs seem ac-
ceptable. Even collateral damage seems low as weapons get better and as
“targeteers” and strategists find clever alternatives.
What does this mean for us today in the war against Iraq? How much of the
decision to take the war to Iraq was influenced by this ten-year background of
asymmetry? Did the United States decide to remove Saddam Hussein literally
because it could? Major combat casualties for coalition forces were relatively
low, as predicted and hoped for. The job was exceedingly well done. But as all
know, intelligence about weapons of mass destruction and al-Qa‘ida connec-
tions to Iraq was vague at best. The war was launched because, as President
Bush put it, “in a world where terrorists can get their hands on weapons of mass
destruction, the risk of inaction is greater than the risk of action.”
The risk of action, however, is low in today’s world of asymmetric American
power and is likely to continue to be low. Could it be that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq
was in some manner a target of convenience, an identifiable target that could be
defeated while the criminal network of Bin Laden continued to threaten?
The administration has hinted that the war in Iraq was meant to have a
demonstration effect. In a speech about counterterrorism policy given on 30
October 2003, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice put it this way: “Un-
til September 11 the terrorists faced no sustained systematic global response.
They became emboldened, and the result was more terror and more victims.
U.S. policy was not working with North Korea. No, it was not working with Iran.
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No, having Iraq for twelve years defy United Nations on seventeen different reso-
lutions—it wasn’t working. We had to confront that.”
With this in mind, we must ask ourselves: Have radical asymmetry and mili-
tary capability made it too easy in a way to militarize certain intractable prob-
lems in a good-faith effort to solve them? As the cliché goes, if you have a
hammer, every problem looks like a nail. The U.S. military is so good—let us
give it the opportunity to do what it does so well. Let’s define the problem in
such a way that it can.
This is a tentative conclusion, not a firm one, raised not for purposes of polit-
ical judgment or partisan politics but simply to understand the logic of the ac-
tion. Has the slide down the slope of asymmetric war now led Americans to
think of force as a way to send a message or demonstrate resolve? Do we now en-
gage in wars of choice rather than wars of strict necessity? The threshold of will-
ingness to use force seems to have dropped because the cost has remained low.
But what happens when the costs rise? What happens when long-range bombing
is not enough to do the job, when ground troops are necessary? What about the
specter of guerilla warfare, as now faced by the army of occupation in Iraq? Here
we see the other side of asymmetry. Here we see foes unrestrained, anxious to use
the weight of U.S. power and the moral standards of Americans against them.
There is political as well as military asymmetry. American frustrations with
the United Nations Security Council, understandable as they are, led them to a
worrisome place. I have heard on more than one occasion the exhortation,
“Lead, follow, or get out of the way.” That sounds inspiring at first, but is it the
way to proceed? Besides its obvious arrogance in belittling the legitimate inter-
ests of others, would it not seem more logical to persuade and gain consensus
where possible? Does it not make sense to search for congruences of interest in
good old-fashioned win-win propositions where possible? Does it not make
sense to seek cooperation in a war against terrorism that by its very definition is
global in scope? Now there is enough cynicism to go around, and it is right to re-
ject the expedient, self-serving behavior of those who seek only to obstruct, with
arrogance and in bold self-interest. But we are speaking here of the general rule
that the United States, the world’s greatest single power, should adopt.
The world stood united on 12 September 2001. A global consensus condemn-
ing terrorism emerged. There was much resolution expressed to fight it. NATO
invoked Article V—an unprecedented act. We must face the fact that somehow,
though global consensus condemning terrorism still holds, global resolve on
fighting it has cracked.
The second big-picture factor relates to the very ways in which we think,
speak, write, and communicate about the war of terrorism. Using language laced
with terms like “good,” “evil,” and “evildoers,” President Bush has framed the
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war on terrorism in distinctly moral terms. To some degree, this has been quite re-
freshing and positive. The president has erased lingering notions of moral equiva-
lence, the corrupt idea that one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.
The president has made it clear that the random killing of innocent people is
simply wrong. He has made it crystal clear that suicide bombers are not martyrs.
They do not die persecuted for their faith; they die misguided killers of innocent
bystanders. They die with hatred and death in their hearts, not love and life.
The president has also made it clear that it is justifiable and right to rid the
world of those who would do such deeds, and he takes it as his responsibility as
defender of the free world to do so. But for all of the good President Bush and the
U.S. government have done in pursuing what might be called this politics of
moral certainty, dangers come with it. We should be mindful that for all of our
rightness in fighting the evil of terrorism, such a fight does not come without a
cost. We should not become intoxicated with our own goodness.
In just war tradition, we are speaking of the problem of “dirty hands.” Even in
pursuit of just causes, hard trade-offs are sometimes called for. We must not be
cavalier about them. World War II was a good war, and yet beyond the sacrifices
of American soldiers, it cost us—I emphasize, us—the cataclysm of Hiroshima.
The Cold War was a good war too, yet it cost very uneasy compromises with dic-
tators and authoritarians who were less than virtuous in many ways. Similarly,
today, in our good war on terrorism, we must remain aware that it will demand
unpleasant compromises. These compromises include dealing again with many
an unsavory character abroad, as well as compromises with civil liberties at
home. Will we look the other way concerning specific human rights abuses if do-
ing so will help us in this good war on terror? The answer is likely yes. Will we
grant restrictions on civil liberties? The answer is already yes. We have taken
other steps too, including preemptive military action. That by definition is a dif-
ficult trade-off.
So in our struggle against evil and evildoers, let us not be too easy on our-
selves, or self-righteous. The great American theologian of the World War II and
Cold War generations, Reinhold Niebuhr, wrote of this theme in his 1944 book,
The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness. Niebuhr was just as fearful of
the so-called children of light as of the children of darkness. His “children of
light” are those who believe in universal reason. Truths are clear to them, and
they believe their ideals can be harnessed and then realized. Their idealism and
good intentions can lead, innocently, to misfortune. The “children of darkness”
are motivated primarily by self-interest, and as such they have a better sense of
the interests and claims of others. They understand human nature and politics
as an inevitable clash of interests. The children of darkness seek to negotiate dif-
ference rather than transcend it. They understand the need to confront evil
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without being able to eradicate it entirely. They understand the tragedy of hu-
man existence and the limits that humans face.
What we have seen since 2001 in the very person of President Bush is a radical
transformation of a realist into an idealist, a child of darkness transformed into
a child of light. With the war on terror, the president has put faces on evil—the
faces of Bin Laden and Hussein—and he now seeks to remove them and their
colleagues from the earth. While such a removal of these players may be neces-
sary and proper and just, we must ask: Where will we go from here? Can evil re-
ally be eradicated? Can we purify the world? Can it be done by military force?
Should it be done by military force?
ISSUES FOR MORAL REASONING AND REFLECTION
Now let us take up the six specific issues of real ethical concern that arise from this
background, these overarching factors. The first is the concept of “war” itself.
War as a Model
Following the attack of 11 September, President Bush declared a new war, the
war on terror. That statement was universally accepted, yet it was unclear at the
time just what sort of war this would be. Would it be a traditional war, with mili-
tary campaigns and the taking of territories? That might be the case in the early
stages, especially in rooting out the Taliban in Afghanistan. It was universally
understood that this new war would also be unconventional in many ways. The
new war was being waged against an enemy that was not a state. The enemy
would not provide any of the legitimacy, accountability, or reciprocity implicit
in the competent authority of a state. The enemy would not abide by the law of
armed conflict; if anything, the enemy would seek to use the moral sensibilities
of the West as a weakness to be exploited. While there was much talk of assigning
responsibility to states—“Stand with the civilized world, or stand with the ter-
rorists”*—the fact remained that the enemy was essentially a nonstate criminal
network. Strategists spoke of the need to use all tools in the tool kit, including fi-
nancial and diplomatic pressure, and various carrots and sticks to break down
and destroy terrorist networks. Yet for all of this mobilization of resources, after
the Afghanistan campaign in 2002 (and before the invasion and liberation of
Iraq) it was unclear whether this war on terrorism was in fact an ongoing “hot
war,” a military campaign. Alternatively, was it a cold war, in which society
would mobilize for an all-out effort in which military engagement is mostly sub-
terranean, sporadic, even peripheral, merely part of a larger struggle?
Was President Bush using, in the tradition of William James, a rhetorical de-
vice to rally support? Was he in fact asking for a moral equivalent of war, a
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complete commitment, such as we have seen in the so-called war on poverty, war
on crime, war on drugs? The decision for war in Iraq suggests that he had some-
thing else in mind—deliberate, classic militarization.
The alternative and perhaps complementary model would be the criminal-
justice approach. The criminal-justice approach is not necessarily limited to the
serving of warrants and the arresting of criminals—it can also be a robust and
deliberate use of force, targeted at specific perpetrators. Terrorists are murderers
and outlaws. They work in criminal gangs and networks, much like interna-
tional organized crime. In this way of thinking about combating terrorism the
focus is not necessarily the taking down of states but the taking down of net-
works. States as part of these networks might become subject to preemption,
lethal force, and deception, but the most important targets are tightly restricted
to terrorists and their immediate networks. States continue to be held responsi-
ble for what happens within them; however, they may lose legitimacy and be
subject to intervention in the pursuit of vital threats.
Here we return to the question of new rules for a new war. Are we at war? Are
we at peace? Or are we somewhere in between? In Iraq we are still clearly at war.
Roadside bombs and the other violence of every day’s news clearly attest to that.
In the broader struggle with terrorism, we are still at war against those whose
avowed mission is the infliction of death and destruction upon us. But should
we complement our traditional pursuit of this war with a criminal justice ap-
proach that recognizes the ongoing need for policing? Can we graft the criminal-
justice approach to the realist model of international relations that we have been
following so faithfully? After all, the liberations of Afghanistan and Iraq did not
end terrorism. There will be no surrender or peace treaty with terrorists. The
war against them will go on, just as the war against crime in America continues
in perpetuity. The war analogy takes us only so far, absent the criminal-justice
dimension. At some point, we come back to the persistent criminal threat and
the need for cooperation in meeting it. We would do well to think about rules
with this in mind.
Prevention, Preemption, and Deterrence
Deterrence has not been much discussed regarding this war on terror. Cold War
assumptions about deterrence were born of nuclear strategy and the doctrine of
mutual assured destruction. But Cold War deterrence was based on symmetry,
on expected and credible threats. Nuclear deterrence had a logic and structure of
its own, even if it also contained moral perversities and paradoxes. Credible and
reliable threats, as immoral as they might be, maximized the possibilities for
peace and thus, it was argued, could be seen as serving a greater good. Can any
such idea of deterrence be helpful as we think strategically about combating
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terrorism, the ultimate asymmetric war? There can be no balance of terror
against suicide bombers. There is no structure of expected reciprocal behavior.
On first glance, it would seem that deterrence is a nonstarter in this situation.
Prevention and preemption seem the likelier alternatives. But pause here a mo-
ment—is there no way to deter terrorists? Some terrorists, to be sure, cannot be
deterred. The truly criminal cannot be satisfied or scared or deterred; they have
no demand that can be met, they seek only destruction. Yet some terrorists do
have political agendas. They do have goals and aspirations. Can and should we
consider potential deterrent strategies? Can we threaten punishments—swift,
sure, and credible—that will dissuade them? Here we focus on networks and in-
frastructures again, but where do we go with that? Should we think of the re-
moval of Saddam as the first step in the creation of a new deterrent strategy, a
willingness to take down states that might harbor terrorist threats? If so, will that
logic hold up? Can we continue to deliver such swift, sure, and credible punish-
ments, worldwide and in perpetuity? Can we then assume all the moral respon-
sibilities for rebuilding that doing so would entail? In targeting terrorist
networks, what becomes fair game? How far out do we draw that circle? Can we
threaten nonlethal punishments against people near and dear to terrorists? Is
that ethical? Will this type of deterrence work? If it might, what would its moral
status be? This leads to my third point: Who is a combatant and who a noncom-
batant in this new war?
The Combatant/Noncombatant Distinction
It is easy to assign combatant status to avowed, “card carrying” members of al-
Qa‘ida. Few in the West regretted the killing in November 2002 of known
al-Qa‘ida operatives in the Yemeni desert by a Predator drone firing a Hellfire
missile. This case may be indicative of the future of this new war, and as such it
raises important questions about rules. Among those questions is who decides
what and who are legitimate targets for such attacks, and based on what criteria
and what information? Who else might be present; in the Yemen case, who else
might have been in the car that was destroyed? Who decides what level of collat-
eral damage is acceptable, and what is the review procedure for such decisions?
Apparently the Predator in the 2002 attack fell under the jurisdiction of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, not the Defense Department; if so, does that affect think-
ing about rules of engagement and the law of armed conflict? Should it matter?
Much of the war on terrorism is likely to be on the model of this episode. Here
we have legitimate targets operating in places that do not look like battlefields
among people who may not be combatants. Not every terrorist is an al-Qa‘ida
member. Not everyone riding in a car with a terrorist is a guilty party. How will
we sort out such things in the future, given the known limits of our intelligence?
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As Americans, we are unlikely to adopt an attitude of shooting first and asking
questions later. What, then, should be the standard? Similarly, the way in which
we treat prisoners is vitally important. The legal status of captured al-Qa‘ida and
Taliban militants is now being sorted out in the courts. While the executive
branch is not arguing for totally new rules since there are some wartime prece-
dents, it is certainly seeking new powers for dealing with these prisoners. In this
connection, the administration would like to see new rules for this new war.
The combatant/noncombatant distinction is not one-dimensional, of course.
This distinction is becoming blurred on our side as well, as private contractors
gain more prominent roles in military operations. There are private security
guards, maintenance workers, and so on, who might find themselves in harm’s
way, but there is also an intriguing new category of combatants in Afghani-
stan—veterans of military special operations units working as contractors for
the CIA. Such operatives have been killed in Afghanistan. Under what rules do
such operatives work? What is their status? What kind of normative guidance
should they be given for their fight on the margins and in the shadows? Many as-
pects of this new war are being put into their hands.
“Shock and Awe”
Is “shock and awe” consistent with the American way of war? Perhaps so, but if
so, we need to be extremely careful. I have no doubt that great care was taken in
target selection for the campaign against Baghdad and the other bombing dur-
ing the invasion of Iraq. I have little doubt that the targets were lawful and that
extraordinary care was taken at every level to use the advantages of precision
guided munitions to deliver weapons in a manner consistent with just war prin-
ciples and the law of armed conflict. I also understand the psychological intent
of the campaign to encourage capitulation by conveying the impression of over-
whelming force.
Yet we also must understand how others see a campaign like this. Our hope
was surely to avoid bloodshed through a spectacular demonstration. But that
may not be how others see such tactics. Many see it as crude intimidation—a
brutal attempt to instill, and rule by, fear. Many see it as maximizing conflict, not
minimizing it—as inflaming it, not containing it. Many see “shock and awe” as
excessive, especially when combined with biblical images and rhetoric. Again,
can and should we clarify our own thinking on this? Are such demonstration ef-
fects justifiable? Do they give credence to the charge that we seek to rule through
fear? What clarifications are needed so that such actions are not misrepresented
or misunderstood?
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HIDDEN COSTS
How should we calculate the costs of the war in Iraq and the war on terrorism?
Here I am not talking about easily identifiable and quantitative costs—to date,
the eighty-seven billion dollars for reconstruction on top of the Pentagon bud-
get and new initiatives for homeland defense. Neither am I talking about
mounting casualties. Instead, I’m talking about more subtle costs: damage to the
goodwill and cooperation of many former allies; the opportunity costs in terms
of resources (military, economic, and political) of liberating and reconstructing
Iraq, while other terrorist threats elsewhere remain; costs to Iraqi society itself,
even though it has gained so much from the liberation (there has been surpris-
ingly little discussion of Iraqi casualties, civilian or military, during the war and
in the struggle for self-rule).
Then there is the hidden cost to the American military itself. We know the
numbers killed and wounded, but we do not know how many will not return
home the same, who will pay a cost psychologically and physically. Is the present
high suicide rate a warning sign? If nothing else, I am sure that it is a reminder of
a true hidden cost of war. The decision to use military force will always involve a
cost-benefit analysis. In this era of asymmetry and high moral conviction, it
might be prudent to think hard, to dig deeply into these not so visible and not so
easily quantifiable costs of war.
Postconflict Responsibilities
Liberators have a deep and profound commitment for what comes next. As
Thomas L. Friedman put it in his New York Times column, “If you break it, you
own it.”* We removed the government in Iraq. We have responsibility for ad-
dressing the current situation, which is of our own making. We cannot walk
away. This is a moral commitment precisely because of our direct involvement.
But as we turn over control to the Iraqis themselves, will we build partnerships
that are true partnerships? Or will we put in place proxies to support our own
design? Will we build genuine democracy in Iraq? Or will we place a premium in
getting out fast? I have no doubt that our aspirations for an Iraqi democracy are
genuine and sincere. And we have raised the stakes on ourselves by placing this
war in the context of democracy promotion.
But let us remember, the purpose of the war was to remove a threat—Saddam
Hussein and his regime. Removal and building are two separate items. The re-
building of Iraq should be an opportunity to think about this relationship be-
tween taking down and building up. Can we do this over the long haul and in
different circumstances? If so, do we have the means, not only the force structure
but also the know-how and the strategy? Should it be an integral part of our
1 0 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
*Thomas L. Friedman, “Present at . . . What?” Editorial Desk, New York Times, 12 February 2003,
p. A37.
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strategy? Should we not think of just war doctrine in three parts, the justice of
war, justice in war, and now a new category, justice after war? If so, what should
be our criteria? Basic security and human rights are obvious places to start. But
where do we go from there? What other minimums need to be met, and how
would progress be measured?
Thus a broad overview of a layman ethicist’s questions, comments, and con-
cerns. Military people represent a core constituency in the debate over how these
concerns will be resolved. Military people serve a civilian command authority,
by which many of these issues are decided, but the fact remains that they offer
advice, and in command positions they interpret the policies and orders they are
given. They stand at the intersection of just war thinking and the implementa-
tion of the laws of war.
That intersection is the space where we reflect together on who we are and,
perhaps more importantly, who we want to be. It is the space where we think
through what is right, what is desirable, what is good. It is where we subject
strong moral sentiments and intuitions to analytical thought and rigor, where
we reflect on our own experiences in the light of the experiences and thoughts of
others—and sometimes change our minds.
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SELF-INFLICTED VULNERABILITIES
Stephen D. Wolthusen
One of the most prominent, if sometimes controversial, figures in softwareengineering resigned in 1985 from the Panel on Computing in Support of
Battle Management of the Strategic Defense Initiative Office, publishing a series
of essays declaring it unlikely that the program would meet the goals implicitly
set forth by President Ronald Reagan for the SDI program.1 Two decades later,
this assessment has gained in pertinence as transformation technologies be-
come reality and reliance increases on network-centric operations and C4ISR*
assets to achieve critical operational objectives. Concern has spread even to the
level of individual tactical units, while the potential persists for damage or at
least costly friction and lost options at the strategic level.2
While information technology has become a highly efficient force multiplier
in a large number of roles—from producing transparency in logistics flows to
providing target data for strike packages in near real time to guiding munitions
themselves—there are differences between information systems and other engi-
neering artifacts that are dangerous to ignore. As information system compo-
nents suffuse what had previously been the domain of mechanical engineering,
as well as similar disciplines, these engineering artifacts frequently come to rely
on information technology for their core functionality and hence take on the
properties previously associated only with pure information systems.
Software engineering has made only limited progress in producing large, reli-
able, and trustworthy information systems. Developing such systems (or even
their software components) that can be mathematically proven, or at least ar-
gued convincingly, to be correct and complete is feasible on a relatively small
scale, but it remains, given the consequences of faults, a daunting task at the
* Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
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scale contemplated and necessary for network-centric operations. Unlike in me-
chanical artifacts, uncertainty in such design criteria generally cannot be ade-
quately compensated for by safety margins.3 Any effort to develop trustworthy,
high-assurance systems faces limitations as to what can be subjected to inde-
pendent verification and validation, let alone mathematical proof with the pre-
cision and completeness of requirements and specifications.4 Success is
extremely rare.
BUILDING FORTRESSES ON SAND
Two examples suggest the gulf in scope between the systems for which capabili-
ties and correctness have been proven with mathematical rigor and those actu-
ally used in mission-critical tasks. The Ship’s Helicopter Operating Limits
System, initially deployed with the Royal Navy’s Merlin helicopter on Type 23
frigates, was developed to the standard of mathematically provable correctness.
A highly specialized and experienced team of scientists and engineers required
five years to generate 27 KLoC (thousands of lines of code) of proven and veri-
fied software.5 Moreover, there existed a physical system for the software to con-
trol, one that could be modeled precisely, complete with kinematic parameters,
and that could therefore be described exactly in a formal specification, from
which code could be derived without ambiguity.
A contrasting example would be a COTS (commercial off-the-shelf) general-
purpose operating system. One of them, Microsoft Windows 2000, contains
more than 10,000 KLoC critical to system security and operational capability;
depending on metrics used, Microsoft Windows 2003 contains approximately
50,000 KLoC. None of that code is modeled, specified, or implemented in such a
way as to permit even evaluation of the trustworthiness of a component running
this operating system, regardless of the characteristics of the layered applica-
tions. Interactions between the layered application and the underlying operat-
ing system escape, by definition, modeling and specification. Despite advances
in computer science and software engineering, it is not at all clear that such large
demands are within reach of the methods used for smaller systems even if the re-
sources and time for such an effort are not bounded.
This is in large part due to the fact that the complexity of interactions among
software components typically increases significantly faster than the size of the
code base, and it does so in a superlinear fashion (i.e., typically as a polynomial
in the LoC). While strict hierarchical design methodologies and implementa-
tions have long been the subject of research, success in the field has been some-
what limited.6 Even under optimistic assumptions regarding defect rates,
therefore, statistical models predict the presence of several thousand defects for
such a COTS product—even with the additional caveat noted above, that
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unspecified behavior can result in ambiguity as to what constitutes a defect.
Though the Microsoft Windows 2000 operating system has been certified as
meeting the Common Criteria Evaluation Assurance Level 4 for trustworthi-
ness, critical vulnerabilities are still discovered with some regularity, which is ex-
tremely likely to continue for the lifetime of the system.7
Even worse, it is not sufficient even to have individual components with
proven certain security and assurance characteristics; their combination, such as
between systems on a network, can still be insecure.8 Such problems also arise—
at levels of rigor far below formal modeling and proof—from configuration
variations and the introduction of new subsystems (attached devices, new pro-
grams, or program revisions) within a single computer system. The ultimate re-
sult is a staggering combinatorial problem that simply cannot be addressed by
mere testing, particularly since by definition the types of defects and cascading
failure modes must be assumed to be triggered deliberately by an adversary with
precise knowledge of the information system, rather than obeying standard
probability distributions.
Despite these well known limitations in trustworthiness, assurance, and
manageability, off-the-shelf information technology products—for which
safety and reliability requirements are generally relevant only as far as the civil-
ian market will bear the inevitable increases in cost and decreases in otherwise
desirable features—are increasingly used at all levels in the U.S. Navy, from plan-
ning to engineering systems onboard warships. This introduces a significant
number of failure modes that must be considered but are nevertheless fre-
quently ignored with predictable results. A case in point is an engineering net-
work casualty aboard USS Yorktown (CG 48) in September 1997 that left the
cruiser dead in the water for about two hours and forty-five minutes.9 Land
combat systems do not typically have the same levels of complexity—at least,
not yet—but the gap is closing rapidly as new electronics subsystems are added
and internetworked, as in the M1A2 main battle tank.
NO WAY BACK
Even if it were not already established acquisitions policy, fiscal considerations
would dictate that COTS products, or marginal variations on them, will con-
tinue to dominate procurement of large parts of C4ISR assets. That is true as
well for critical elements of civilian infrastructure that are increasingly relied
upon for mission-critical requirements. Even if procurement of custom solu-
tions were considered, such alternatives would lag considerably behind com-
mercially available systems in terms of functionality.10
This reliance on commercially available products has already shown its draw-
backs in such areas as electronics for weapons systems, where the cost and
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feasibility of reengineering are even less attractive than for purchasing systems
reliable for the “life of type.”11 For software-based COTS systems, the outlook is
even bleaker, for a number of reasons. First, hardware components are tradition-
ally designed to a significantly higher level of quality, not least because errors in-
troduced at the design stage are considerably more expensive to correct than
with software-based systems. Hardware already manufactured with defects may
need to be destroyed, recalled, and, if the defect is found, replaced.
For their part, most commercially available microprocessors have a sizable
number of “errata,” documents detailing known problems and, where possible,
work-arounds. Such errors have occasionally garnered much public attention,
with customers demanding replacement of defective parts. Nonetheless, the in-
centives for software vendors are somewhat different. For them it is cost-effective
to ship a product with possible, suspected, or even known defects and, by and
large, correct them only when reported from the field. This practice appears to
be accepted by virtually all users of COTS products.12
Thus, it is frequently possible simply to replace a microprocessor or other
electronic component with a newer, functionally equivalent component as it
reaches the end of its service life. In software-based systems, however, not only
functionality of obsolete and ill-defined software must be reproduced but, fre-
quently, its defects as well. The behavior of the actual system may well depend on
fixes and work-arounds installed in the old equipment.
This situation has led, particularly in the financial services industry, to cases
of decades-old financial software running on multiple layers of simulated oper-
ating systems and “middleware” components—not unlike Russian matryushka
nesting dolls. Each of these layers introduces its own defects and uncertainties,
limiting overall efficiency and ul-
timately assurance. As a result,
presumably, the reliability of
complex software-based systems
drops. Options to redress this
quandary are quite limited, since frequently when defects and vulnerabilities are
discovered the remedies require configuration changes (for both hardware and
software, the former often necessitating the latter) beyond the immediate cor-
rective measure.
A second, related problem is the tendency of software systems to make use of
the rich functionality available in COTS systems or systems assembled from ex-
isting components. The dependencies introduced in commercial systems are
less well known than for government in-house, or GOTS, components. This in-
troduces a further web of unknowns. Situations can result where repairing a de-
fect in one component generates cascading side effects, possibly rendering the
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entire system unusable—even when the components are all from a single ven-
dor. These dependencies produce systems for which the traditional last resort of
“life-of-type buys” is simply not feasible, particularly once vulnerabilities be-
come publicly known; for which reengineering—just as with civilian systems—
is frequently a euphemism for complete redevelopment; and for which assur-
ance in mission-capability declines precipitously over time as new elements and
components are introduced into already underdefined designs.
The alternative of developing and maintaining similarly feature-rich systems
with provably high assurance, however, is likely not to be palatable to decision
makers except under the most dire requirements, and even then it may not be
feasible. An example of such an attempt was the onboard flight control software
of the Space Shuttle program. This software, though far less complex than that
associated with most COTS-based environments and so, one might have ex-
pected, less expensive, has cost in excess of a hundred million dollars to main-
tain.13 Indeed, the very concept of mechanized proofs of correctness has been
the subject of intense scrutiny.14
SAME TOOLS, DIFFERENT OBJECTIVE
Despite dire predictions implied by these considerations, and although a number
of highly critical situations have been documented, in remarkably few incidents
have malfunctioning information systems led directly to loss of life or similarly
grave consequences.15 The reason may be, however, that systems are being built with
adequate safeguards, and the complexity of critical systems is being limited not be-
cause of laws, regulations, formal mathematical methods, or similar engineering
mandates but because engineers are aware of such warnings as those discussed
here about software safety and reliability.16
However, there exists a marked difference between adequate provision for
failure in the majority of civilian application areas and in defense systems,
whether they are to be relied on in harm’s way or used in supporting roles. Most
civilian systems (with some obvious exceptions such as avionics) can ensure
safety by shutting down an information subsystem or components.17 Such a
“fail-stop” mechanism, however, is not likely to be an option in defense-related
applications, let alone in those used in combat, unless features for recovery and
falling back on manual emergency procedures can be employed.
Traditionally, critical applications without fail-stop options, such as flight-
control systems, have relied on multiple redundancy and component-based
survivability, as well as fallback. This approach, however, implies significant ex-
pense, delay, and a need to codify and validate elaborate operating procedures,
clearly beyond what is feasible. For most defense-related information systems,
one cannot unambiguously demonstrate the effectiveness of redundancy or
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fallback, and in any case the required decision loops are likely to be faster than
even partial manual fallback mechanisms can achieve.
All this implies, especially given the usual circumstances under which defense
systems must operate, that even a system known to be in some degree defective
can be acceptable (for instance, a sensor that occasionally reports false measure-
ments) if the alternative would be downing it and jeopardizing a mission. What
is critical here is to recognize that such failures can and will occur and must be
anticipated at the level of overall mission planning and execution.
Even in combat support missions, such as logistics, where time scales are less
compressed than in combat itself, flaws or failures in information systems can be
extremely detrimental to overall objectives if inadequate consideration has been
given to their possibility. While
clerical errors can be made, and
have always been, without the aid
of electronic information sys-
tems, the results can be consider-
ab ly le s s amus ing than the
delivery of snow plows and road
salt to Danish troops in Basra at
the height of the summer of 2003. Such errors could render entire missions im-
possible if the rapid and unchecked propagation of their effects causes large vol-
umes of data to become invalid or even merely unreliable. The lack of fallback
solutions in case of a severe failure of a logistical system, whether caused by an
intrinsic defect or a deliberate attack, can severely affect combat readiness or en-
danger missions. In the worst case, it might be necessary to open each and every
container and crate to locate vital items, then to ascertain the location and needs
of each unit requiring them.
It is therefore imperative to consider, for each use of information systems, the
faults that could be induced and the effects, both primary and secondary, they
could have on overall mission objectives. This has to be done however mundane
an application seems to be, even for commercial desktop and productivity soft-
ware. It is precisely the improbable and unanticipated side effect that can cause
the most significant disruption, as no contingency plans are likely to exist. Tech-
nical countermeasures can be identified and taken, but information assurance
rests equally on the organizational factors, along with technical prevention,
hardening, and countermeasures. Whether information is delivered electroni-
cally or on a scrap of paper is largely irrelevant—if it is accurate, complete, and
received in time.
A corollary to this observation is to partition information systems in such a
way that individual elements to be employed in network-centric warfare (NCW)
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are developed to desirable levels of assurance (presumably through testing and
other verification and validation measures), and independently, to establish base-
line capabilities. The additional capabilities provided by the linking and
internetworked operation of such information systems must, given the limitations
in providing assurance sketched above, be treated as fundamentally ephemeral.
ASSURANCE AND INFORMATION WARFARE
Information warfare thus far has clearly not lived up to the expectations raised
during the 1990s.18 While it would be clearly imprudent to dismiss IW as yet an-
other ploy to focus resources and funding through overstated threat analyses—
the threats identified are very real indeed, if somewhat exaggerated—the con-
cept can be carried farther. Information warfare may or may not be useful in the
foreseeable future as an instrument of warfare in the narrow sense of subjugat-
ing the will of an adversary to one’s own, because of the potential impact on ci-
vilian populations (an impact that clearly makes it a potential instrument for
terrorists or other entities not bound by the Geneva Conventions Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War). Nonetheless, the role of infor-
mation in warfare can hardly be overstated and has in fact been understood
since antiquity.19 It is precisely in that respect, however, in which forces relying
on network and information-centric systems could expose themselves unknow-
ingly (or worse, having ignored known threats) to new modes of attack.
A design criterion for cryptographic protocols has been proposed in which
the authors assume “the presence of a hostile opponent, who can alter messages
at will. In effect, our task is to program a computer which gives answers which
are subtly and maliciously wrong at the most inconvenient possible moment.”20
In designing information systems to take account of their effects on mission ac-
complishment, or indeed their effect on the planning and execution of missions
themselves, the same assumptions need to be made.
Defects in information systems obviously can cause severe damage and dis-
ruption even without intervention of an adversary. It is the hallmark of skilled
attackers, however, to identify weaknesses and vulnerabilities in information
systems that, taken by themselves, might seem insignificant. Beginning with
such small openings, attackers will attempt to escalate the damage potential un-
til their objectives have been reached. Sophistication is not always necessary; fre-
quently vulnerabilities exist that make attacks a rather rote, straightforward, and
even automatable matter.
Improving information assurance can therefore be considered a
two-pronged undertaking. One part consists of identifying the mission assur-
ance category for each system and component, as laid down by the assurance re-
quirements.21 The possible system failure modes, both internal and external, can
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then be identified (using, for instance, fault-tree analysis) and remedies or con-
tingency plans devised.22
The other part of ensuring overall information assurance is far more chal-
lenging. It requires considering effects on other systems that operate (at least
nominally) independently or at higher levels and devising similar mitigation
and remediation strategies. One might justifiably argue that the onus is on sys-
tems “upstream” of the system under review. This argument is valid, however,
only under highly idealized circumstances, since it assumes that a system once
examined is permanently frozen with regard to its potential harmful effects on
upstream systems. To the contrary, and as noted above, even apparently minor
changes can invalidate critical assumptions and introduce new failure modes.
The insidiousness of the problem lies primarily in internetworking effects,
which can also have transitive detrimental effects across multiple intermediate
systems and components. Consider a network with critical systems built upon a
vulnerable COTS base into which a piece of malicious code is inserted—rapid
spread throughout a possibly monocultural information system network can
cripple vital operational capabilities.23 In aviation safety, one frequently hears of
“long, thin chains” leading to the few documented cases of mechanical failure.
Such chains exist in information-assurance failures also, but human and organi-
zational elements must be taken into consideration as well. When information
assurance is considered this way, defenses against information warfare attacks
become a welcome but implicit side effect of overall information assurance,
since there is no need to specify deliberate actions an adversary might take, since
any such action must already have been considered pursuant to the most cher-
ished law of engineering—Murphy’s.24
IMPACTS ON NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE
Even in highly asymmetric conflicts, the temptation must be resisted to extract
maximum economies of force on the basis of an assumption that technological
superiority, particularly in information systems, ensures success. There exists a
profound danger that the wrong lessons will be learned, particularly from the
successes of ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. If they are, future plans
and operations will be built on highly brittle foundations.25
Operations, whether at the strategic or tactical level, should not be predicated
upon the full nominal capabilities of network-centric organization. Account
must be taken at the outset of the considerable spectrum of possible degradation
or complete failure of information systems and other elements, regardless of
cause, but certainly including enemy information operations. Otherwise, mis-
sions could commence under overoptimistic assumptions of forces required or
objectives possible; success would then require that the vast majority of
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information system components operate at peak performance for the entire du-
ration of the mission. Plainly, that cannot be safely assumed.
Planning, then, should allow for contingencies that require humans in the
loop at critical junctures to transmit and process mission-critical information
when automated systems fail, and missions should be structured accordingly.
This is, ultimately, the price one has to pay for using highly complex, inter-
networked systems of low assurance. It also means, however, that the ability to
short-circuit the enemy’s decision cycle may be degraded considerably at any
given time by system failure. To restore overall decision speed and responsive-
ness, it may be necessary to shift at certain points, if only temporarily, to a hier-
archical, pre-network-centric structure, or vice versa.26 Planning should identify
such junctures in advance and explicitly include capabilities that permit infor-
mation system components to be used effectively even when operating in isola-
tion or only on a small component of the overall network. Ultimately, however,
it is information systems, both civilian and defense, that must change to improve
survivability and assurance, as more and more military systems are designed
that cannot function at all without information components.
NOTE S
1. D. L. Parnas, “Software Aspects of Strategic
Defense Systems,” Communications of the As-
sociation for Computing Machinery 28, no. 12
(1985), pp. 1326–35.
2. A. K. Cebrowski, J. J. Garstka, “Network-
Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future,” Na-
val Institute Proceedings 124, no. 1 (January
1998), pp. 28–35; T. P. M. Barnett, “The
Seven Deadly Sins of Network-Centric War-
fare,” Naval Institute Proceedings 125, no. 1
(January 1999), pp. 36–39; D. S. Alberts, J. J.
Garstka, F. P. Stein, Network Centric Warfare,
2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assis-
tant Secretary of Defense for Networks and
Information Integration, 1999); U.S. Navy
Dept., Naval Transformation Roadmap: Power
and Access . . . from the Sea (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Defense Dept., 2003); and J. C.
McGroddy, ed., Realizing the Potential of C4I:
Fundamental Challenges (Washington, D.C.:
National Academy Press, 1999).
3. R. Woodhead, “Spirit Rover Humbled by
Classic Programming Error,” ACM Risks Fo-
rum 23, no. 14; P. Regan and S. Hamilton,
“NASA’s Mission Reliable,” IEEE [Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers] Com-
puter 37, no. 1 (January 2004), pp. 59–68.
4. The term “assurance” is used in two ways,
distinguished by context. In the context of
“information assurance,” it refers to the guar-
antee that an entity obtains required infor-
mation in such a way that a set of constraints
is met. The set of constraints contains but is
not limited to timeliness, correctness, confi-
dentiality, integrity, availability, and non-
repudiability. In a second, more narrow
context, assurance refers to developmental
assurance or trustworthiness measures fol-
lowing the standard nomenclature of ISO/
IEC 15408 (see note 7).
5. S. King, J. Hammond, R. Chapman, and A.
Pryor, “Is Proof More Cost-Effective than
Testing?” IEEE Transactions on Software Engi-
neering 26, no. 8 (2000), pp. 675–86.
6. P. G. Neumann, R. S. Boyer, R. J. Feiertag, K. N.
Levitt, and L. Robinson, A Provably Secure
Operating System: The System, Its Applica-
tions, and Proofs, SRI Computer Science Lab-
oratory Report CSL-116, 2d ed. (Menlo Park,
Calif.: SRI, May 1980); L. Robinson and K. N.
W O L T H U S E N 1 1 1
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Summer_Autumn 2004.vp
Tuesday, September 28, 2004 12:26:36 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
115
War College: Summer/Autumn 2004 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2004
Levitt, “Proof Techniques for Hierarchically
Structured Systems,” in Data Structuring, ed.
R. T. Yeh, vol. 4 of Current Trends in Pro-
gramming Methodology (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1977), pp. 173–96; D. A.
Peled, Software Reliability Methods (Berlin:
Springer-Verlag, 2001).
7. International Organization for Standardiza-
tion and International Electrotechnical Com-
mittee, Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation: International
Standard 15408, version 2.1 (Geneva: 1999);
and U.S. National Institute of Standards and
Technology Information Technology Labora-
tory and U.S. National Security Agency Infor-
mation Assurance Directorate, National
Information Assurance Partnership Common
Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report: Microsoft Corporation
Windows 2000, Report CCEVS-VR-02-0025
(Washington, D.C.: 2002). Evaluation techni-
cal reports are partially withheld as propri-
etary information.
8. D. McCullough, “Noninterference and the
Composability of Security Properties,” Pro-
ceedings of the 1988 IEEE Symposium on Secu-
rity and Privacy (SOSP ’88) (Oakland, Calif.:
1988).
9. G. Slabodkin, “Smart Ship Inquiry a Go,”
Government Computer News, 31 August 1998;
and A. DiGiorgio, “The Smart Ship Is Not the
Answer,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings
124, no. 6 (June 1998), pp. 61–64.
10. Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics), The Defense Ac-
quisition Systems, U.S. Department of De-
fense Instruction 5000.1 (Washington, D.C.:
2003); and P. Oberndorf and D. Carney, A
Summary of DoD COTS-Related Policies,
Technical Report (Pittsburgh, Penna.:
Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Insti-
tute, 1998).
11. S. Morrow, “What Comes after Tomahawk?”
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 129, no. 7
(July 2003), pp. 32–35.
12. R. M. Brady, R. J. Anderson, and R. C. Ball,
Murphy’s Law, the Fitness of Evolving Species,
and the Limits of Software Reliability, Techni-
cal Report 476 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge
University, Computer Laboratory, 1999); and
R. Anderson, “Security in Open versus
Closed Systems: The Dance of Boltzmann,
Coase and Moore,” Proceedings of Open
Source Software: Economics, Law and Policy
(Toulouse, Fr.: 2002).
13. N. G. Leveson, ed., An Assessment of Space
Shuttle Flight Software Development Processes
(Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press
for the Commission on Engineering and
Technical Systems, National Research Coun-
cil, 1993).
14. D. MacKenzie, Mechanizing Proof (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001); J. H. Fetzer,
“Program Verification: The Very Idea,” Com-
munications of the Association for Computing
Machinery 31, no. 9 (1988), pp. 1049–63; R. A.
DeMillo, R. J. Lipton, and A. J. Perlis, “So-
cial Processes and Proofs of Theorems and
Programs,” Communications of the Associa-
tion for Computing Machinery 22, no. 5
(1979), pp. 271–80; D. MacKenzie and G.
Pottinger, “Mathematics, Technology, and
Trust: Formal Verification, Computer Secu-
rity, and the U.S. Military,” IEEE Annals of
the History of Computing 19, no. 3 (1997), pp.
41–59; G. Pottinger, Proof Requirements in the
Orange Book: Origins, Implementation, and
Implications, Technical Report (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell Univ., Mathematical Sciences Insti-
tute, 1994).
15. P. G. Neumann, Computer-Related Risks
(Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1994);
and N. G. Leveson, Safeware: System Safety
and Computers (Reading, Mass.: Addison-
Wesley, 1995).
16. C. A. R. Hoare, “How Did Software Get So
Reliable without Proof?” in FME ’96: Indus-
trial Benefit and Advances in Formal Methods,
Third International Symposium of Formal
Methods Europe, ed. M.-C. Gaudel and J.
Woodcock, Lecture Notes in Computer Sci-
ence (Heidelberg, Ger., Springer-Verlag,
1996), pp. 1–17.
17. Another exception is the “supervisory control
and data acquisition” system. SCADA sys-
tems, which link master and remote units
and monitoring stations, are typically used to
monitor and control plants or equipment dis-
tributed over large geographic areas.
18. R. C. Molander, A. S. Riddile, and P. A.
Wilson, eds., Strategic Information Warfare:
A New Face of War, MR-661-OSD (Santa
Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1996); R. E. Neilson,
ed., Sun Tzu and Information Warfare
1 1 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Summer_Autumn 2004.vp
Tuesday, September 28, 2004 12:26:36 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
116
Naval War College Review, Vol. 57 [2004], No. 3, Art. 28
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol57/iss3/28
(Washington, D.C.: National Defense Univ.
Press, 1997); R. Henry and C. E. Peartree,
“Military Theory and Information Warfare,”
Parameters 28, no. 3 (August 1998); and Z.
Khalilzad, J. P. White, and A. W. Marshall,
eds., Strategic Appraisal: The Changing Role of
Information in Warfare, MR-1016-AF (Santa
Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999).
19. L. T. Greenberg, S. E. Goodman, and K. J. S.
Hoo, Information Warfare and International
Law (Washington, D.C.: National Defense
Univ. Press, 1998).
20. R. J. Anderson and R. M. Needham, “Pro-
gramming Satan’s Computer,” in Computer
Science Today: Recent Trends and Develop-
ments, ed. J. van Leeuwen, Lecture Notes in
Computer Science (Heidelberg, Ger.:
Springer-Verlag, 1995).
21. U.S. Defense Dept., Information Assurance,
U.S. Department of Defense Directive 8500.1
(Washington, D.C.: 2002).
22. M. R. Lyu, ed., Handbook of Software Reliabil-
ity Engineering (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1996); and R. Manian, J. B. Dugan, D.
Coppit, and K. J. Sullivan, “Combining Vari-
ous Solution Techniques for Dynamic Fault
Tree Analysis of Computer Systems,”
Proceedings of the 3rd IEEE International
Symposium on High-Assurance Systems Engi-
neering (HASE ’98) (Washington, D.C.: IEEE
Computer Society, 1998).
23. M. Newman, “The Structure and Function of
Complex Networks,” SIAM [Society for In-
dustrial and Applied Mathematics] Review 45
(2003), pp. 167–256; A.-L. Barabási and R.
Albert, “Emergence of Scaling in Random
Networks,” Science 286 (1999), pp. 509–12;
D. S. Callaway, M. E. J. Newman, S. H.
Strogatz, and D. J. Watts, “Network Robust-
ness and Fragility: Percolation on Random
Graphs,” Physical Review Letters 85 (2000),
pp. 5468–71; and R. Albert, H. Jeong, and A.
Barabási, “Error and Attack Tolerance of
Complex Networks,” Nature 406 (2000), pp.
378–82.
24. T. Bear, “Murphy’s Law Was Born Here,”
Desert Wings, 3 March 1978, p. 3.
25. M. Boot, “The New American Way of War,”
Foreign Affairs 82, no. 4 (July/August 2003),
pp. 41–58.
26. C. S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford, U.K.:
Oxford Univ. Press, 1999); and G. T.
Hammond, The Mind of War: John Boyd and
American Security (Washington, D.C.: Smith-
sonian Institution Press, 2001).
W O L T H U S E N 1 1 3
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Summer_Autumn 2004.vp
Tuesday, September 28, 2004 12:26:36 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
117
War College: Summer/Autumn 2004 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2004
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Summer_Autumn 2004.vp
Tuesday, September 28, 2004 12:26:37 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
118
Naval War College Review, Vol. 57 [2004], No. 3, Art. 28
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol57/iss3/28
TO THE EDGE OF NOWHERE?
U.S.-Icelandic Defense Relations during and after the Cold War
Gudni Th. Jóhannesson
In May 1951, the United States and Iceland signed an agreement on the perma-nent presence of American forces on the island. The arrangement was in many
ways momentous. For the first time in its history, the United States had made a
bilateral defense pact with another state.1 Also, troops were stationed in Iceland
in peacetime for the first time since the settlement of the island over 1,100 years
ago. When the first contingent arrived, a Bank of England official who dealt with
Icelandic matters in London summed up the significance of its appearance by
saying that from now on the Icelanders, having survived for so long without per-
manent military forces, would live in “the shadow of the Superfortress.”2
Mutual interests seemed to lie behind the making of this new defense rela-
tionship. Spurred on by the tension between East and West, the authorities in
Reykjavík felt that the Icelanders, without a military of their own, needed effec-
tive protection from the Soviet Union. At the same time, the United States
wanted to establish a base in Iceland, both to aid offensive operations in a possi-
ble war and to watch Soviet movements in the North Atlantic. Nonetheless, the
bond was often strained. The relationship was obvi-
ously a marriage of convenience. The Icelanders were
a “reluctant ally,” resentful over the need to have for-
eign troops on their soil but apparently determined to
make the most of it, materially and politically.3 For
their part, the Americans sometimes disliked the hos-
tility and opportunism that they claimed to encounter
in Iceland.
Dr. Jóhannesson is a Research Fellow in the Center for
Research in the Humanities at the University of Ice-
land. He earned his doctorate in history at Queen
Mary, University of London, and a master’s at St. An-
tony’s College, University of Oxford. He is the author
of numerous articles and conference papers in both
English and Icelandic.
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Unsurprisingly, the end of the Cold War upset the balance of interests in the
U.S.-Icelandic union. Throughout the 1990s, forces in Iceland were reduced,
most notably by the withdrawal of a number of F-15 fighter jets; in May 2003,
the American ambassador in Reykjavík notified the Icelandic government that
within a month all the remaining aircraft would be removed. The Icelanders ad-
amantly protested and argued that the defense of the island would not be credi-
ble without the planes. The American authorities agreed to postpone and
reconsider the proposed departure of the F-15s, but the Icelandic bargaining po-
sition had clearly deteriorated since the Cold War era. Thus, it had to be asked
why the United States should maintain its forces there. The whole basis for that
presence seemed to have disappeared.
THE ARRIVAL, DEPARTURE, AND RETURN OF U.S. TROOPS,
1941–1951
In May 1940, British forces occupied Iceland, then a sovereign state within the
Kingdom of Denmark. The following summer (a good six months before Pearl
Harbor), the United States, anxious to assist Britain in the Battle of the Atlantic,
took over the protection of Iceland.4 In a matter of a few years, Icelandic society
was transformed. Before
the war, Iceland had been
among the poorest coun-
tries of Europe, isolated
and struggling with the
effects of the Great De-
pression. But suddenly
unemployment vanished
and the Icelanders pros-
pered, more or less pro-
tected from the horrors of
war. Icelandic seamen
suffered most, as they
sailed in the submarine-
infested North Atlantic,
carrying fish to Britain
for Lend-Lease dollars
and bringing goods from
the United States on favorable terms. Runaway inflation was an unfortunate
side effect; furthermore, the Icelanders found it hard to accept the new arriv-
als on the island. More than fifty thousand troops were stationed among its
130,000 inhabitants, and although relations with the locals were on the whole
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satisfactory, the foreigners realized that they were not welcome. Charles S.
Minter, a U.S. Navy pilot in Iceland during the war who was to end a distin-
guished career as a vice admiral, later recalled that Icelanders “were very stand-
offish. As a matter of fact, more than standoffish. I think they really resented our
presence there, and that’s not too difficult to understand. We were a sizeable mil-
itary presence.”5
As the war progressed, the strategic importance of Iceland was confirmed,
and American statesmen came to the conclusion that after the end of hostilities
and the departure of U.S. forces, the United States would still need facilities on
the island. In 1945–46, Washington rather clumsily insisted on a long-term lease
of bases, which the authorities in Reykjavík rejected. Iceland had declared full
independence from Denmark in 1944, and the general public would almost cer-
tainly have condemned a pact of that kind. Instead, the two sides made the com-
promise that U.S. civilian contractors would run Keflavík Airfield, the main base
during the war and a vital stepping-stone for airplanes flying across the Atlantic.
This agreement, it has been said, “amounted only to a minimal concession, but
under the circumstances the United States could be grateful for having main-
tained any foothold in Iceland, albeit a tenuous one, which could hopefully serve
as a ‘point of departure’ for a later solution.”6
The deficiencies in this arrangement were quickly visible. To begin with, se-
curity at Keflavík was utterly inadequate. Pilfering and black marketeering upset
the Americans.7 More ominously, however, a hostile power could obviously cap-
ture the airport. In early 1948, when the communist coup in Prague caused great
anxiety in Western capitals, the foreign ministers of the Scandinavian countries
told their Icelandic colleague Bjarni Benediktsson “how fortunate Iceland was to
be situated out in the Atlantic.” But the open sea was no longer a sure protection,
as indeed the recent war had demonstrated. “I would be much happier if Colo-
nel Snyder [that is, U.S. forces] were still here,” the American chargé d’affaires in
Reykjavík remarked when Benediktsson told him of the conversation.8
At the same time, the United States strove to strengthen Iceland’s ties with the
Western camp by giving the country a generous share of Marshall Plan aid.9
Most Icelanders were aware as well of the irrevocable split between East and
West and the strategic significance of Iceland. In 1949 the country became a
founding member of NATO, the North Atlantic alliance. Still, Icelanders consid-
ered alignment in the struggle between the superpowers a necessary evil, not a
welcome change. The pro-Moscow Socialists, who regularly polled up to a fifth
in elections, worked against any military cooperation with the West.10 Thus, the
reappearance of American forces, which the authorities in Washington consid-
ered highly desirable, if not vital, would hardly be accepted in Iceland.11 How-
ever, the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 proved to be a catalyst, as had the
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Czech coup. All political parties in Iceland, with the obvious exception of the So-
cialists, grudgingly concluded that the island could no longer remain
defenseless.
“FISH HEADS” AND “HERRENVOLK,” 1951–1956
When the U.S. forces returned in 1951, they were admitted only under a set of
stringent conditions. The Icelanders, remembering the negative aspects of the
wartime presence, insisted on restricting freedom of movement for military per-
sonnel, especially the lowest-ranking soldiers. A sad sign of the times and of Ice-
land’s insular apprehensions about everything foreign was the insistence that
“no colored troops” be sent to the island.12 In general, apart from a staunchly
pro-Western minority, American diplomats and officers in Iceland got the im-
pression that the population was not sympathetic to the U.S. presence.13 The
Americans were even referred to behind their backs as “Herrenvolk,” wrote a
British official after a visit to Reykjavík in 1952.14
As in the war, however, the military base became an important part of the Ice-
landic economy, quickly accounting for almost 10 percent of the national in-
come and 20 percent of foreign currency receipts. The inflationary
consequences of construction and well paid jobs at the base were easily offset by
these economic benefits.15 Moreover, the strategic importance of the island
aided the Icelanders in their dispute with Britain over their extension in 1952 of
fishing limits from three to four nautical miles. British fishermen, driven from
their favorite fishing grounds, retaliated by imposing a ban on the landings of
fresh fish from Iceland. The ban was bound to hurt, because fish accounted for
more than 90 percent of the country’s exports. At this juncture, the Kremlin
sensed a way to play on fissures in NATO and offered Iceland a lucrative
oil-for-fish agreement. Suddenly, the Soviet Union became one of the country’s
largest trading partners.16
American officials were unhappy that the Icelanders had decided to trade to
such a degree with the enemy. Nevertheless, they understood the situation and
managed to increase Icelandic exports of fish to the United States—by, for in-
stance, refusing to impose countervailing duties for which the New England
fishing industry was calling. In 1955, President Eisenhower even asked why the
United States did not “buy up the entire export of Icelandic fish.”17 While this
breathtaking idea was never seriously considered, American officials put in-
creasing pressure on Britain to have the embargo lifted. By 1956, the British au-
thorities were at last prepared to accept defeat in the fishing limits dispute. As
the cabinet in London concluded, its prolongation would “increase the eco-
nomic dependence of Iceland on the Soviet bloc; it would also strengthen the
hands of the communists in Iceland, whose aim is to deny the United States the
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use of the vital air base at Keflavík and to bring about the withdrawal of Iceland
from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.”18
The end of the fishing conflict was, of course, welcomed in Washington. An
important friend had been kept in the allied camp. On the other hand, displea-
sure with Icelandic attitudes remained intact. American soldiers at Keflavík re-
ferred to the locals as “fish heads,” and a fair number saw their hosts as only “a
bunch of Commies and hostile nationalists who never show the slightest cor-
diality toward an American.”19 The British minister in Reykjavík complained of
the “arrogant and discourteous way in which [the Icelanders] treat the Ameri-
cans here.”20 The hostility may have been exaggerated, and in any case it was
probably based to a certain degree on a minority complex, deep-rooted isola-
tionism, and resentment over the need to be reliant on foreign forces. Neverthe-
less, it begged the question, as the commander of the Iceland Defense Force
pointed out in early 1956, of whether the United States could “afford to continue
to face and to endure passively an unfavorable public opinion toward its Defense
Force in Iceland.”21 Around the same time, the Operations Coordinating Board,
an agency that reported to the National Security Council, wondered whether it
might be better to leave before being asked to go. The board asked the Joint
Chiefs of Staff “to reexamine the military necessity of the base versus the politi-
cal considerations of its continued operation.”22
THE CRISIS OF 1956
In early 1956, the Social Democrats and the Progressive Party, both situated near
the center of the political spectrum in Iceland, decided that the world situation
had improved to such a degree that U.S. forces could safely leave Iceland. The
country would remain a member of NATO, but the Icelanders would run
Keflavík airport. In Parliament, the Socialists were only too pleased to support a
resolution of this kind. The ruling coalition of the Progressives and the
right-wing, pro-Western Independence Party came to an end, and elections were
scheduled for the summer.23
Predictably, this turn of events caused a fair degree of anxiety in Western cir-
cles. American officials concluded that having Icelandic civilians in charge of the
base was wholly unrealistic. Within NATO, the Icelanders were told that Soviet
capabilities for a surprise attack were much greater than they had been a few
years before, when no troops were in the country.24 In Washington, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff insisted that a departure from Iceland would be “unacceptable.”25
Clearly, the island’s military importance had, if anything, increased over the years.
The Americans were deeply disappointed, therefore, when the elections in
Iceland led to the formation of a left-wing coalition of the Progressive, Social
Democrat, and Socialist parties. Before the elections, the Operations
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Coordinating Board had tentatively recommended that if the results were unfa-
vorable, the U.S. administration turn from the friend of Iceland to foe and work
for a “prompt cutoff of earnings from base . . . and possible expulsion from
NATO.”26 When the outcome was clear, the United States urged other Western al-
lies to offer the new government no support, “whether moral or economic.”27
The coercion would, it was apparently hoped, “force through a change of gov-
ernment in Iceland.”28
The Icelanders seemed to be facing the full fury of the United States. However,
U.S. officials soon realized that in spite of the preelection pledges, the Progres-
sives and the Social Democrats might be willing to reconsider their stand, pro-
vided that Iceland would receive much-needed economic assistance.
U.S.-Icelandic negotiations began and were proceeding satisfactorily when the
Soviet invasion of Hungary secured the continued operation of the Keflavík
base. Simultaneously, the Icelanders received a generous loan from the United
States. Although historians disagree as to the extent to which financial induce-
ment affected the turn of events, all accept that it played some role.29 In Wash-
ington the impression was certainly created that (as expressed in 1971) “we
preserved the military agreement status quo by agreeing to provide Iceland with
$9 million in loans.”30
In 1957, only a year after the crisis over the Keflavík base, the Icelandic gov-
ernment again secured Western loans, this time at least partly by pointing out
that assistance would otherwise have to be sought in the East.31 The need for
goodwill was clear, but resentment certainly arose over the Icelandic negotiating
tactics. “Is Iceland blackmailing us?” asked an exasperated National Security
Council official in August 1957.32 Canadian and British diplomats asked the
same question, and the British ambassador in Reykjavík heartily asserted that
“blackmail” was the right word for Iceland’s relations with the West.33 He also
summed up the country’s relations with the United States like this:
• We want your money
• You can have our base
• We do not want the American way of life.34
In fact, however, “blackmail” is too strong a word to describe Icelandic atti-
tudes toward the base. When it came to the crunch, a majority of Icelanders sin-
cerely felt that they needed the American presence. Nonetheless, they
consciously (ab)used the relatively strong popularity of the political left in Ice-
land, as well as the island’s strategic importance, to secure economic assistance
and political goodwill in the fight for widened fishing limits, a vital Icelandic
interest.
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COD WAR AND FIGHTER JETS, 1958–1962
In the following years, British statesmen and officials felt that it was their turn to
be the objects of Icelandic intimidation. In the spring of 1958, Iceland an-
nounced that it was going to extend its fishing limits to twelve miles, thereby fur-
ther excluding British trawlers from rich fishing grounds. Britain condemned
the move. At a meeting of NATO foreign ministers, both the British and Icelan-
dic representatives stressed that they could not budge an inch (not to mention a
mile) from their respective positions. During the Icelandic minister’s speech,
Selwyn Lloyd, the British foreign secretary, passed a slip of paper to John Foster
Dulles, the American secretary of state, saying that in the past Britain would
simply have broken off diplomatic relations and sent a battleship. “Now they
dare not break relations and have no battleship,” Dulles thought to himself. Ap-
parently, Britain did not dare in any case; the Icelandic foreign minister claimed
in private that unless his government took some such action as it was taking,
“the Communists will take over.”35 The pro-Western parties in Iceland were un-
hesitatingly using—and exaggerating—communist power to insist that their
hands were tied on the issue of fishing limits.
In Washington, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, after a brief look at reports
from the NATO summit, was reminded of Bismarck’s expression, “the tyranny
of weakness.”36 The Icelanders were so feeble that they could not be fought, for
that would be bullying, and their allegiance was strategically vital. Nonetheless,
when the extension took effect Britain decided to contest this “encroachment”
on the high seas, by sending the Royal Navy to the disputed waters to protect
British trawlers from harassment by Icelandic gunboats. Thus began the
so-called Cod War. Immediately, Icelandic statesmen and diplomats declared
that both Iceland’s membership in NATO and the American presence on the is-
land had come under threat. In private, Paul-Henri Spaak, NATO’s secretary
general, was so angry at such announcements that he insisted that “whatever
Iceland’s strategic value to the Alliance, it would be a grave mistake to give way
before such blatant blackmail on the part of small countries.”37
Still, Iceland’s gamesmanship was successful. In 1961, London had to accept
the twelve-mile limit. In the words of Sir Patrick Reilly, one of the British diplo-
mats who negotiated the settlement, “We were dealing with skillful and at times
unscrupulous negotiators, who made good use of what was in fact political
blackmail. . . . If we resumed naval protection, this [Icelandic] government
would call for American support, which would be refused. They would then turn
to the Russians, would leave NATO, denounce their Defence Agreement with the
U.S. and demand the removal of the American Base, all of which would be a very
severe setback for the West, which Khrushchev would exploit gleefully.”38
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Thus, as before, Reykjavík turned Iceland’s strategic importance into a politi-
cal asset. Also as before, American officials argued that the United States must al-
ways be prepared to face the possibility of “having the roles and missions now
carried out at the base performed elsewhere.”39 The image of a hostile and arro-
gant population also remained fairly strong in Washington.40 Ultimately, how-
ever, all examinations of the value of facilities in Iceland led to the same
outcome—that the island remained absolutely vital for U.S. and Western
defenses.
Even so, by the late 1950s and early 1960s American military thinkers felt that
the threat to Iceland itself had diminished. From 1951, U.S. Army, Navy, and Air
Force units had been stationed at Keflavík, but in 1957 the Pentagon recom-
mended that the ground troops (around 1,200) be withdrawn, due to decreased
danger and increased budget limitations.41 The authorities in Reykjavík might
have been expected to welcome the willingness in Washington to reduce the mil-
itary presence at Keflavík, but some politicians warned that the defense of Ice-
land had to be credible.42 In other words, the soldiers should not be allowed to
leave the base very often, but they had to be there in adequate numbers to protect
the Icelandic people. Such considerations delayed the departure of the Army
units until 1959.
In these years, the strategic need for facilities in Iceland was also changing.
The need increased in connection with the establishment of submarine surveil-
lance along the GIUK line (from Greenland, via Iceland, to the United King-
dom); in addition, Iceland became a key link in the North American Early
Warning System.43 Simultaneously, however, technological advances made a
“stepping-stone” in the mid-Atlantic no longer as vital for the U.S. Air Force as it
had been. In 1961, the Air Force relinquished the Keflavík base to the Navy. Fur-
ther, however, because not only had technology advanced but the threat of a So-
viet attack on Iceland had apparently lessened, the Air Force leadership called
for the withdrawal of the 57th Fighter Interceptor Squadron from the island.
The episode that resulted is especially interesting in light of the most recent
developments.
The Icelanders were to be told that the safety of Iceland would not be jeopar-
dized by the move, since the United States had substantial forces elsewhere that
could be deployed “in a matter of hours.” Furthermore, U.S. officials argued that
the removal of the fighter jets would “re-emphasise to the Soviets our intention
not to use Iceland as an air offensive base, thereby reducing the probability of
Soviet attack upon Iceland in case of open hostilities.”44 At the height of the Cold
War, that argument was not especially convincing. The U.S. Navy, for one, was
not won over. A Soviet surprise attack could never be totally discounted, the
Commander in Chief, Atlantic insisted when the idea was first suggested. The
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proposal having come so soon after the Army’s departure, he argued, “it will ap-
pear that we are using the island purely as a forward outpost for ASW [antisub-
marine warfare] and for early warning for defense of the North American
continent.”45 Indeed, Icelandic statesmen used that argument to protest the sug-
gested change: “A single plane could without hindrance penetrate into Icelandic
territory and drop saboteurs or even bomb Reykjavík.”46
In 1962 the decision makers in Washington resolved to put in abeyance all
plans for the removal of the fighter jets. Political reasons outweighed either eco-
nomic considerations or a realistic assessment of the direct threat to Iceland.
The jets remained at Keflavík primarily to “insure continuation of U.S. base
rights in Iceland,” as Curtis LeMay, chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force, put it.47
“A COUNTRY SO DEPENDENT ON FOREIGNERS”
U.S.-Icelandic relations entered a more stable phase after the end of the Cod War
and the decision to continue the presence of the fighter squadron. The compara-
tively strict restrictions on movements outside the base still caused some resent-
ment in American circles, however, and the Icelandic segregation policy proved
embarrassing at times. The authorities in Reykjavík maintained their objections
to nonwhite personnel, only reluctantly agreeing to the arrival of “three or four”
Americans of color, provided they were “carefully selected” family men. Yet
when this policy of discrimination became public knowledge in the United
States, the Icelanders refused to admit that they were responsible for it.48
A shortage of housing on the base, which meant that a considerable number
of military personnel had to be accommodated in nearby towns, continued to
cause bitterness on the Icelandic side. The resentment toward American influ-
ence also manifested itself in quite fierce objections to the television station at
the base. Until 1966, Iceland did not have its own TV station, and thousands of
Icelanders received broadcasts from the base. Prominent intellectuals con-
demned this “Americanization,” however, and found support for that view in
government circles. The problem was solved only in 1974, when the U.S. forces
began to operate a cable broadcasting system.49
At that stage, a crisis in U.S.-Icelandic relations, similar to the events of 1956,
had just come to an end. In 1971, a new left-wing coalition came to power in
Reykjavík, supposedly determined to get rid of the American forces in Iceland.
Although American officials had the impression that a satisfactory compromise
could be reached, they realized that it would come with a price. For instance, Ice-
landic Airlines was given concessions that enabled the company to offer cheap
transatlantic flights via Iceland. Other airlines regularly voiced displeasure over this
preferential treatment, but as the State Department concluded in late 1972, “at this
point, the last thing the U.S. should consider doing is altering Icelandic Airline’s
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current, favored status. This would be an incredibly severe blow to Iceland, a step
guaranteed to damage bilateral relations and to terminate U.S. base rights.”50
Once again, the issue of fishing limits now became entangled with military
matters. The new government extended Iceland’s fisheries jurisdiction to fifty
miles, triggering another Cod War with Britain. The rulers in Reykjavík declared
that an agreement on the future of the Keflavík base was inconceivable as long as
British warships were in the disputed waters.51 By May 1973 tension had become
quite high, and the Icelanders were threatening to fight Britain to the end. Henry
Kissinger, national security adviser in the Richard Nixon administration, visited
Reykjavík, where he found that he could not but admire the “turbulent tiny
country threatening to make war against a nation 250 times its size and to leave
NATO (without which it would be defenseless).” The audacity, wrote Kissinger
later, “said volumes about the contemporary world and of the tyranny that the
weak can impose on it.”52 Others agreed. Charles Minter (who had flown in Ice-
land during the Second World War), now an admiral and deputy of the Military
Committee in NATO, later said of the Icelanders, “They didn’t really blackmail
NATO, but it came awful close to it.”53
In late 1973, this fishing conflict ended in a compromise, heavily favorable to
Iceland. Although the British side was always fighting a losing battle, the general
feeling in Britain was that the authorities in London had given way “in exchange
for a NATO base,” as one member of Parliament would later remark.54 Once
more the Icelanders had reaped benefits from their island’s importance in the
struggle between East and West. As before, U.S. officials complained about the
tendency in Reykjavík to exploit this state of affairs. In late 1973, when the Cod
War was over but the future of the Keflavík base was still to be decided, Frederick
Irving, the energetic and capable U.S. ambassador in Iceland, sought to impress
on the country’s leaders that their behavior represented “an arrogance which
does not fit a country so dependent on foreigners for its livelihood.”55 Irving also
argued that while “both countries need each other, . . . in the long run Iceland
needs the U.S. more.”56 In other words, he felt that the Icelanders, at least those
who claimed to be pro-Western, should start acting like a true ally and friend.
In Iceland, conversely, the United States had come under considerable criti-
cism for not having done more to aid the country in the Cod War. In their view it
was the United States that should be showing solidarity. Ólafur Jóhannesson, the
Progressive Party prime minister, had insisted that “as [a] great power, one
crook of USG’s [the U.S. government’s] little finger could bring [the] U.K.
around.”57 Staunch supporters of NATO and the United States therefore had a
difficult time in Iceland during the Cod War. Increasingly, the Americans were
denounced as poor friends in time of need; unless they intervened on Iceland’s
behalf in the Cod War, they should just pack up and leave.58
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In private, however, Icelandic statesmen and officials would usually acknowl-
edge the economic benefits of the American presence in Iceland: it represented a
safe source of foreign income and employment on the base, as well as a free in-
ternational airport. The nonsocialist members in the Icelandic coalition also
accepted that the country could not be without Western defenses of some
kind. For instance, Prime
Minister Jóhannesson
told Irving that he felt it
“unrealistic to have an
unarmed airport because
of terrorism and because
of the ease with which
unfr iend ly e lements
could seize the airport.”59
Thus, while Jóhannesson
certainly wanted to see a
reduction in the Ameri-
can presence at Keflavík
(if only to keep his coali-
tion together), he did not
like one of the ways that
Washington suggested
meeting that demand—
that is, the old idea of
withdrawing the 57th Fighter Interceptor Squadron.60 Similarly, the leader of the
right-wing Independence Party reminded Ambassador Irving in no uncertain
terms that the party supported the stationing of U.S. forces only insofar as they
provided a “direct defense of Iceland.”61
In 1974, a center-right coalition assumed power in Reykjavík, and in the fall
of that year the United States and Iceland reached an agreement on the continu-
ation of the Defense Agreement of 1951. Military personnel at Keflavík would be
reduced, and replaced in certain areas by Icelandic citizens. More members of
the U.S. forces were also to be housed on the base itself, and the United States
pledged to finance an expensive upgrade of the airfield at Keflavík.62 The fighter
squadron, of course, remained intact.
THE FINAL COD WAR, 1975–1976
The U.S.-Icelandic defense relationship seemed set for the foreseeable future.
Once more, however, fish upset everything. In 1975, the new government in
Reykjavík declared an exclusive economic zone of two hundred miles, and
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Britain responded yet again by sending in the Royal Navy. Cod War III was a
nasty affair, with a number of serious collisions between British warships and
Icelandic coast guard vessels. By early 1976 the Icelanders had become so infuri-
ated that they broke off diplomatic relations with London (the only such in-
stance between two NATO states to date). Iceland’s membership in the alliance
appeared to be in jeopardy, and so was the American presence on the island. Ice-
landic citizens blocked roads to U.S. radar stations and even looked ready to
blow up radar masts unless the “aggression” by Britain, a “supposed” ally in
NATO, immediately ceased.63 Likewise, Ólafur Jóhannesson, by now minister of
justice, told Ambassador Irving that the United States must take on “an active
and visible defense of Iceland against the British.” He realized perfectly well that
the U.S. forces at Keflavík would never fight British frigates; he was primarily con-
veying the message that unless the United States put pressure on Britain to with-
draw its warships, Icelandic support for NATO and the base would disappear.64
Irving spoke with equal firmness: “I told Jóhannesson . . . that it appeared Iceland
was trying to flex muscles it really does not have, and reminded him that USG [the
U.S. government] does not succumb to ‘blackmail.’ I also suggested that he not
delude himself that the IDF [the U.S. Iceland Defense Force] is not vital to the secu-
rity of Iceland, and I cautioned him not to jeopardize that security.” Furthermore,
while stressing that his words were not to be taken as “threats or predictions,”
Irving, as he later reported, underlined to Jóhannesson in a long monologue the
economic benefits that the Icelanders would lose if they expelled the U.S. forces:
a. All construction at IDF would naturally stop, hitting Iceland the hardest at a time
when Iceland expects unemployment to develop. . . .
b. Iceland earns approximately $26 million a year in foreign exchange from IDF op-
erations which just happens to be the amount of its reserves in good times and
which this year has been of indescribable advantage. It is a cushion Iceland denies
it needs but is always glad to have.
c. If IDF is forced to withdraw, Iceland’s security would be so endangered that its fi-
nancial credibility with foreign lenders could be shakier than it is now.
d. Icelandic Airlines currently enjoys an attractive concession from USG. There
would be serious question whether this concession should be continued. . . .
e. If Iceland . . . left NATO, and forced out the IDF, there was no reason to believe
Iceland would be better off on the fishing grounds than now. In my opinion, most
likely worse.
f. Iceland’s largest customer of fish is U.S. If Americans became angry enough over
Iceland’s action, we could conceivably look elsewhere for suppliers. If USSR of-
fered to fill the gap and take Iceland’s fish [as in the 1950s], it will not be without
disadvantages to Iceland.65
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According to Irving, the United States would—if necessary—be prepared to
call Iceland’s bluff on the Keflavík base. American officials had grown tired of
the constant threat that unless they acceded to Icelandic demands, whether on
fishing limits or economic assistance, the Iceland Defense Force might have to
leave the island. In May 1976, State Department officials warned that the day
might come when “the price tag gets beyond our means.”66 Consequently, Presi-
dent Gerald R. Ford decided that a study should be undertaken of “the political,
military, and intelligence importance of Iceland to the U.S. and NATO.” The
study would, for instance, consider the military significance of the Keflavík facil-
ities, the options and costs of relocation, the trade-offs in political and economic
cost, legal obligations that might have been incurred in past agreements with
Iceland requiring the provision of assistance, and the need for, types, and costs
of possible assistance to Iceland, including appropriate legislative authority and
sources of U.S. or allied funding of any such assistance.67
In June 1976, the Cod War ended, with an Icelandic victory. Britain had been
struggling against the tide. The law of the sea was undergoing rapid changes, and
later in the year the European Community (including Britain itself) adopted a
two-hundred-mile exclusive economic zone. Furthermore, a victory in the dis-
puted waters could only be achieved by capturing or sinking Icelandic coast
guard vessels, and that option was always ruled out for political and strategic
reasons.
The tension in Iceland’s relations with its Western allies eased, and consider-
ations in Washington about having to leave the island no longer seemed as press-
ing. In any case, it was widely accepted that the “price tag” for doing so would be
high. In public, NATO’s secretary general, Joseph Luns, calculated that it would
be hugely expensive to establish the necessary observation facilities elsewhere,
“and still this new system would not be as secure and perfect.”68 Throughout the
decade the perceived need for solid surveillance and reconnaissance in the North
Atlantic had increased as the Soviet naval buildup continued and the USSR
made regular flights over and submarine passages through the waters off Ice-
land.69 Hence, as long as Icelandic demands for political or economic support did
not become absolutely intolerable, the need for a base on the island outweighed
the difficulties of dealing with the “reluctant ally.”
TABLES TURNED? THE POST–COLD WAR ERA, 1989–2003
From the late 1970s to the end of the Cold War, U.S.-Icelandic relations were
more stable and amicable than ever before, or since. The American presence in
Keflavík ceased to be of primary importance in Iceland’s domestic politics. The
fear of foreign influence and “Americanization” greatly subsided, and no further
fishing disputes occurred. While the United States called for increased “burden
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sharing” by European allies, it remained willing to carry the cost of various im-
provements at Keflavík airport. After all, as the Icelanders were still apt to point
out, the location that Iceland offered was extremely valuable to the United
States.
Then the Cold War came to an end. The communist threat disappeared, and
the need for military facilities in Iceland dropped dramatically. As Colin Powell,
then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs, later recounted:
On one occasion, I suggested to the Admiral in charge of the Atlantic Command that
we remove our AWACS [Airborne Warning and Control System] planes from Ice-
land and send them to look for drug-running aircraft in the Caribbean. He fought
me tooth and nail. I pointed out that the only Soviet bombers now approaching the
United States from the direction of Iceland were those on their way to an open house
at their new “sister” unit at Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana. He was unper-
suaded, so I just took the planes away without further argument and reassigned them
to the drug beat.70
Bigger changes lay
ahead. In early 1993, the
State Department noti-
fied the authorities in
Reykjavík that the United
States wished to reduce
the forces in Iceland by
a third, to around two
thousand military per-
sonnel. The 57th Fighter
Interceptor Squadron—
now equipp ed w ith
F-15s—was also to be
withdrawn from Iceland,
along with a helicopter
rescue squadron and a
group of tanker aircraft.71
By this stage the number
of fighters at Keflavík had already been reduced to twelve and the U.S. Air Force
concurred with the planned removal of the whole squadron. Just as in the early
1960s, however, the Navy felt that the defense of Iceland would not be credible
without some fighter presence.
The State Department also came round to that view, especially after the Ice-
landers had commented on the proposed measures.72 The original message from
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Washington about the removal of the fighter jets had caused Icelandic decision
makers to “shiver and shake,” as one journalist put it.73 Since 1991, the Inde-
pendence Party has been in coalition governments in Iceland, with the Social
Democrats to 1995 and from then on with the Progressive Party. In the minds of
the government’s leaders in 1993, the end of the Cold War had not changed the
fundamental fact that the defense of Iceland was not credible without some ae-
rial element. If the United States was to fulfill its obligations under the Defense
Agreement of 1951, the fighters would have to stay. The definition of Iceland’s
needs could not be solely an American matter, influenced to a large degree by fi-
nancial pressures in Washington.74 Moreover, the rescue helicopters had often
proved vital during nonmilitary search and rescue missions; also, severe cut-
backs at the base would result in a significant number of job losses in the neigh-
boring towns. Icelandic officials did not use such arguments directly in talks
with the U.S. side, but the facts almost inevitably influenced their position.
In 1994, a compromise was reached. The number of jets on station in Iceland
dropped to between four and six, and other cost-cutting measures were imple-
mented as well. The following year, the 57th Fighter Interceptor Squadron was
relieved of its mission in Iceland and replaced on a rotational basis by aircraft
from units in the United States.75 In 1996, the understanding from 1994 was re-
affirmed in an Agreed Minute, which was to last for five years.76 On the one
hand, the Icelandic authorities had achieved what they wanted—the continued
presence of the fighter jets. On the other hand, the United States had carried
through its intention to reduce costs at Keflavík.
The year 2001, when the 1996 understanding was due to expire, was the fifti-
eth anniversary of the U.S.-Icelandic Defense Agreement. Colin Powell, now sec-
retary of state, used the occasion to affirm that the administration still felt that
the Keflavík base and other facilities in Iceland were needed for the defense of
the United States, as well as of Iceland.77 Icelandic statesmen spoke in similar
terms. They also warned, however, against the increasing desire in Washington
to cut back the air defenses of Iceland. Prime Minister Davíd Oddsson declared,
“There should be no military base here if it only serves as an observation and ad-
vance warning post for the United States and it does not serve what we define as
the defense of Iceland. If the Americans reach the conclusion that they are un-
willing to run a base which serves the interests of both parties, then it will simply
be shut down. The situation is as simple as that and there is no threat involved in
these words.”78
Discussions on an extension of the 1996 Agreed Minute and on other aspects
of the U.S.-Icelandic defense relationship had not reached a conclusion when
the events of 11 September 2001 occurred. According to a news report in Ice-
land, the U.S. administration requested a few months later that the fighter jets at
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Keflavík be relieved temporarily so that they could take part in the protection of
American cities. The request was promptly turned down, the same report
stated.79 Both the request and the rejection pointed to a clear divide in U.S.-
Icelandic defense relations. In Washington, basing the fighters in isolated Ice-
land seemed an expensive waste of scarce sources; in Reykjavík the jets were
deemed a vital deterrence in the new, unpredictable world.
THE CRISIS OF 2003
In 2003, matters were brought to a head. In early May, James I. Gadsden, the U.S.
ambassador in Reykjavík, notified Prime Minister Oddsson that the remaining
fighter jets at Keflavík would be withdrawn within a month. The timing was
clumsy, to say the least—parliamentary elections were to be held in Iceland the
following week. Oddsson, who remained in power, kept the request secret
through the elections, but once they were over he made clear his displeasure with
the U.S. decision. Apart from the timing, Oddsson resented having to respond to
an ultimatum from Washington. Throughout the 1990s the Icelandic govern-
ment had followed a pro-American policy within NATO and the United Na-
tions. In March 2003, furthermore, Iceland had become a member of the
“coalition of the willing” in the war against Iraq. To one American observer of
U.S.-Icelandic relations it seemed that while the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq
demonstrated that it does not pay to be an enemy of the United States, “our be-
havior in Iceland shows that maybe it does not pay either to be a friend of the
United States.”80
In Iceland, concerns about the loss of employment were again raised. “It was
bad to have the Russians around, but worse to lose them,” said a trade union
leader in the town of Keflavík.81 As one member of the U.S. forces commented,
there was some irony in the fact that “Iceland’s been complaining for years about
Big Brother America invading their soil, but now this has happened they sud-
denly don’t want us to go.”82 Economic considerations would not be paramount,
however. “Iceland, which enjoys one of the highest living standards in the world,
can easily cope with the economic consequences,” wrote Valur Ingimundarson,
an Icelandic expert on U.S.-Icelandic relations.83 The intended withdrawal of the
jets forced the Icelanders to consider taking on themselves the defense of their
country. But Iceland’s smallness made such ideas almost laughable. A nation of
less than three hundred thousand people could not be expected, it was widely as-
serted, to maintain an active and credible air force in the North Atlantic.
Could not, then, the Icelanders simply accept the American assessment that
the fighters could safely be withdrawn from Iceland because the Soviet threat
was gone? “Here’s an analogy,” a senior official in Reykjavík replied to that ques-
tion. “Just because you have an excellent record in fire prevention, you don’t
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suddenly abolish the fire force.”84 If Icelandic ministers could worry about “a
single plane” attacking Reykjavík in the 1960s, it was understandable that they
would do so after 9/11. As a European analyst pointed out, terrorists might con-
sider a NATO country like Iceland a “soft target” if it were completely without
permanent aerial defenses.85 Thus, the Icelandic position was unchanged—the
visible defense of Iceland was an integral part of the Defense Agreement with the
United States. “In my opinion,” Premier Oddsson reiterated, “if the Americans
remove unilaterally the main substance of the Defense Agreement, then the
Agreement itself goes as well.”86 The United States could not then have radar sta-
tions or antisubmarine aircraft in Iceland. In this sense, the Icelanders were once
more trying to get the United States to act against its will in return for the use of
facilities.
American strategists, indeed, still valued the surveillance and advance warn-
ing role that the country offered. There was never any mention of a total with-
drawal from Iceland. Thus, the sharp Icelandic response led to some
reevaluation in Washington. In June 2003, the deadline for removing the jets was
dropped and high-level negotiations began, including an exchange of letters be-
tween Oddsson and President George W. Bush. Icelandic ministers had com-
plained that officials in Washington tended to look at U.S.-Icelandic defense
relations from a “narrow, technical point of view.”87 They now hoped that in-
creased attention at the highest levels would lead to a satisfactory solution.
But could Iceland possibly have its way against the United States? The coun-
try was “strategically on the edge of nowhere,” as one NATO official rather
dourly asserted.88 Undeniably, Iceland had lost much of its leverage. In any case,
as a highly placed Icelandic official asked in June 2003, “Does any state have a le-
verage in relations with the United States these days?”89 American officials had
already argued that four, six, or twelve jets could not avert a terrorist air attack
on Iceland, and Icelandic journalists could easily find people in the Pentagon
“who just cannot understand the threat assessment of Icelandic statesmen.”90
Moreover, the United States was committed to a general reduction in its overseas
forces. The Icelandic government’s only hope of keeping even four interceptors
on the island seemed to be that the United States might still deem its facilities in
Iceland—as well as the country’s general support on the international scene—
important enough to warrant their permanent “political” presence.
In August 2003, a provisional compromise was reached. The Bush adminis-
tration declared that the F-15s at Keflavík would stay for the time being and that
a final decision on their future would be made in connection with the general re-
vision of U.S. forces in Europe.91 Thus ended, at least for the time being, the
greatest crisis in U.S.-Icelandic relations since the turbulent days of Cod War
and Cold War.
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RESPECT FOR THE OPINION OF OTHERS
During the Cold War era, the U.S.-Icelandic defense relationship illustrated how
a minor party can sometimes have its way against its much more powerful ally.
Such a state of affairs seems to contradict the general emphasis on force and
power in the realist theory of international relations. Then again, Hans J.
Morgenthau, one of the best known realists, once cited the relationship between
the United States and Iceland in support of the assertion that “it is possible that a
weak nation possesses an asset that is of such great value for its strong ally as to
be irreplacable. Here the unique benefit the former is able to grant or withhold
may give it within the alliance a status completely out of keeping with the actual
distribution of material power.”92
Understandably, American officials and statesmen sometimes resented this
skewed correlation of forces. The word “blackmail” could even be heard. But ul-
timately the United States always accepted that it was in its own interest to ac-
commodate, not alienate, its prickly ally. As a distinguished historian of
U.S.-European relations in general during the Cold War has said, “America’s
strategic and economic ‘generosity,’ if one can call it that, was, of course, closely
related to American interests.”93 Furthermore, Icelandic policy makers undoubt-
edly made sacrifices in the name of Western cooperation during the Cold War.
The U.S. presence in Iceland split the population and fueled charges about
“Americanization” and warmongering. On the whole, however, a majority of
Icelanders usually supported the Defense Agreement of 1951. The agreement
would neither have been made nor have lasted for so long had both sides not
been convinced of its advantages. Shared perceptions of the Soviet threat
weighed more than unhappiness about certain aspects of the relationship.
The end of the Cold War reduced the strategic importance of Iceland; conse-
quently, the United States decreased its presence in the country. The government
in Iceland has been fairly content with that development, apart from the re-
moval of the fighters from Keflavík. Icelandic governments have resisted this
move ever since it was first mooted in the early 1960s, on the grounds that it
would leave the island defenseless. Inside Washington, officials and statesmen
have differing views on the question of the fighters. The Pentagon—particularly
the Air Force—sees no strategic reason to have them in Iceland. The State De-
partment, however—and probably the political leadership as well—are more
aware of the political need for a visible defense of Iceland, notwithstanding
cost-cutting measures abroad.
It is impossible at this stage to predict the final outcome of the decision to tie
the future of the jets to the overall revision of U.S. forces in Europe. In early
2004, Prime Minister Oddsson stated that discussions between American and
Icelandic officials were still “difficult” and gave him no cause for optimism.94 It
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may be suggested, however, that a mutually acceptable resolution would be
based on two premises. The first would be that the Icelanders take on a greater
cost and even responsibility for their own defense. It would perhaps be about
time, for as Bjarni Benediktsson, the statesman primarily responsible for Ice-
land’s accession to NATO in 1949 and the 1951 Defense Agreement, argued in
the early 1960s, “Iceland can never truly claim independence until it has at least a
token defense force.”95 Iceland may be small, but it is one of the richest countries
in the world.
Secondly, American policy makers will need to consider more than U.S. stra-
tegic and economic needs and wishes in the defense relationship with Iceland.
They may be tempted to think that the Icelanders are bluffing in their warnings
that there can be no U.S. presence at all in Iceland without the aircraft. But Ice-
landic statesmen seem totally sincere in their conviction that visible defenses on
the island itself are an integral part of the U.S.-Icelandic Defense Agreement.
Moreover, Iceland has been a political ally, albeit a small one, on the interna-
tional scene. Respect for the feelings of such an ally could be worth four fighter
jets. In short, in its relations with Iceland, the United States might have to heed
the warning of an American scholar that “failure to pay proper respect to the
opinion of others . . . will eventually come to hurt us. As our allies frequently re-
mind us, even well-intentioned American champions of benign hegemony do
not have all the answers.”96
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RESEARCH & DEBATE
BUILDING THE FUTURE FLEET SHOW US THE ANALYSIS!
Eric J. Labs
Since 11 September 2001, the U.S. defense budget has risen by about 25 percent,
after factoring out inflation. The reasons for such an increase are numerous: si-
multaneously fighting wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq, increases in military
pay and benefits, and more money for some major weapons programs. In this
same time period, money devoted to building the
Navy’s ships has only bounced around. In fiscal year
2001, the Navy spent $12 billion on ships. The Presi-
dent’s request for ships in 2005 is $11 billion. Why
might this be the case?
• First, while Navy officials may be doing an
excellent job explaining why the United States
needs a navy, they are not doing a good job
explaining why it needs the navy they say it needs.
• Second, both numbers of ships and their
capabilities matter when measuring or justifying
the need for naval power.
• Third, the Navy’s transformation vision, Sea
Power 21, does not resolve those issues.
• Fourth, as a result, the Navy may find itself
constrained to execute its long-term ship-
building program with budgets no greater than
today’s levels.
Dr. Labs received his doctorate from the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology in 1994. For the past ten years,
he has worked at the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO). He is the principal analyst for Naval Forces and
Weapons and specializes in procuring budgeting and
sizing of the forces for the Department of the Navy. He
has published several studies under the auspices of the
CBO, as well as a number of articles and papers in
academic journals and conferences, including the U.S.
Naval Institute’s Proceedings and Sea Power. His most
recent Navy-related CBO study is Transforming the
Navy’s Surface Combatant Force (March 2003). His
most recent CBO publication is Paying for Iraq’s
Reconstruction (January 2004). He is currently
working on studies that examine the Navy’s
requirement for its amphibious forces and its total ship
force structure. In 2002 and 2003, he received the CBO
Director’s Award for Exceptional Achievement.
The views in this article are those of the author and
should not be interpreted as those of the Congressional
Budget Office or the U.S. Congress. A shorter version of
this essay was first delivered at the June 2004 meeting of
the Current Strategy Forum.
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THE NAVY MUST PROVIDE A BETTER EXPLANATION FOR ITS
SHIP PROGRAMS
The U.S. Navy is doing a great job explaining why the United States must have a
Navy, but not such a good job explaining why it needs either a 375-ship fleet, or
even to maintain its current 295-ship fleet. For example, in many presentations
on military transformation or the future security environment, Navy officials il-
lustrate the paths and avenues of the world’s oceangoing commerce, or the dis-
tribution of the world’s population. Their point is to demonstrate how more
and more of the world’s economic activity crosses the oceans—hence the need
for the United States to maintain an active military presence around the world to
ensure the freedom of the seas. They also observe that 80 percent of the world’s
population lives in the littorals; therefore the Navy must focus on and be able to
operate in the world’s coastal regions because with the demise of the Soviet
threat, that is where the action will be. The fact that most of the world’s popula-
tion lives in coastal regions was true twenty years ago and 200 years ago.
In 1992, the U.S. Navy in its first post–Cold War vision statement, . . . From
the Sea, emphasized the importance of refocusing its attention from blue-water
sea control to littoral operations. Twelve years later, redefining the spread of eco-
nomic globalization or the sea-oriented distribution of the world’s population
provided little help to anyone trying to determine “how much Navy do we really
need?” Over the past decade, the Navy has proposed at various times a fleet com-
posed of 300, 310, 346, or 360 ships. The latest number is now “around 375.”
The Navy’s justification for the 375-ship fleet rests on a sequence of key con-
cepts articulated in the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and the Navy’s re-
sponse to meet it. The DPG states that U.S. military strategy must defend the
homeland, deter aggression in four theaters, swiftly defeat aggression in two, and
win decisively in one. This has been dubbed the 1-4-2-1, or simply 4-2-1, strat-
egy. In response, the Navy developed its Global Concept of Operations (Global
Conops), which redistributes the fleet to create expeditionary strike groups out
of amphibious ready groups, surface combatants, and submarines. Today’s nine-
teen strike groups include twelve carrier battle groups and seven surface action
groups. The thirty-seven strike groups of the Global Conops include those for-
mations as well as the twelve expeditionary strike groups, two additional surface
action groups, and the four SSGNs, each of which constitutes its own “group.”
To carry out this concept of operations, the Navy has stated, it would require
about 375 ships. This is the official justification so stated in the report submitted
to Congress last year. It is also found in the Navy’s vision statement, “Sea Power
21,” the cornerstone article written by the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral
Vern Clark.1
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Yet the Navy does not explicitly answer the question of how or why those capa-
bilities in those quantities will achieve the strategy articulated in the DPG. Why
are thirty-seven strike groups the right number? Why not forty-five or thirty?
The Navy prefers to talk about capabilities and those capabilities are quite im-
pressive, but why are 375 ships needed? Is the Navy arguing that 375 ships are
necessary for deterrence in four theaters but that three hundred ships would not
be able to do the same in the future? Are 375 ships necessary to swiftly defeat in
two theaters, or win decisively in one? As I will demonstrate, the Navy’s wartime
requirement for ships appears to be less than 375. Recent history and any com-
parison with the naval forces of the world suggest that one decisive victory is
more than covered by today’s 294-ship Navy. So, if 375 ships are necessary to
swiftly defeat in two theaters, then that has not been made explicit. Of course,
one could criticize my argument by saying that the Navy can already do all the
jobs asked of it by the Defense Planning Guidance with its existing fleet, but the
nation assumes some “risk” in doing so. However, one can then immediately ask
how that risk is being measured. Are U.S. national security or vital interests at
stake? Or only some minor interest? How is the reduction of risk being related to
by the capabilities of different fleet sizes?
Both Numbers and Capabilities
Let me now turn directly to the numbers versus capabilities question. While
some contend that the service needs more ships, others argue that the emphasis
should be on fleet capabilities. For example, during his first tour as Secretary of
the Navy, Gordon England stated that “it is capabilities, not numbers that matter
. . . our 300 ships are far more potent than [was] our 600-ship Navy.”2 At the
same time, Admiral Clark maintains that the Navy needs about 375 ships to do
all things asked of it, adding, “You can only be in one place at one time with one
ship and so numbers do matter. Numbers do have a quality all their own.”3
Those public statements indicate a tension among Navy officials over whether
the service should emphasize the issue of numbers or capabilities. Capabilities
measure the actual ability of the Navy to do certain missions or tasks. However,
as Admiral Clark indicated, quantity also plays a role in this. One could build the
most expensive, most capable warship the world has ever seen, and still it will be
in one place at one time. Thus the proper question is a combination of both con-
cepts: What capabilities does the U.S. Navy need and in what quantity?
Consider the ongoing debate over how many expeditionary strike groups are
required. A year ago the Navy’s answer was twelve, but according to officials, the
answer may now be eight because of Sea Swap (the Navy’s experiment with ro-
tating crews every six months to a forward deployed ship); the number of groups
1 4 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Summer_Autumn 2004.vp
Tuesday, September 28, 2004 12:26:45 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
144
Naval War College Review, Vol. 57 [2004], No. 3, Art. 28
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol57/iss3/28
will make about the same contribution to forward presence as twelve.4 That is an
interesting point on several levels.
On one hand, just two or three years ago, the Navy argued that rotating crews
to forward deployed ships would be too difficult—the challenges in both main-
tenance and training were considered by many as too great. Despite earlier pessi-
mism, however, the Navy did not in the end stop considering, experimenting
with, and pushing new methods of operations. Sea Swap is still an experiment
only on surface combatants, although Navy officials have declared it “success-
ful.” Thus the Navy may be embracing Sea Swap with more zeal than is war-
ranted at this stage. It has already indicated that it is planning—or at least
justifying—reductions in major portions of the force structure based on the Sea
Swap experiment.
Yet in the absence of a clear understanding of the Navy’s peacetime and war-
time requirements for amphibious ships and expeditionary strike groups, pro-
posing to cut the force structure based on the Sea Swap experiments is raising
issues and concerns in Congress, particularly among members who represent
shipbuilding states.5 Sea Swap only helps by providing more overseas presence
with the existing number of ships or the same amount of presence with fewer
numbers of ships. Sea Swap does not create more wartime capability but actually
reduces it by a little or a lot depending on how it is used. If the size of the force
structure in question remains the same, Sea Swap reduces wartime capability a
little because no ships are preparing to go on deployment (to relieve the forward
deployed ship) or have returned from deployment (after relieving the forward
deployed ship). Wartime capability is greatly reduced if cuts in the force struc-
ture follow its implementation. Wartime capability is still determined by the
number of ships—actual, physical hulls—in the fleet. Thus one could argue that
if Sea Swap permits the Navy to reduce its number of ships, it may also help pro-
vide deterrence in four theaters since it enables presence, yet it weakens the
Navy’s ability to swiftly defeat adversaries in two theaters because it reduces war-
time capability.
Reducing the number of ships via Sea Swap, in categories that have an excess
relative to wartime requirements would be prudent. However, the Navy should
clearly explain what its wartime requirements are and why. Until this recent de-
bate over the number of expeditionary strike groups, both the Marines and the
Navy had wartime requirements for amphibious lift ships that were greater than
the existing amphibious lift force. The long-standing Marine Corps require-
ment for amphibious lift is to have enough ships to carry 3.0 Marine expedition-
ary brigades. Long viewed as unaffordable, the Navy and the Marine Corps in
the 1990s accepted that the Navy’s “fiscally constrained” requirement for am-
phibious lift would be 2.5 Marine expeditionary brigades. Currently, the Navy
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has enough amphibious ships to lift 1.9 Marine expeditionary brigades. Cutting
to eight expeditionary strike groups on the basis of Sea Swap would be, in short,
a major change to long-standing wartime force planning.
Consider another example, the DD(X). Navy and industry briefings on the
DD(X), of which there have been many over the past few years, make the case for
why we need the DD(X). The ship will have an integrated power system, growth
potential for new and innovative weapons, dramatic signature reduction in or-
der to make the ship very stealthy, and long-range guns. Such capabilities,
should they prove successful, would be very impressive and a valuable addition
to the fleet. What is lacking in those briefings, however, is a case for how many of
these ships the Navy should buy, and why. Do we need six DD(X)s or twenty-
four? In 2003, the Navy’s Global Conops brief stated it needed sixteen: one for
each of the twelve expeditionary strike groups and then an additional four for
wartime surge. Three months later, the Navy submitted to Congress a report on
shipbuilding requirements over the next thirty years.6 It proposed a force of
twenty-four DD(X)s. Does that imply two DD(X)s for each ESG? If so, why
two? (It requested one just three months earlier.) Perhaps sixteen are now
needed because there might be only eight expeditionary strike groups. What is
the justification for all these numbers? Is there analysis behind them? Should
analysis matter? In June 2004, John Young, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
for Acquisition, acknowledged that the Navy would probably end up with be-
tween thirteen and nineteen ships.7 He went on to add that the Navy is study-
ing various “scenarios” to determine the right number. Yet the DD(X)
program has been under way, in one form or another, since the mid-1990s, and
the Navy is asking for the first ship authorization in fiscal year 2005. Why has
the Navy not yet finished the analysis needed to determine how many of those
ships are needed? The DD(X) appears largely oriented to providing long-range
fire support from the sea, a capability the Navy currently lacks. The scenarios
for it, however, seem fairly predictable and, therefore, so should the size of the
DD(X) force.
Let us consider another well known example of this problem—requirements
for the littoral combat ship. In 2000, the Navy sent a thirty-year shipbuilding re-
port to the Congress. Nowhere in that report did it make mention of a need for
small, fast surface combatants to maintain sea control in the world’s coastal re-
gions, nor was there mention in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report.
By 2002, however, the Navy was discussing widely the need for such a craft, and
by 2003, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Clark, was describing the LCS
as his “most transformational program and number one budget priority.”8 He
stated a need for thirty to sixty of these vessels. In May 2003, the Navy sent a new
long-range shipbuilding program to Congress that called for fifty-six LCSs. No
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analysis had been prepared ahead of time to determine whether the LCS was the
right ship for the missions the Navy wanted, and the characteristics and capabil-
ities of the ship had not been established. Later Admiral John Nathman, who was
then Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Pro-
grams (N6/N7), stated in testimony that most of the analysis done to support
the LCS program was done after the Navy made the decision to go forward with
the program.9 What, then, was the basis for requiring fifty-six LCSs?
In addition, senior officials have stated that Sea Swap could also affect the LCS
program. In June 2004, Admiral Nathman, now the Vice Chief of Naval Operations–
designate, stated that perhaps they needed only forty to fifty LCSs. He argued
that crew swapping could yield a “smaller procurement objective for LCS.”10 Ac-
cording to the Navy, the primary missions of the LCSs are defeating anti-access
threats, such as hunting for diesel electric submarines, countering swarms of
small boats, and clearing mine fields. Those wartime missions are unlikely to be
undertaken except in an imminent crisis or wartime environment. For a ship de-
signed and built for wartime missions, why should the procurement objective
change if crew swapping is used? The wartime requirement for ships is based on
the number of hulls—something Sea Swap, as stated earlier, does not address.
What, then, is the wartime requirement for LCSs? It does not appear to be fifty-
six, or applying Sea Swap would not matter. Finally, the Navy also states that the
LCS may take on additional missions, such as safeguarding the sea lanes, as a second-
order task after the anti-access missions. Because that is more of a presence mis-
sion, Sea Swap would improve the ability of the LCS force to do that job.
Finally, even as the numbers of DD(X)s (and other types of ships) changed
over the course of the past two years, the 375-ship number remained essentially
the same, potentially adding to the confusion regarding what the Navy needs.
Such confusion may be affecting the funding and implementation of the Navy’s
shipbuilding program. In the 2004 Department of Defense authorization bill,
the House Armed Services Committee acted to cut construction money from
the DD(X) and LCS programs in order to delay them for one year. The House
Appropriations Committee cut both DD(X) and LHA(R) funding, and criti-
cized the Navy for its lack of analysis and detailed explanations for what it was
doing. The Committee stated that it
. . . remains deeply troubled by the lack of stability in the Navy’s shipbuilding pro-
gram. . . . Programs justified to Congress in terms of mission requirements in one
year’s budget are removed from the next. . . . The Committee further notes that doc-
umentation submitted with budgetary proposals is often lacking in specifics regard-
ing total program requirement (number of ships to be constructed), total program
cost, and detailed expenditure plans. This lack of information makes it difficult for
Congress to weigh options for funding programs throughout the Department of
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Defense. Furthermore, it obscures the impact of current decisions on future budget-
ary requirements. 11
SEA POWER 21 IS NOT HELPING
The Navy’s vision statement, Sea Power 21, makes a good case for having in the
tool kit all the capabilities it mentions, such as Sea Shield, Sea Strike, and Sea
Basing. Sea Shield describes all of the capabilities that will be brought to bear to
defend the fleet—or elements of it—from attack. They include missile and air
defense provided by surface ships and the planes of an aircraft carrier, as well as
anti-access threats posed by quiet conventional submarines, small boats, and
mines. Sea Strike focuses on the offensive power of the fleet, to include the strik-
ing power of surface combatants (either with missiles or gunfire support), sub-
marines, aircraft carriers, or the Marines disembarking from amphibious ships.
Sea Basing refers to the Navy’s and Marine Corps’s plans to conduct military op-
erations with battalion and brigade-sized forces ashore, supported logistically
almost entirely from the sea.12
Nevertheless, Sea Power 21 provides no guidance that would help anyone un-
derstand how much is needed. It lays out in detail the changes and capabilities
the Navy requires, including all of the major programs the Navy is now pursu-
ing: CVN-21, DD(X), CG(X), LCS, Virginia-class attack submarines, SSGNs,
LPD-17, LHA(R), MPF(F), etc. No discussion of the quantities required for
those programs, however, is included. This is somewhat understandable. It is of-
ten easier to explain and thus justify the capabilities a particular weapons pro-
gram brings to the fight than to sort out how many of them are necessary.
Without additional justification for the quantities of major platforms the Navy
desires, other factors may play a more important role in determining the size of
the future fleet.
Resource Constraints
Budgets will play a key role in determining the U.S. military’s force structure, in-
cluding that of the Navy. No matter how much money is available, there are al-
ways demands for more spending on an increasing range of goods and services.
Thus Navy shipbuilding programs are competing with other demands within
the Department of the Navy, the demands of other services, and those of domes-
tic programs, be they social security, the environment, industry subsidies, or tax
cuts. National strategy and force structure are always developed within that bud-
getary context. After all, if strategy (and thus force structure) could be developed
unconstrained by budgets, a strategy would be unnecessary—the trade-offs and
balances between competing priorities inherent in a strategy would not need to
be made.
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Future budgets may thus force hard choices on the Navy. From 1990 to the
present, the Navy’s shipbuilding program was underfunded by about $50 billion
simply to maintain today’s 295-ship fleet. If the force goal was 375 ships, ship-
building would be underfunded by more than $100 billion. Hence if those hard
choices must be made, either by the Navy, the Department of Defense, or Con-
gress, a clear explanation of the wartime and peacetime requirements of the fleet
would be valuable. In some ways, the Navy is a victim of its own success. It no
longer has the Soviet navy to plan or size its fleet against. Today, the U.S. Navy
could defeat any naval power on the planet within a short period of time. While
that may be a blessing at sea, it can be a burden in Washington, D.C. Answering
the question of what capabilities the Navy needs, in what quantities, and why
may make the difference in determining whether it ends up with a fleet that is
substantially larger, or smaller, than the one it has now. Right now, the service’s
strategy, vision, and analysis do not appear to have succeeded in producing a
convincing answer. This is not to say that good answers will guarantee a larger
fleet. But the long-term fiscal future suggests that with the baby boomers begin-
ning to retire and the demand for resources by Social Security and Medicare
costs rising dramatically, the lack of a strong justification will increasingly look
like taking a knife to a gunfight.
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REVIEW ESSAY
WHAT DID THE COLD WAR TEACH US?
James M. Goldgeier
Nichols, Thomas M. Winning the World: Lessons for America’s
Future from the Cold War. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002.
254pp. $49.95
In the late 1940s scholars and practitioners reached for the lessons learned from
World Wars I and II to combat the growing threat posed by the Soviet Union.
The United States established a free trade order to ensure Western prosperity,
built peacetime alliances around the world to help contain Soviet power, and went
to war to save South Korea and to demonstrate that aggression would not pay.
For four decades Americans experienced a Cold War with the Soviet
Union. The two superpowers engaged in a massive arms race and almost
went to war over Berlin, Cuba, and the Middle East.
The United States got bogged down in Vietnam, the
Soviets in Afghanistan, and each expended re-
sources in places of dubious strategic value in the
Third World. As America faces its new enemy re-
sponsible for 9/11, does the Cold War contest offer
any lessons for American strategists? Thomas
Nichols says that it does.
Nichols stresses that the key feature of the U.S.-
Soviet struggle was the difference in ideology and that
in a new war with new ideological foes, the United
States can learn from the recent past. Just recognizing
that the enemy has an ideology is for Nichols no small
matter; he spends a good deal of the book deriding
liberal academics who in his view failed to understand
James M. Goldgeier is professor of political science and
international affairs and the director of the Institute for
European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies at George
Washington University. He is also an adjunct senior fel-
low at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the coau-
thor of Power and Purpose: U.S. Policy toward Russia
after the Cold War (Brookings, 2003) and author of Not
Whether but When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge
NATO (Brookings, 1999) and of Leadership Style and
Soviet Foreign Policy (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press,
1994), which won the 1995 Edgar S. Furniss Book
Award in national and international security. He previ-
ously taught at the University of California, Berkeley,
and Cornell University, and he was a visiting fellow at
Stanford University and the Brookings Institution. From
1995 to 1996 Dr. Goldgeier was a Council on Foreign Re-
lations international affairs fellow serving at the State
Department and on the National Security Council staff.
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the true goals of Soviet communists. One cannot bargain with those who are
ideologically opposed to your way of life. Détente was a mistake. What is needed
now to combat this new enemy is the kind of pressure used by President Ronald
Reagan against the Soviets.
Nichols’s viewpoint on ideology is important. The more we learn about Soviet
decision making from notes of Politburo sessions, the more we know that those
at the top were not just spouting out propaganda but actually believed in what
they were saying. Even Stalin, the cynical and brutal master of realpolitik, whom
many viewed as merely using ideology instrumentally in his struggle for control,
was steeped in Marxism-Leninism and was known to engage in lengthy philo-
sophical discussions. So also was Mikhail Gorbachev, a true believer in a nonvio-
lent form of Marxist-Leninism, whose failure was in not recognizing how
bankrupt his ideology was when he tried to destroy the old system with nothing
credible to take its place.
The main U.S. foreign policy experiment in engaging this ideological oppo-
nent was President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s
détente. Nichols argues that avoidance of nuclear war was the chief source of the
policy. However, if the United States really wants to draw lessons from this, it
should consider Kissinger and Nixon’s concern about maintaining America’s
preeminent position in global affairs. It was not just the avoidance of nuclear
war they were seeking, it was the preservation of the U.S. position as the leading
world power at a time when America was at war in Vietnam and the Soviets had
achieved nuclear parity. Their strategic goal then was to prevent the balance of
power from shifting to the Soviet Union—in the parlance of the 2002 White
House national security strategy, how to keep the balance of power in favor of
freedom. The problem today is that though the United States can maintain its
lead over any combination of states in traditional measures of power, how does
it maintain its preeminent position in the face of nonstate threats seeking to at-
tack it at its most vulnerable points?
It turns out that even Nichols believes that engagement is not always a bad
thing. He does a nice job illustrating how there was not such a huge divide be-
tween the end of Jimmy Carter’s presidency and the beginning of Reagan’s.
Carter had already rejected détente—Reagan was just more emphatic about it.
Yet Nichols argues that although Reagan put the pressure on, by the end of 1983
even he believed that he had gone too far and was looking to engage.
Perhaps more striking is the author’s statement that although Reagan’s strat-
egy was appropriate for its time, it was better that President George H. W. Bush
was the one to handle the collapse of the Soviet Union and help ease Moscow’s
decline. The Bush team was clearly successful in managing the end of the Cold
War and, in particular, German unification. But would we be praising Bush’s
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prudence if the Soviet August 1991 coup had succeeded and hard-liners reas-
serted their control in Moscow?
Surprisingly, given the current world situation, Nichols almost completely ig-
nores the most radical element of Reagan’s global vision—the creation of a nuclear-
free world. This vision underpinned Reagan’s desire for the Strategic Defense
Initiative, his willingness to share the technology with the Soviet Union, and his
hope to be rid of offensive nuclear weapons. (His advisers thought him naïve.)
Such deep cuts in nuclear forces were possible only after the Cold War. No ad-
ministration since has declared such a commitment that could help in the over-
all effort to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Finally, what about superpower interests in the periphery? Nichols argues
that much of the Third World conflict was unnecessary given the interests of
both superpowers. The United States should have felt secure enough to avoid
many far-flung conflicts, and the Soviets expended resources that could have
been used more productively for their own people. Based on the author’s argu-
ment on ideology, however, was it really so preposterous for the USSR to seek al-
lies among underdeveloped countries? In the 1970s, both the Soviets and the
Americans bought into the notion that the correlation of forces was shifting in
favor of the Soviets. However, Europe and Japan were already in the U.S. camp,
and after 1972 the United States was engaging China. All major power centers
were arrayed against the Soviet Union. What else could Moscow do but court an
Ethiopia or an Angola?
Although Nichols argues that many lives and resources were wasted in places
of little strategic value, he stresses the importance of the war in Vietnam. “If it
was really only one theater of many in a world war, then the question becomes
one of whether fighting is better than surrender, what price should be paid to
slow the enemy’s advance, and perhaps even to avoid having to fight another day
in another place.” Why would that be true in Vietnam and not in Africa?
Nichols argues that the “Cold War of 1945–1991 was only the first of its kind,”
because “the war with terrorism, like the war against communism, is a war of
ideas against people who will one day seek again to hold us hostage with nuclear
weapons.” Will America again really face that kind of war with that kind of ad-
versary? Are we in a war of ideas or a war against a network of disaffected people
willing to blow themselves up to kill us? Is there truly an alternative vision in
how to organize the world, followed by our adversaries in the way Lenin pro-
vided? Should we not be more concerned that nonstate actors, who feel no com-
punction about using weapons of mass destruction against the United States,
gain access to the technology they need than fear they will seek to “hold us
hostage”?
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The study of the Cold War has become increasingly exciting in recent years.
Nichols makes some use of new material from places like the Cold War Interna-
tional History Project and the National Security Archive, but he spends so much
time expressing his rage at those who did not understand Soviet evil that he
misses how much the new materials enable us to explore these themes in even
greater detail. We now have access to open archives in places like Central and
Eastern Europe, including the former East Berlin. Scholars are exploring in
depth from multinational sources the very issues that Nichols raises. Scholars
around the world are trying to understand what happened in their own coun-
tries. Cold War studies programs and journals have sprouted up on campuses
like George Washington University, University of California at Santa Barbara,
London School of Economics, Harvard University, and New York University.
Young scholars, who do not have the baggage of those who debated each other
during the Cold War, are studying and enriching our understanding.
As the United States struggles with adversaries opposed to its way of life,
Nichols is right to remind us of what is at stake. Just recall the joy with which
Central and Eastern Europeans threw off Soviet rule and took the steps neces-
sary to rejoin the West. We have seen individuals cherish the right to vote in
Namibia and Mongolia, and a population in Iran increasingly frustrated with
theocratic rule. As did World War II, the Cold War also taught that we should
never sell short democratic values.
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BOOK REVIEWS
HOW TO AVOID SUDDEN SHOCK
Schwartz, Peter. Inevitable Surprises: Thinking Ahead in a Time of Turbulence. New York: Gotham, 2003.
245pp. $27
The intelligence community is getting a
bad rap these days as it attempts to help
policy makers weather the myriad na-
tional security challenges in the Age of
Disruption. The controversy over weap-
ons of mass destruction and protracted
post-conflict insurgency in Iraq are
only two incidents in a series of sur-
prises. Whether it is the demise of the
Soviet Union, economic collapses in
Southeast Asia, the development of nu-
clear weapons in India and Pakistan,
North Korea’s nuclear and missile pro-
grams, terrorist attacks on the United
States, or the subsequent anthrax at-
tacks, being taken by surprise is becom-
ing the norm.
Peter Schwartz, however, was not
knocked for a loop by many of these
events—in some cases he predicted
them. Schwartz is an expert at avoiding
surprises. Starting with his work with
Royal Shell in the 1970s, his efforts with
the Pentagon’s eighty-year-old futurist
and director of the Office of Net Assess-
ment, Andrew Marshall, and the U.S.
National Security Commission in the
last decade, up to his present consulting
work with the Global Business Network,
Schwartz has made a career out of help-
ing clients avoid strategic surprises. He
does not necessarily make forecasts, but
he does predict that denial, defensive-
ness, and ignorance are the principal
preceptors for sudden shock.
Schwartz’s specialty is researching the
innumerable drivers and wild cards in
our environment from which he can
craft scenarios that will help strategic
planners and decision makers anticipate
crises well before they happen. He is no
stranger to naval readers, who will be
familiar with his The Art of the Long
View: Planning for the Future in an Un-
certain World (Currency, 1991), once
required reading at the Naval War Col-
lege. In Inevitable Surprises, Schwartz
points out that we will face numerous
sharp jolts or major discontinuities in
political, military, and economic areas.
“If anything,” he notes, “there will be
more, not fewer, surprises in the future,
and they will all be interconnected.”
These interconnected surprises, which
Schwartz calls discontinuities, will
bring about a different world, one in
which the rules of the game are funda-
mentally altered. The critical value of
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this work is the author’s belief that
many of these discontinuities have their
roots in ongoing trends and that we can
anticipate them. By realizing what to-
day’s driving forces are, we can alter
our perception about today’s emerging
realities, anticipate the consequences,
and avoid surprise.
Schwartz offers a simple process for
thinking anew and avoiding major
shocks. The first step is to pay attention
and identify and monitor the driving
forces that influence tomorrow’s world,
get ahead of the so-called inevitable
surprises, and prepare for them. The
second step is to remove ourselves from
the rigid mental paradigms about what
is fixed and what can be changed in the
landscape. The final step is to envision
new strategies for dealing with new
circumstances.
Most of this book discusses macro-level
factors in terms of social, economic,
and technological change. Some of the
discontinuities Schwartz deals with in
chapter-length detail include: dramatic
extension in human longevity based on
improvements in medical science, with
substantial influences on retirement, so-
cial institutions, and the political power
of influential centenarians; a “great
flood” of immigration with resultant
social tensions in China, Europe, and
the United States; continued economic
growth in the developing world and a
return to what Schwartz called the
“long boom,” predicated upon the en-
hanced productivity of the Information
Age and the updated critical infrastruc-
ture that undergirds it; a series of inter-
related breakthroughs in science and
technology, especially nanotechnology,
biomaterials, and regenerative medicine,
quantum computers, and fuel cells; and
a few environmental crises, including the
impact of global climate warming and
the coming of a great plague.
Military professionals and policy ana-
lysts will be particularly interested in
Schwartz’s range of geopolitical scenar-
ios. In one scenario, the European
Union consolidates into an effective
bloc and begins to challenge what it
perceives as America the rogue super-
power. China also grows in political
and military muscle, and it too seeks to
check the global dominance and influ-
ence of the United States. On the other
extreme, Schwartz paints a scenario of
American preeminence, including com-
plete dominance of space with instant
global strike. In this scenario, because
the benefits of a benign superpower are
shared, a quiet and sustained Pax
Americana emerges.
Before anyone gets complacent about
American preeminence, read chapter 5,
in which the author details the dismal
prospects of the near future. His “cata-
log of disorder” includes an updated
version of the Four Horsemen of the
Apocalypse, beginning with terrorism,
religious wars—including evangelical
Christianity in Africa—criminal state-
hood in Mexico, ethnic conflict, and
HIV/AIDS. Schwartz’s grasp of the in-
terrelated nature of many of these de-
pressing transnational problems is
masterful. His grim projections of such
disorders are largely predetermined,
thus inevitable and therefore troubling.
These future flashpoints are all too
rarely identified as issues in the national
security community until U.S. military
forces are dispatched to provide some
form of stability.
Inevitable Surprises is well worth any-
one’s time, as long as the reader under-
stands that predicting is like planning—
it is not the prediction or the plan itself
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that is important but the diligent pro-
cess of identifying drivers and develop-
ing scenarios that is invaluable. To
paraphrase Helmuth von Moltke, no
forecast survives contact with reality;
good forecasters, like good planners,
excel because they have gone through
the rigorous intellectual process of ex-
amining the mental geography of a
problem and anticipating the various
contours and conditions that could arise.
Read this book only if you would like to
avoid being surprised by tomorrow’s
predictable discontinuities.
FRANK HOFFMAN
Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities
Quantico, Virginia
Gray, Colin S. The Sheriff: America’s Defense of the
New World Order. Lexington: Univ. Press of Ken-
tucky, 2004. 232pp. $29.95
What role should the United States play
in contemporary international politics?
This question, or rather debate, began
at the end of the Cold War and has
never really concluded. It is a unique
debate because while everyone disagrees
on the question, all agree on its sub-
stance—the United States is the preem-
inent power in the world. People refer
to the United States by various names:
the lone superpower, the unipolar mo-
ment, Pax Americana, and from some
of its erstwhile allies and former ene-
mies, the unilateral hegemon or
hyperpower. All such names try to cap-
ture the signal fact that America carries
tremendous weight in world affairs,
though for obvious reasons everyone
interprets the implications differently.
In the United States, two different
groups dominate the contemporary
study of strategy: defense analysts and
scholars of international security. In
both fields most writers seem content
to work on very specific problems. De-
fense analysts tend to emphasize what
many have called the Revolution in
Military Affairs or military transforma-
tion, while many in international secu-
rity still contend for a theory-driven
approach to international conflict.
However, despite the fact that strategy
bridges politics and war, defense ana-
lysts narrowly focus on the details of
defense policies to the exclusion of the
larger political issues. On the other
hand, security theorists miss even the
most basic issues pursuing theoretical
elegance and, consequently, tend to
write only for one another. Colin Gray
avoids the pitfalls of each approach in
The Sheriff.
Colin Gray is professor of international
politics and strategic studies at the Uni-
versity of Reading, England, and senior
fellow of the National Institute for
Public Policy in Virginia. He has writ-
ten extensively on strategy, geostrategy,
and defense policy, and has long been
connected to the defense establishments
of the United States and NATO. Many
of his former students are working in
both places and in the academy today.
Gray begins this work by trying to un-
derstand some of the major issues fac-
ing the United States in the post-post–
Cold War era and finishes by noting it
is the little things that imperiled every-
one’s ability to see the larger picture. “I
found that so much about the U.S. role
in the world is coming into contention,
that were I to devote most of my pages
to military issues, as long intended, I
would be analyzing secondary issues
while leaving matters of first-order sig-
nificance insufficiently addressed.” It is
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to the issues of first-order significance
that the book is addressed.
Given the fact of America’s preemi-
nence in the world, what should it do?
Gray sees the United States performing
the role of “sheriff” of international
politics, where others suggest running
an empire. Gray explains that “sheriff is
of course a metaphor. By its use I mean
to argue that the United States will act
on behalf of others, as well as itself, un-
dertaking some of the tough jobs of in-
ternational security that no other agent
or agency is competent to perform.”
That is precisely what the United States
has been doing, albeit sporadically,
since the end of the Cold War. How-
ever, during the interregnum of the
Cold War and the attacks of 9/11, the
United States was strategically adrift,
particularly during the years of the
Clinton administration, which had no
real focus except in the hope of reviving
multilateral institutions.
Three things gave rise to a renewed
strategic focus for the United States.
The first was the election of the gener-
ally experienced, conservative leader-
ship of the Bush team; the second was
the commitment to military transfor-
mation by Bush’s Pentagon team under
Donald Rumsfeld; and third, the cata-
lyzing attacks of 9/11, which provided
focus for their efforts. Though the ad-
ministration is focused on the war on
terror now, Gray believes that U.S.
strategy should also prepare for the
eventual return of state-centric conflict.
Gray is a classical realist. A classical re-
alist differs from the neorealist of the
academy, who emphasizes theoretical
modeling from the realpolitik practiced
by cynical German politicians of the
Bismarck era. Classical realists take
their lead from the writings of
Thucydides, Sun Tzu, and Clausewitz
and calculate strategy in terms of power
and geography, or geostrategy. Through
five chapters, Gray shows why he be-
lieves the proper role for the United
States is to sheriff the international
system—that is, to regulate the interna-
tional political order. He believes his-
tory shows that world order is not
self-enforcing and unless the United
States commits to regulating it, it may
not be regulated at all; or, worse, U.S.
neglect may encourage others to try
their hand at regulating international
politics, to the detriment of the current
world order.
Gray makes a strong case for the U.S.
role in regulating international politics.
The role of sheriff will help provide the
conceptual focus for military planners
and advocates of transformation. He
also suggests ways the United States can
maintain its preponderance of power,
prudent ways to serve U.S. interests as
well as keep both domestic and interna-
tional politics on its side, or at least not
overtly hostile. What he does not ad-
dress, however, is why the United States
should act as sheriff. What is it about
America that makes it the best candi-
date for the job? It cannot be simply be-
cause it is the most powerful country in
the world.
Clausewitz famously links war—and
the instruments of war, the military—
to politics. The central question for
strategy, then, should be to what end
and for what purpose should strategy
be made? To answer that question, one
must first ask what are the conditions
of internal politics that lead the United
States to want, or need, to regulate in-
ternational politics. What is it about the
United States that makes it the right
power to act as sheriff? Unfortunately,
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Clausewitz himself never addressed
politics much, and neither do his suc-
cessors. However, if one assumes that
the United States is the right country
for sheriff, which Gray clearly does,
then it behooves us to pay attention to
what he says.
MARK T. CLARK
Director of the National Security Studies Program
California State University, San Bernardino
Korb, Lawrence J. A New National Security Strat-
egy in an Age of Terrorists, Tyrants, and Weapons
of Mass Destruction: Three Options Presented as
Presidential Speeches. New York: Council on For-
eign Relations, 2003.
Since the end of the Cold War and the
subsequent demise of the Soviet Union,
the United States has been in search of
a new grand strategy. Over time, the
question “What should be the post–
Cold War U.S. grand strategy?” evolved
into “What should the United States do
with its preeminence?” The answers
provided by the various erstwhile suc-
cessors to George Kennan, who gave us
the Cold War’s “containment,” have
ranged from neo-isolationism—dubbed
“strategic independence” by some of its
advocates—to primacy, the consolida-
tion and indefinite preservation of U.S.
hegemony, of what had initially been
thought to be a “unipolar moment.”
Some, most notably neoconservatives,
have even made the case for a U.S. em-
pire—primacy on steroids.
The declaration by the United States of
a global war on terror following the at-
tacks of 9/11 has done little to bring
closure to the grand strategy debate. In-
deed, the brutally manifest new threat
and the response to it, particularly as
formulated in the Bush administration’s
September 2002 The National Security
Strategy of the United States of America,
and implemented in Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM, served to further fuel the de-
bate. For many, the boldness, even arro-
gance, exhibited in the administration’s
security strategy, especially the explicit
embrace of “preemption” and the after-
math of the Iraq campaign, have raised
more questions than have been
answered.
It is here that Korb, with this admirably
concise and sharply focused volume,
steps up to the plate. In the tradition of
such previous Council on Foreign Rela-
tions Policy Initiatives as Reshaping
America’s Military by Korb (2002) and
Future Visions for U.S. Defense Policy by
Hillen and Korb (2000), Korb here lays
out, in the form of presidential speeches,
three alternative national security
strategies.
As a senior fellow at the Center for
American Progress, former director of
the National Security Studies Program
at the Council of Foreign Relations, and
former assistant secretary of defense,
Korb possesses the intellect and experi-
ence this project requires.
The author takes as his point of departure
the concerns—in some corners, furor—
generated by the Bush administration’s
2002 security strategy. Controversies
surrounding four issues are highlighted:
the embrace of preemption (and appar-
ent abandonment of containment and
deterrence); the willingness to sacrifice
the principles of political and economic
liberalism in the global war on terror-
ism by recruiting the likes of Pakistan’s
President Pervez Musharraf to the
cause, for example; the inclination to go
it alone; and the evident internal ten-
sions and contradictions, particularly
the call for maintaining and enhancing
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U.S. primacy in the face of chronic eco-
nomic challenges.
These issues are featured in assessments
of three alternative national security
strategies. The first alternative, “U.S.
Dominance and Preventive Action,” is
embraced by neoconservatives and
those within the administration and
elsewhere who have been referred to as
“assertive nationalists.” It begins with
the premise that “the most serious
threats to American security come from
the combination of terrorism, rogue
states, and weapons of mass destruc-
tion.” The capability and will to act pre-
emptively and unilaterally are essential;
American military dominance must be
maintained; and U.S. security requires
widespread democracy and capitalism.
The second option, “A More Stable
World with U.S. Power for Deterrence
and Containment,” is said to be favored
by moderate Republicans and Demo-
crats. They share the characterization of
the threat provided by advocates of op-
tion one, yet counsel against elevating
“preemption” to the status of a doc-
trine, emphasize the need for interna-
tional support in the ongoing war on
terror, and warn against the strategic
overextension that may well result from
proactively spreading free-market
democracies.
The distinctly liberal third option, “A
Cooperative World Order,” is reminis-
cent of the Clinton administration’s na-
tional security strategy—“Engagement
and Enlargement,” in Anthony Lake’s
formulation. To the nexus of terror-
ists, rogue states, and weapons of mass
destruction, its proponents add the
longer-term threats posed by “global
poverty, growing lawlessness, and the
increasing isolation of the United
States from like-minded states.” This
multitude of dangers requires
international diplomatic, economic,
and military cooperation; military re-
sponses are not to be given pride of
place. The United States must
strengthen, not tear asunder, interna-
tional norms and institutions. Even the
world’s dominant military power can-
not unilaterally ensure its security.
Korb masterfully translates the three al-
ternatives into full-blown presidential
addresses to Congress and the nation.
He also systematically and evenhand-
edly assesses the strengths, weaknesses,
and political impact of each. Signifi-
cantly, “liberal,” for Korb, is not a
four-letter word. Unlike many Republi-
cans, he knows how to count. This vol-
ume should be required reading for
President George W. Bush, his advisers,
and the broader U.S. national security
community.
ANDREW L. ROSS
Naval War College
Scarborough, Rowan. Rumsfeld’s War. Washing-
ton, D.C.: Regnery, 2004. 253pp. $27.95
Rumsfeld’s War is a close-up look at one
of the most influential figures in the
Bush administration, and a key leader
in the current war against militant
Islamism. The book examines Rumsfeld
the man, reviewing his long and varied
career at the top levels of government
and industry, and analyzes his role in
the two principal themes of his tenure,
transformation of the Cold War mili-
tary and defeat of Middle Eastern
terrorism.
Rowan Scarborough is a well known
Washington Times reporter, specializing
in defense issues. While not a panegyric,
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his book provides a sympathetic look at
Rumsfeld. This is not surprising, in that
the Washington Times has been notably
supportive of the Bush administration.
As in his reporting, when writing his
book, Scarborough doubtless benefited
from close and frequent contact with
the senior people around the secretary
of defense.
One characteristic of Donald Rumsfeld
that leaps from the pages is his utter
self-assurance, bordering on arrogance,
which manifests itself as remarkable de-
cisiveness and precision in thought and
speech. The book opens with Rumsfeld’s
conversation with President Bush soon
after American Airlines flight 77
crashed into the Pentagon. He is noted
as saying, “This is not a criminal action,
this is war.” His phrase crystalized a
radical shift in strategic thinking that
decisively took America from the list-
less strategic drift of the 1990s to one of
activism and intervention. As noted by
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Douglas Feith, “That was really a break-
through strategically and intellectually.
Viewing the 9/11 attacks as a war that
required a war strategy was a very big
thought and a lot flowed from that.”
The twin themes of transformation and
fighting wars are inextricably inter-
twined. Serving as secretary of defense
for President Gerald Ford from 1975 to
1977, Rumsfeld returned to the White
House a second time with a specific
mandate from President Bush to
“transform” the military—bring strat-
egy and military capabilities into better
balance with the post–Cold War
geopolitical context. The Bush adminis-
tration came into office believing that
the Pentagon was too wedded to expen-
sive, obsolescing systems from the Cold
War and to the accompanying policies,
processes, and mind-set that demanded
more of the same. When Rumsfeld ag-
gressively set out to overturn the tables
in the Pentagon, he was met with deter-
mined resistance, for both substantive
and stylistic reasons. By early Septem-
ber 2001, there were widespread ru-
mors that Rumsfeld would be the first
cabinet secretary to resign, over his in-
ability to foster change in the Pentagon.
Flight 77 changed all that. The United
States was no longer chasing criminals,
it was at war. The operations in Afghan-
istan were dominated by remarkable
synergies between special operations
forces and precision weapons, themes
that had long been pushed by “transfor-
mation” advocates. In both Afghanistan
and Iraq, Rumsfeld insisted on far
smaller numbers of ground combat
units than the military leadership was
comfortable with, arguing that the syn-
ergies possible in a heavily netted joint
battle space, coupled with precision
weapons and targeting, greatly in-
creased the lethality and effectiveness of
U.S. forces. The combat results amply
repaid his confidence.
The lessons from the fighting merely re-
doubled Rumsfeld’s determination to
keep transforming the Department of
Defense. Battlefield results notwith-
standing, change in the military bu-
reaucratic processes remained difficult.
Rumsfeld noted that he “was struck by . . .
how resistant people are to looking at
strategy in a different way and pursuing
advantages, rather than focusing on re-
acting to threats.” On the other hand,
his often abrasive manner needlessly
antagonized people otherwise willing to
help bring about overdue change in the
Pentagon.
There is no doubt, however, that
Rumsfeld has made an enormous effort
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to overcome the stultifying stasis of the
huge Department of Defense bureau-
cracies—military and civilian—and the
mental inertia of fifty years of Cold War
thinking. As Scarborough notes,
“Rumsfeld’s task of reconfiguring the
military and fighting the war on terror
is so immense that it will take the light
of history to determine exactly what he
finally accomplished and at what he
failed.” If nothing else, Rumsfeld cre-
ated, if not institutionalized, the state of
intellectual ferment that antecedes ma-
jor change in any large organization.
Rumsfeld’s War is a quick, instructive
read from a pro-Rumsfeld perspective.
In that sense, it perhaps could be con-
sidered a counter to Bob Woodward’s
two recent “insider” books on the cur-
rent war, for which Woodward received
very little support from Rumsfeld, and
in which Rumsfeld is not sympatheti-
cally depicted. On the downside, the
book stylistically feels somewhat as if
the author threw together some of his
day-to-day reporting text and called it a
book. Also, fully one-third of the book
consists of appendices, with copies of
various memos and papers, many clas-
sified “secret”; no military reader can
applaud the open use of such docu-
ments. However, the book is an inter-
esting depiction of a remarkable man.
As Scarborough notes on the final
page, “It is hard to imagine any other
man to whom Bush could have turned
to fight this war with more tenacity,
panache, and, at the appropriate time,
good humor.”
JAN VAN TOL
Captain, U.S. Navy
Machiavelli, Niccolò. The Art of War. Edited and
translated by Christopher Lynch. Chicago: Univ.
of Chicago Press, 2003. 262pp. $25
Machiavelli’s classic, if now rarely read,
The Art of War was probably the single
most popular military treatise in Eu-
rope prior to Jomini—Clausewitz was a
professed admirer.
At first sight, this book, with its appar-
ent attempt to revive the infantry-
centered military organization of the
imperial Roman legions, seems hope-
lessly irrelevant to present concerns.
Even within its historical setting (it was
originally published in 1521),
Machiavelli’s work is often dismissed
today for its alleged failure to appreci-
ate the social and technological
trends—particularly the growing im-
portance of gunpowder—underpinning
the “revolution in military affairs” of
the sixteenth century. Christopher
Lynch makes an excellent case that such
interpretations neglect the literary or
rhetorical dimension of The Art of War
and its relationship to Machiavelli’s
larger intellectual project. In an exten-
sive introduction, as well as an interpre-
tive essay, Lynch rebuts the criticisms of
contemporary scholars, defends
Machiavelli’s grasp of the military reali-
ties of his own day, and reinterprets the
intention of the work in relation to
Machiavelli’s more famous political trea-
tises, The Prince and Discourses on Livy.
Lynch’s key point is that Machiavelli
was not simply the backward-looking
admirer of Rome he is often taken to be
but a revolutionary thinker who com-
bined elements of past military and po-
litical systems in a novel synthesis. His
apparent reliance on Roman models is
to be understood fundamentally as a
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rhetorical device designed to appeal to
the prejudices of the humanist-oriented
Italian elite of his day. At the military
level, Lynch argues that Machiavelli’s
appreciation of the role of artillery and
cavalry has long been underestimated.
Machiavelli goes out of his way to call
attention to the limitations of the Ro-
man way of warfare, which was evident
in their campaigns against the
Parthians, who relied exclusively on
light mobile cavalry armed with the
bow and guerilla-style raiding tactics.
Lynch suggests that what Machiavelli ul-
timately envisions is a synthesis of Rome
or “Europe” and “Asia,” a combination
of Clausewitzian commitment to the de-
cisive battle and extensive employment
of maneuver, deception, and surprise in
a manner reminiscent of Sun Tzu.
Whatever view one takes of Lynch’s
bold and provocative reading of
Machiavelli’s text, his handling of the
translation is exemplary and unlikely to
be challenged in the foreseeable future.
He makes use of the definitive critical
edition of the Italian text published in
Rome in 2001, which removes many
errors present in older versions. The
translation itself is relatively literal, with
occasional awkwardness but much en-
hanced access to the terminology of
Machiavelli himself; there is also a very
extensive glossary of terms.
CARNES LORD
Naval War College
Singer, Peter W. Corporate Warriors. Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell Univ. Press, 2003. 330pp. $35
Corporate Warriors is a must read for
military professionals and national se-
curity experts. It opens a dialogue to a
valuable aspect of national security that
demands greater attention—the armed
forces’ use of contractors. The frame-
work Singer develops is especially
worthwhile, and although many of his
suggestions are often provocative, in
some areas his analysis is flawed and the
implications are loose and unsup-
ported. Overall, however, this work is a
superb effort to advance discussion on a
critical topic.
The Bush administration has made it
clear that even with the demands re-
lated to the global war on terror, it
would prefer not to dramatically in-
crease the size of its forces. To make up
for the difference—particularly with re-
spect to Afghanistan and Iraq—con-
tractors have been hired to pick up the
slack. Hence, the current war is one
where corporate warriors of private
military firms have become part of the
environment.
Throughout the world other states and
international organizations have also
turned to private military firms for as-
sistance. Singer argues persuasively that
there are policy and operational con-
cerns about the use of these firms that
need to be examined more thoroughly.
The book is divided into three parts, of
which the first two are the most useful
and of durable value. “The Rise” con-
tains an interesting thumbnail of mer-
cenaries through the ages and sets the
context for understanding contempo-
rary motivations for the use of private
military firms. “Organization and Op-
erations” provides an exceptionally
useful framework for understanding the
roles of various private firms that per-
form duties often identified with the
military. Chapter 6, “The Private Mili-
tary Industry Classified,” lays out the
taxonomy for firms involved in
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military-like activities and distinguishes
between providers, consultants, and
support firms. The next three chapters
are devoted to contemporary examples
for three types of firms: Executive Out-
comes, the notorious but now officially
disbanded South African–based merce-
nary group, illustrates a military pro-
vider firm. MPRI, an American-based
firm founded, run, and largely staffed
by retired flag officers, illustrates a mili-
tary consulting firm; and Brown and
Root, logistics providers, is a U.S.-based
Halliburton subsidiary and illustrates a
military support firm. In addition to
clarifying the types of firms, these chap-
ters are engaging case studies of promi-
nent and influential corporations.
The book contains some significant
flaws, but they generally stem from the
groundbreaking effort to comprehend
the significance of these firms. There
are also many loose assertions, insinua-
tions, and innuendos that are unlikely to
withstand closer scrutiny, but for now,
as an opening argument, they should be
taken seriously.
The effort to differentiate the firms in
an analytical and useful fashion breaks
down in part 3, entitled “Implications.”
The words “possible,” “might,” and
“can” show up with inordinate fre-
quency and are indicative of a looser,
more speculative analysis. Here, Singer
has a hard time maintaining the dis-
tinction between the firms he had care-
fully created earlier. The effect is often
to tar all provider firms that bear the
most resemblance to mercenaries or
traditional military combat organiza-
tions. Singer darkly intones about the
pitfalls and potential problems that can
arise from the use of private military
corporations. In this section, he tends
to lump together all flavors of private
military corporations, suggesting guilt
by association with a small number of
admittedly distasteful companies. This
tendency to associate loosely all firms
with the sins of the most egregious ones
(almost always provider firms) seems
even less fair given the fact that else-
where Singer notes that such firms
constitute a small fraction of the overall
private military firm population. Many
of his accusations do not apply well to
support firms. A more useful approach
would have been to assess the implica-
tions for each type of firm with respect
to contracting dilemmas, market dy-
namics, accountability, civil-military
relations, morality, and effectiveness.
Corporate Warriors is a valuable point
of departure for understanding private
military firms. It has cut a path through
the dense thicket of concerns about
their appropriate role but has by no
means cleared the way. The book opens
a debate that should engage military
professionals, civilian national security
leaders, and civil society. In the pursuit
of national objectives there are many
potentially useful instruments, and this
book is clearly one of them. Better un-
derstanding private military firms and
addressing their appropriate role are es-
sential challenges.
RICHARD LACQUEMENT
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army
Naval War College
Schneider, Barry R., and Jerrold Post, eds. Know
Thy Enemy: Profiles of Adversary Leaders and
Their Strategic Cultures. Maxwell Air Force Base,
Ala.: U.S. Air Force Counterproliferation Center,
2002. 325pp.
The devastating attack of 9/11 starkly
revealed how the United States failed to
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understand its adversary and, by exten-
sion, itself. The difficult, age-old chal-
lenge for the United States to accurately
assess foreign leaders has not changed,
nor has its spotty track record of getting
it right.
It is a tough business getting at human
identity and predicting the behavior of
reclusive, complex characters to whom
we have no access and who possess
weapons of mass destruction. However,
with America’s extraordinary resources
one must ask why the United States has
not brought to bear its best know-how
to fill this serious vacuum of
understanding.
The U.S. Air Force’s Counterprolif-
eration Center’s “America’s Adversary
Project” has tackled this problem and
produced Know Thy Enemy, which is a
fine collection of studies on the person-
alities and cultural context of such dan-
gerous international rivals as Iran,
North Korea, Libya, Syria, and terrorist
groups like al-Qa‘ida.
Co-editors Jerrold Post, psychiatrist
and former CIA profiling guru, who
now heads the Political Psychology Pro-
gram at George Washington University,
and Barry Schneider, director of the
Counterproliferation Center at Maxwell
Air Force Base, assembled a formidable
group of leadership assessors with re-
gional knowledge and functional exper-
tise ranging from history, international
relations and security, and war fighting
to Japanese art.
Schneider’s introduction, “Deterring
International Rivals from Escalation,”
critiques the inadequacies of classical
political science deterrence theory rela-
tive to twenty-first-century enemies
armed with lethal weapons. The United
States must know these enemies’ “hot
buttons” and what contingencies could
affect their decision to use weapons of
mass destruction.
Both authors argue that although nec-
essary, traditional profiling is not suffi-
cient to understand the enemy. A
deeper appreciation of individual per-
sonalities and their strategic cultures is
necessary to supplement deterrence
theory’s shortcomings. What is now re-
quired in each case are specific U.S. de-
terrence policies tailored to each leader’s
unique profile, which directly informs
our policy and public diplomacy.
Three essays bookend seven leadership
profiles, offering a loose theoretical al-
ternative and some recommendations.
The seven assessments are timely,
in-depth, and informative. “Kim
Chong-Il’s Erratic Decision Making and
North Korea’s Strategic Culture” by
Merrily Baird is well done, synthesizing
excellent research analysis into a work-
ing model for assessment.
Two other thought pieces are Alexander
George’s “The Need for Influence The-
ory and Actor-Specific Behavioral
Models of Adversaries” and the con-
cluding chapter by Post and Schneider,
“Precise Assessments of Rivals: Vital
Asymmetric War Threat Environment.”
George argues that it is necessary when
dealing with irrational adversaries to
distinguish between abstract concepts
and real-time strategy. He states that
“actor specific” calls for a more differ-
entiated behavioral model of adversaries,
but he qualifies the recommendations
in light of the high degree of uncer-
tainty and context specificity within
strategic cultures. Post and Schneider
reiterate that to avert an adversary’s
use of weapons of mass destruction,
models of actor-specific psychology
and decision making are required.
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For those seeking more than a basic ed-
ucation, this work provides a serious
guide to today’s “hottest” adversaries
and their weapons of mass destruction.
Through well researched history, biogra-
phy, and analysis of the cultural and
strategic setting, this book acquaints
readers with today’s enemies and invites
them to ponder critically the propensity
of these enemies to use their weapons.
A curious omission of this research is
its lack of any systematic methodologi-
cal discussion. The book’s primary as-
sumption is that deterring adversaries
requires an understanding of their stra-
tegic culture. Yet nowhere do the edi-
tors formally define strategic culture
or its link to the adversary. The reader
comes to appreciate, however, that each
study uniquely attempts to make the
connection.
Between the lines, this study calls for a
new paradigm, yet the book itself
mostly relies on an outdated theoretical
approach that ultimately handicaps
what it set out to do—assess adversaries.
That kind of work requires a deeper ana-
lytic template for profile analysis than
presently conceived, one that cannot be
wedged into political science paradigms.
Ultimately, knowing the enemy re-
quires a better appreciation of the ad-
vanced capabilities that studies of such
behavioral areas as emotion, cognition,
and performance can offer. Alongside
traditional political science and psy-
chology, this brings a deeper under-
standing to the urgent and complex
problem of knowing our adversaries in
relation to deterrence, information
warfare, and psychological operations.
An adversary’s behavioral structure re-
flects his identity and a consistency of
pattern and style that no amount of
image management can disguise. Direct
microanalysis at the level of structure of
a leader’s videotaped expression offers
insights into psychological states and
cognitive patterns, cues into how these
contextually unfold over time, and
topic-yielding insights into stress, credi-
bility, level of certitude, and conflict
that can still remain undetected after
years of traditional analysis.
Challenging the way policy makers and
analysts think about this vacuum in
understanding weapons of mass de-
struction and foreign adversaries is the
problem that this book illuminates, and
it is perhaps ultimately its most signifi-
cant contribution.
BRENDA L. CONNORS
Naval War College
Keegan, John. Intelligence in War: Knowledge of
the Enemy from Napoleon to Al-Qaeda. New York:
Knopf, 2003. 387pp. $30
Among many military historians, the
release of a book by John Keegan is
cause for celebration, and the sentiment
is not altogether out of place. Keegan’s
prolific output of insightful studies,
reaching back to his seminal Face of
Battle (1992), has won for himself dev-
otees from both the academic and public
sectors. In his latest book, Intelligence in
War, Keegan returns to the distinctive
format he used in The Face of Battle,
dividing his study into several vignettes
from a broad range of military his-
tory—what he labels here as “a collec-
tion of case studies”—organized, in this
case, to highlight the effect that good
intelligence has on military operations,
and the general role intelligence plays
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in underpinning the effectiveness of
armed forces in the field.
Beginning with Admiral Horatio Nelson’s
chase of the French Mediterranean fleet
in 1798, Keegan goes on to discuss the
role of intelligence in Stonewall Jackson’s
Shenandoah Valley campaign of 1862,
the British navy’s search for Rear Admi-
ral Maximilian von Spee and his ships
in World War I, and the battle of Mid-
way, the German assault on Crete, and
the Battle of the Atlantic in World War
II. In each of these, we see how the
gathering and the use of intelligence—
two very different acts—affected the ac-
tion. As usual, Keegan’s narrative skill
sets the stage succinctly for his discus-
sion. We feel how heavily the unknown
weighs on the commanders, Nelson es-
pecially, and how at times they were
bogged down sorting through an over-
abundance of intelligence, especially
after the advent of wireless communica-
tion, to divine the plans of the enemy.
Commanders had to deal with many
possible answers to difficult questions,
usually with only one being the right
answer. Intelligence, we realize, works
to weed out possibilities and narrow
the options.
A book-length study of how crucial in-
telligence is will almost inevitably run
the risk of elevating this one element
above all other elements in a successful
military operation. “If only this com-
mander had known about the enemy’s
troops,” we might find ourselves saying,
or, “If only his spies would have alerted
the admiral to his opponent’s plans the
outcome here would surely have been
different.” To his credit, however,
Keegan avoids this determinism that
would cause us to think that with good
intelligence, battlefield victories can be
made all but certain. On the contrary,
he acknowledges that “however good
the intelligence available before an en-
counter may appear to be . . . the out-
come will still be decided by the fight.”
Brutal fighting, we are reminded, along
with a good bit of luck, are the key de-
terminants of battlefield success. What
Keegan instead shows is that good intel-
ligence can reduce the scope of the un-
known, and most importantly remove
guesswork from the equation as much
as possible. “Thought,” Keegan ex-
plains, “offers a means of reducing the
price” of the cold, bloody attrition that
lurks in the background of all battle-
field victories.
Unlike some other Keegan volumes,
this work builds its effectiveness only
cumulatively through its stories. If one
picks up this book and reads but one or
two of the vignettes, a clear and time-
less axiom of intelligence is likely to
elude him. It is through the cumulative
effect of all these stories, one after the
other, that we begin to grasp Keegan’s
broader point and see just how varied
in form and content, but fundamentally
useful, sound intelligence of every sort
can be. One clear contribution that this
book makes is to remind us that intelli-
gence has much to do with mundane
issues of how dense that forest on the
map really is, how muddy that road
becomes in April, or how to interpret
what we inadvertently overhear on the
radio.
Professional military readers will un-
derstand intuitively the importance of
intelligence in the new kind of war the
United States finds itself fighting today,
and that brings us to the book’s subti-
tle. Given the recent debates over the
quality of American intelligence, many
readers will eagerly anticipate that
Keegan’s analysis of the war against
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al-Qa‘ida and that the war on terror will
be as fully developed as his examination of
Jackson’s Valley campaign or the battle
of Midway. Those readers will be disap-
pointed. The discussion of al-Qa‘ida is
only a small part of his penultimate
chapter, “Military Intelligence since
1945,” which discusses the Falklands
War in greater length than what the
United States faces today. Nevertheless,
Keegan speculates that old-fashioned
human intelligence will be the best
means of carrying the war to the new
enemies of the United States, and
through his historical exposition of in-
telligence, we are well reminded just
how crucial this apparently mundane
work really is.
DAVID A. SMITH
Baylor University
Reeve, John, and David Stevens, eds. The Face of
Naval Battle: The Human Experience of Modern
War at Sea. Crows Nest, Australia: Allen and
Unwin, 2003. 363pp. $24.95
An author who uses the words “the face
of battle” in the title of any book per-
taining to military matters is throwing
down a pretty hefty literary gauntlet.
For “face of battle” guarantees that the
work in question will be compared to
Keegan’s 1976 landmark volume of the
same name. Keegan asked the basic
question, “What is it like to be in a bat-
tle?” He sought the answer in a compar-
ative study of the battles of Agincourt,
Waterloo, and the Somme.
John Reeve and David Stevens were well
aware their book would be compared to
The Face of Battle. In fact, they encour-
age the comparison and offer their
book as a sort of maritime bookend to
Keegan’s earlier work. There is a patent
need for such a work and while some,
including Keegan himself, have tried to
fill it, none have yet succeeded. Despite a
most encouraging beginning, however,
Reeve and Stevens also miss the mark,
although this book is still worth reading.
Rather than a coherent examination of
the human experience of naval combat,
this work is a collection of essays by
seventeen separate authors, the major-
ity of whom happen to be Australian.
This is not surprising when the reader
learns that most of the essays were orig-
inally presented at the 2001 King-Hall
Naval History Conference in Canberra.
The book starts off strongly with a mas-
terful essay by John Reeve, who dis-
cusses naval history in general,
identifying certain challenges in “pierc-
ing the veil” of individuals’ experiences
in naval battle and suggesting an orga-
nizational approach, analogous to that
used by Keegan, that could be used to
grow a general understanding of naval
combat. Unfortunately, the use of
preexisting essays may have precluded
such an approach, and the promise of
the first chapter is not met in the book’s
subsequent pages.
The essays are arranged more or less in
chronological order and cover such di-
verse topics as a look at the battle of the
Yellow Sea, the treatment of German
sailors taken prisoner in World War I,
and the personal experiences of an offi-
cer in command of an Australian
guided missile destroyer in Operation
DESERT STORM.
Despite its failure to live up to the
promise of its title, this work is worth
reading for several reasons. First, much
of it, especially the portion written by
Russell Parkin, deals with the
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development of Australian naval power
and doctrine. Though it was one of the
staunchest allies of United States, Aus-
tralia’s development and contributions
in this area are often overlooked or
misunderstood. In addition, the naval
challenges Australia has faced and con-
tinues to face are by and large shared by
other maritime nations that do not
have the industrial or economic capac-
ity of a superpower. Thus the Austra-
lian experience may contain lessons for
other mid-sized naval powers. Further-
more, as all U.S. sailors lucky enough to
have worked with their counterparts
“down under” know, Australian war-
ships are superbly handled, well main-
tained, and boldly employed. Australian
sailors’ maritime skills and contribu-
tions to both world wars, Korea, Viet-
nam, and DESERT STORM deserve wider
recognition.
A second reason to read this book is
that several of the writings illuminate
obscure yet fascinating historical epi-
sodes. Bruce Elleman’s discussion of the
1894 battle in the Yellow Sea between
modern Japanese and Chinese warships
is excellent, although his attempt to
draw parallels between the Chinese navy
of 1894 and that of today is on less firm
ground. Likewise, Michael Dowsett’s ex-
amination of the treatment of casualties
resulting from the 9 November 1914
battle between the German SMS Emden
and the Australian cruiser HMAS Sydney
makes for compelling reading.
A significant portion of this work is de-
voted to personal recollections. The
best of these are written by Rear Admi-
ral Guy Griffiths, AO, DSO, DSC, RAN,
Ret., and Commodore Lee Cordner,
AM, RANR. Griffiths is a veteran of
World War II, Korea, and Vietnam,
where he commanded HMAS Hobart.
Commodore Cordner commanded
HMAS Sydney during Operation
DESERT STORM and is an alumnus of
the Naval War College. A third essay,
written by Michael Whitby, which dis-
cusses the wartime diaries of Com-
mander A. F. C. Layard, DSO, DSC,
RN, is also well done. Yet as good as
these individual accounts of service and
command are, so much more could
have been done if the editors had
mined these narratives for points of
commonality. For if the face of naval
battle is not so unique as to preclude
any similarities between one battle
and the next, it should be possible, as
Keegan did with land combat, to iden-
tify the shared perspectives and experi-
ences that affect sailors who make war
upon the sea.
At least the editors did not fall into the
trap of concentrating solely upon the
memoirs of officers. Some room is also
provided to the enlisted view of naval
combat. These include a discussion by
David Jones on the wartime experi-
ences of U.S. submariner Thomas R.
Parks, and Peter Stanley’s quick look
at the naval life of J. S. Macdonnell,
who rose to the rank of gunner in the
Royal Australian Navy and then went
on to a life of writing “potboiler” nov-
els. While entertaining, and at times
poignant, these recollections, like
those of the senior officers, lack the
analysis and study that could elevate
them to more than just brief bio-
graphical sketches.
The book concludes, somewhat predict-
ably, with a look at “The Face of the Fu-
ture Naval Battle.” There is a discussion
of such emerging technologies and con-
cepts as network-centric warfare, and
transformation and concept-led long-
range planning. These complex issues
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are barely touched upon, so readers who
are familiar with them will not learn
anything new, and readers who had not
heard of them will know little more.
No doubt the day will come when
someone will write the book that truly
reveals the face of naval battle in all its
dimensions, but this is not the day.
Taken as a whole, Reeves and Stevens
have created a work of interest and
merit that is able to stand on its own. It
is a significant contribution to an in-
creased understanding of history and
the contribution of the Royal Austra-
lian Navy. Readers who do not expect
more will not be disappointed.
RICHARD J. NORTON
Naval War College
Phillips, Donald T., and James M. Loy. Character
in Action: The U.S. Coast Guard on Leadership.
Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2003.
178pp. $22.50
According to the opening chapter, the
Coast Guard manages to achieve a com-
plex mission on an annual budget that
is smaller than 2 percent of all the other
services’ combined budgets. Phillips
and Loy identify a twelve-part mission
that includes responsibilities ranging
from boating safety to homeland de-
fense. Thus they argue that the Coast
Guard provides a valuable case study
for leading a complex organization be-
cause it achieves so much with limited
funds.
Using a variety of approaches, includ-
ing historical examples, anecdotes, and
organizational philosophy, Phillips and
Loy illustrate sixteen principles that
they believe are foundations for a well
run organization. For example, the first
principle they posit is “define the cul-
ture and live the values.” By discussing
exactly how the Coast Guard achieves
this goal, they then set forth how this
principle can also be successfully imple-
mented by other organizations.
The authors are uniquely positioned
to examine Coast Guard leadership.
Donald Phillips has written ten books
on leadership, including the best-selling
Lincoln on Leadership (Simon and
Schuster, 1992), and spent twenty-five
years as a manager in major corpora-
tions. After graduating from the Coast
Guard Academy in 1964, coauthor Ad-
miral James Loy served in the Coast
Guard for over thirty years, culminating
in four years as commandant. Upon his
retirement in 2003, he assumed the post
of administrator of the Transportation
Security Administration.
Overall, this book has many points to
recommend it. Unlike many manage-
ment books, this one is written in an
easy-to-read fashion. The aforemen-
tioned sixteen principles are grouped
into four parts: Set the Foundation, Fo-
cus on People, Instill a Bias for Action,
and Ensure the Future. Readers can
thus focus on groups of principles that
are of specific importance or interest in
their own organization. In addition,
while leaders may be reluctant to read a
management book that discusses “sea
stories” over the latest theories, the au-
thors do an excellent job of linking the
Coast Guard experience to leadership
and management principles. Every
chapter closes with a summary of the
important leadership points behind
each principle.
The leadership principles presented
here will resonate with federal civilian
and military managers alike as many re-
late to issues they currently face. The
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chapters that cover “Promoting Team
over Self” and “Instilling a Commit-
ment for Action” in part 1 will assist
those federal leaders who work in a
team environment. In part 2, “Focus on
People,” there are discussions of such
principles as “Eliminating the Frozen
Middle,” “Cultivating Caring Relation-
ships,” and “Creating an Effective
Communication System.” The Coast
Guard experience in this area may be a
source of ideas to federal leaders who
are currently struggling with workforce
planning issues such as recruitment, re-
tention, and motivating a large popula-
tion that is or soon will be retirement
eligible. Part 3, “Instill a Bias for Ac-
tion,” also proves helpful in thinking
about current issues. For instance,
chapter 12’s “Give the Field Priority”
will provide ideas to both military lead-
ers working to implement network-
centric warfare and a State Department
leader working to improve communica-
tion between Washington and the field.
Other chapters in this section, “Make
Change the Norm” or “Encouraging
Decisiveness,” may seem self-evident,
but they are actually cultural changes
needed to bring the federal workforce
into the twenty-first century. Lastly,
part 4’s discussion of “Ensure the Fu-
ture” may also seem obvious, but a re-
cent management survey noted that
most workers want to hear “thank you”
above all other rewards. Chapters on
topics of “Spotlighting Excellence” are
also important reads.
Character in Action does have some lim-
itations. Due to a publication date that
preceded the Coast Guard’s merger into
the Department of Homeland Security,
readers may find themselves wondering
if the book’s lessons still hold true. For
an answer to this question, see the
Spring 2004 Review article “Change and
Continuity: The U.S. Coast Guard To-
day,” by Admiral Thomas H. Collins.
LAURA MILLER
Naval War College
Funabashi, Yoichi, ed. Reconciliation in the Asia-
Pacific. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace,
2003. 240pp. $19.95
Asia’s brutal colonial and wartime his-
tory has left wounds that continue to
shape the region’s politics and interna-
tional relations. Traditional approaches
to international relations say little
about how to overcome lingering ani-
mosity and to replace it with trust and
harmonious relations. Time alone is
never a solution. Nor, as Japan has dis-
covered repeatedly, are apologies
enough. Even need, as that between de-
veloping China and economically and
technologically advanced Japan, is in-
sufficient. The contributors to this vol-
ume demonstrate that the path to
reconciliation is different for each
country, requiring unique blends of a
wide range of political and social ingre-
dients, many of which are in short
supply.
This volume is the result of a confer-
ence sponsored by the U.S. Institute of
Peace, which includes chapters on intra-
state (Taiwan, Cambodia, East Timor,
Australia) as well as interstate relations
(Japan-China, Japan-Korea, North
Korea–South Korea, and an appendix
on Germany-Poland). Its timing is pro-
pitious as reconciliation itself is a grow-
ing phenomenon. South Africa’s Truth
and Reconciliation Commission and
the UN-led war crimes tribunals for
Bosnia and Rwanda have elevated world
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consciousness. Democratization has al-
lowed for the spread of appropriate le-
gal structures, even as it has promoted
self-awareness and sometimes ethnic
nationalism. Media attention and the
Internet strengthen such dynamics.
Yet the kind of success seen in South
Africa and between Germany and its
European neighbors has not been
achieved in the Asia-Pacific. Daqing
Yang shows how, following normaliza-
tion of relations and apologies by To-
kyo, the “history problem” resurfaced
in the 1980s and has not gone away
since. Diet members and millions of
Japanese citizens have expressed their
opposition to offer further apologies
and to any prolonged self-flagellation.
For its part, Beijing occasionally “plays
the history card” in order to wrest con-
cessions out of Japan, although the
“card” is often played because of bellig-
erent actions in Tokyo and “held” by
the millions of Chinese who retain le-
gitimate grievances for the ills of the
1930s and 1940s. Yang argues that his-
torians on both sides need to acknowl-
edge the complexity of the relationship
and to disseminate their knowledge
among large segments of the popula-
tion. A more fundamental problem is
that reconciliation presupposes an au-
tonomous society capable of critical
self-examination—in other words, de-
mocracy. In this case the People’s Re-
public of China has a long way to go.
Victor Cha explains how despite the es-
tablishment of formal relations between
Seoul and Tokyo in 1965, and a great
deal of mutual interest and admiration
between the two societies, historical an-
imosities prevent the sort of coopera-
tion that one might expect from a
rational or realpolitik perspective. The
two main South Korean national
holidays celebrate independence from
Japanese colonial rule. Substantive
problems include the content of Japa-
nese history textbooks, the political and
social discrimination to which some
650,000 Korean-Japanese are subjected,
the memory of Korean forced laborers
killed by the atomic bombs, and the use
of Korean “comfort women” by Japa-
nese troops during the war. The secu-
rity threat of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK), as well as
concern in Seoul and Tokyo over
Washington’s commitment to provide a
security umbrella, have both contrib-
uted to the steps toward reconciliation
that have been made, including apolo-
gies, high-level meetings on the subject,
and the establishment of consultations
on security cooperation. Cha argues
that democracy and development have
contributed to this process. “As genera-
tions of Koreans, in the South or in a
unified entity, come to live in a demo-
cratic and developed society, they will
cultivate norms of compromise, nonvi-
olence, and respect for opposing view-
points that will become externalized in
their attitudes toward Japan.”
The argument about democracy and
norms is critical. Interestingly, Seoul’s
perception of a lessened threat from the
DPRK has actually increased its invec-
tives toward Japan. Cha claims that
without a process of identity change,
material incentives such as the need for
security or economic cooperation alone
cannot ensure a continued march to-
ward reconciliation.
This notion also captures the promise
and peril of intra-Korean relations,
where the nature and timing of recon-
ciliation will have serious implications
for the region’s security. Scott Snyder
argues that Pyongyang’s economic
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needs have driven the process, while
public opinion in the South has deter-
mined its course. South Korean
nongovernment organizations have
also contributed large sums of money.
The whole process presents a major
challenge to the North’s system “as it
will be more and more difficult to build
fences around South Korean economic
investments and business practices.”
Once again, democratization and nor-
mative development will be as important
as economic and security imperatives to
successful reconciliation. Considering
the implications, it is sobering to con-
sider that there is no obvious way that
such identity change can occur peace-
fully in North Korea.
Internal reconciliation processes are no
easier than external ones. Nayan
Chanda explains how Cambodia has
achieved only superficial reconciliation
following the genocidal acts of the
Khmer Rouge regime. The Buddhist
tradition can justify much as resulting
from actions of a prior life. The lack of
political stability makes many Cambo-
dians fearful of reopening old wounds,
particularly when racist aspects of Cam-
bodia’s political philosophy may bear
some culpability. Phnom Penh earlier
granted amnesties that would make it
difficult to prosecute former leaders,
and more recently argued that a full-
blown tribunal would make reconcilia-
tion less likely. The legitimacy bestowed
on the regime by other states makes
prosecution somewhat awkward, and
China opposes revealing fully the re-
cord of the former regime. The pros-
pects are not good for major trials
capable of healing this nation.
Other chapters present a mixed record
on the prospects and benefits of recon-
ciliation for Aborigines in Australia and
East Timor, and for the loved ones who
died in a popular uprising on Taiwan in
1947. In addition to the political and
cultural repression involved, the dead
in each case number in the tens of
thousands. The Taiwan case makes
what is probably the most convincing
argument that democratization and po-
litical stability, combined with firm po-
litical leadership, are critical to
successful reconciliation.
All who study Asian security or the role
of justice in international relations
should read this book. Reconciliation
can bring restorative justice to war-torn
peoples. However, this requires a rejec-
tion of purely retributive justice. In ad-
dition, the case studies in this volume
reinforce that there is no universal for-
mula and that a great deal of political
creativity and political courage is re-
quired. As the editor also concludes,
victims and victimizers must work to-
gether and maintain a forward-looking
approach, preferably in a democratic
environment. Most of all, there must be
a commitment to the process. It is per-
haps this factor that promotes the kind
of identity change that is required for
true reconciliation.
JOHN GAROFANO
Naval War College
Langston, Thomas S. Uneasy Balance: Civil-Military
Relations in Peacetime America since 1783. Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2003. $39.95
Thomas S. Langston believes “it has
never been easy for Americans to decide
what to do with the military” at the end
of a war. During peacetime, should the
military solely focus on preparing for
future wars, or should it usefully serve
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the nation in other ways? Langston cites
some examples of the military provid-
ing a service to the nation during peace-
time. For instance, after the War of
1812, the military “took the lead in
opening the West for settlement” by
building roads, surveying canals, and
farming. After World War I, the mili-
tary “operated the main barge line on
the Mississippi River . . . operated and
extended cable and telegraph lines in
Alaska, operated steamship and canal
services in Panama, and responded to
natural disasters.”
According to Langston, the “transition
to peace and the postwar era” is impor-
tant to civil-military relations.
Langston, a professor of political sci-
ence at Tulane, has written several
books with political themes, including:
With Reverence and Contempt: How
Americans Think about Their President
(1995), and Ideologues and Presidents:
From the New Deal to the Reagan Revo-
lution (1992).
Langston relies on historical analysis
and judgment to determine how the
military balanced war preparation and
internal reform with service to the na-
tion after the following conflicts: the
Revolutionary War, the War of 1812,
the Mexican War, the Civil War, the
Spanish-American War, World War I,
World War II, the Vietnam War, and
the Cold War. He wrote this book
halfway through George W. Bush’s
term and before Operation IRAQI FREE-
DOM. Langston predicted that the war
on terror would essentially be like a po-
lice operation, similar to the war on
drugs. It turns out, however, that the
post–Cold War peace was short-lived;
America currently finds itself fully en-
gaged in the war on terror.
Independent of whether the United
States is currently fighting a war or en-
joying peace, Langston’s thesis still ap-
plies, believing that the ideal postwar
transition balances military reform with
service to the nation. This balanced
“happy state of affairs” occurs when
there is cooperation between civilian
and military leaders and when “political
consensus [is] in support of the military
and its varied uses.” For example, is
there agreement for the use of military
force? Should it be used to protect only
vital interests or should it also support
humanitarian objectives? Does the na-
tion expect a “peace dividend”? Accord-
ing to the author, during the post–Cold
War period of the late 1990s, there was
an uneasy balance between the mili-
tary’s desire to hold onto a Cold War
force structure and the president’s use
of military force that “stretched a
shrinking force around the globe.”
In my opinion, it is understandable that
the military would want to prepare for
the next war during peacetime. Like-
wise, it makes sense for the nation to
expect the military to provide different
services to the nation when not at war.
My only wish is that the author had
specifically recommended a list of mili-
tary service projects for the post–Cold
War period.
Langston’s work is useful because of its
depth of research on previous peace-
time periods. Although all the details
can be cumbersome, his idea that mili-
tary and civilian leaders must cooperate
and reach consensus on the purpose of
a peacetime military force is clear and
succinct.
CYNTHIA PERROTTI
Naval War College
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Dick, Steven J. Sky and Ocean Joined: The U.S.
Naval Observatory, 1830–2000. Cambridge, U.K.:
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003. 609pp. $130
In this beautifully produced, albeit very
expensive volume, Steven Dick of the
U.S. Naval Observatory in Washington,
D.C., has written the fascinating story
of the origins and development of the
Navy’s and the nation’s oldest scientific
organization. It is a fascinating and well
written story that ranges from the es-
tablishment of the observatory in 1830,
as part of the Navy’s Depot of Charts
and Instruments under Lieutenant
Louis Goldsborough, to the sixteen-
and-a-half-year tenure of the longest-
serving superintendent, Matthew
Fontaine Maury, who led when it was
first designated the National Observa-
tory. The institution was originally es-
tablished to serve the very practical
application of astronomy to the mea-
surement of time in day-to-day naviga-
tion at sea. Under Charles Wilkes and
Maury, it quickly moved beyond this
restricted use to extend its work to geo-
magnetic, astronomical, and meteoro-
logical observations that soon brought
it into the forefront of scientific re-
search, bringing global credit to the
U.S. Navy and the United States.
Dick, who has a degree in astrophysics,
as well as a doctorate in the history and
philosophy of science, tells the wide-
ranging story of the observatory’s work
over 170 years, from the rise in the use
of the chronometer in the U.S. Navy in
the early nineteenth century, to its new
work in the opening of the twenty-first
century with the application of the sat-
ellite Global Positioning System. His
highly competent and very readable ex-
planation of the observatory’s scientific
accomplishments ranges across the
administrative and bureaucratic ele-
ments in its history and provides strik-
ingly humanistic portraits of some of
the key and colorful scientific figures
that were involved, such as Maury,
Simon Newcomb, and Asaph Hall.
The story that unfolds encompasses a
range of fascinating and quite different
events and details, which many readers,
whether they are general readers, naval
historians, or historians of science, will
not readily associate with the achieve-
ments of the U.S. Navy. Chief among
them are the discovery of Phobos and
Deimos, the moons of the planet Mars,
and Charon, the moon of Pluto; the six-
teen nineteenth-century expeditions to
measure the transit of Venus across the
face of the Sun; and the establishment
of the master clock of the United States.
In terms of practical contributions to
fleet operations, the observatory played
a key role in providing the most
up-to-date navigational technology to
ships at sea, even mass-producing chro-
nometers during both world wars, and
providing early applications of
punch-card calculating technology for
the production of an improved and
more accurate American Air Almanac
from 1941. Because the Nautical Alma-
nac had one of the few scientific com-
putation laboratories in the United
States, its equipment was adapted in
late 1943 to do rapid calculations in
spherical trigonometry to calculate the
positions of German U-boats, using in-
coming intelligence and radio bearings
from a hundred listening stations
around the world. For this purpose, the
observatory staff used the equipment at
night, when it was not being used for
Almanac computations, and calculated
solutions to a quarter of a million
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spherical triangles to locate the real-
time positions of enemy U-boats within
five miles.
For those interested in the history of
Washington, D.C., the book contains a
fascinating account of the different sites
of the Naval Observatory, as it moved
from its first location on G Street near
the White House, to Capitol Hill from
1834 to 1842, to temporary quarters on
Pennsylvania Avenue near New Hamp-
shire Avenue from 1842 to 1844, on to
Foggy Bottom until 1893. It was then
that famed architect Richard Morris
Hunt designed the buildings on Obser-
vatory Hill on Massachusetts Avenue,
including the Superintendent’s Resi-
dence, which served from 1928 as the
residence of the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, and which in 1974 was designated
as the official residence of the vice pres-
ident of the United States.
Readers of this journal will be partic-
ularly interested in the recurring
civilian-military controversy through
the observatory’s history and in the ques-
tion as to whether the Navy should hand
over administration of all or part of its
functions to the Smithsonian Institu-
tion, the National Bureau of Standards,
or some other civilian agency. The nat-
ural administrative tensions that result
from competing national security in-
terests and scientific interests were
ameliorated as early as 1908 by the cre-
ation of the Astronomical Council that
allowed leading astronomers to have an
influence on decisions relating to the
staff’s scientific work. From 1958, with
the employment of increasingly compli-
cated astronomical technology, the ap-
pointment of a civilian scientific
director has provided a more effective
means to work under the active-duty
naval officer who is the superintendent.
On this point, Dick concludes that
maintaining the observatory as a scien-
tific institution under Department of
Defense control, within the Department
of the Navy, is particularly important in
regard to the observatory’s continuing
role in providing accurate atomic-clock
time to the Global Positioning System
satellites and its contributions to accu-
rate detail on star positions and earth
orientation, critical elements to current
defense projects in space.
JOHN B. HATTENDORF
Naval War College
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RECENT BOOKS
Friedman, Norman, ed. U.S. Destroyers:
An Illustrated Design History.
Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,
2004. 552pp. $76.50
U.S. Destroyers is a robust technical and
historical reference documenting the
birth and development of the U.S. Navy
destroyer and its influences from
abroad and within design bureaus and
boards. Evolution of engineering, weap-
onry, and hull form are covered with a
continuity that lends to an understand-
ing of progressive improvements be-
tween successive classes of destroyers.
Illustration is ample and detailed; in
many cases equipment is circled in pho-
tographs and specifically identified. Ap-
pendices document the specifications of
each class of destroyer as well as the
date upon which each keel was laid and
when each ship was launched, commis-
sioned, decommissioned, and what the
ship’s final disposition was, from DD 1
to DD 997. From the spar torpedo that
sank Confederate ironclad CSS
Albemarle in October 1864, the found-
ing of the Navy Torpedo Station, New-
port, Rhode Island, in 1869, to the
DD(X) and “Arsenal Ship” concepts of
the twenty-first century, this book
serves as a detailed and evenly balanced
technical reference.
Tenney, W. J. The Military and Naval
History of the Rebellion in the United
States: With Biographical Sketches of De-
ceased Officers. New York: D. Appleton,
1866; repr. Mechanicsburg, Penna.:
Stackpole Books, 2003. 880pp. $39.95
Nonspecialists in U.S. Civil War history
may be surprised to learn of the existence
of the 1866 Military and Naval History of
the Rebellion (not to be confused with the
foundational Official Records), reissued in
facsimile format by Scarecrow. The work
has the defects of histories rushed to print
so quickly, but it also has their merits—
the memories of surviving commanders
were fresh, and Tenney submitted proofs
for approval to many of them. His book
also offers a broad range of political, lo-
gistic, medical, and social issues, as well as
a wealth of primary sources (reports and
correspondence), engravings, photo-
graphs, tables, and biographies.
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Dr. Catherine McArdle Kelleher, editor of the Naval War College Press and Review
through the present issue, receives commendation from Rear Admiral Ronald A. Route,
President of the Naval War College at that time, for her receipt of the German Ministry of
Defense’s Manfred Wörner Medal for outstanding services rendered to peace and freedom
in Europe. The recognition came during the College’s 18 June 2004 graduation exercises.
Photograph by PHC(AW/NAC) Robert Inverso
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FROM THE EDITORS
HUGH G. NOTT PRIZES
The President of the Naval War College has awarded this year’s Hugh G. Nott
Prizes, to the authors of the best nonhistorical articles appearing in this journal
in the 2003 publishing year. These prizes are given by the generosity of the Naval
War College Foundation.
First Prize ($1,000): Michael Evans, for “From Kadesh to Kandahar: Military Theory
and the Future of War,” Winter 2003
Second Prize ($650): Lt. Col. Antulio J. Echevarria II, U.S. Army, for “Clausewitz’s
Center of Gravity: It’s Not What We Thought,” Winter 2003
Third Prize ($350): Scott Pegg, “Globalization and Natural-Resource Conflicts,”
Autumn 2003.
EDWARD S. MILLER HISTORY PRIZE
The President of the Naval War College has also awarded this year’s Edward S.
Miller History Prize, to the author of the best historical or history-oriented arti-
cle appearing in this journal in the 2003 publishing year. This prize ($500) is
given by the generosity of the historian Edward S. Miller, through the Naval War
College Foundation. The winner this year is John B. Hattendorf, for “The Uses of
Maritime History in and for the Navy,” Spring 2003.
STAFF CHANGES
Readers may have noticed two conspicuous changes on our online “masthead.”
First, Dr. Peter Dombrowski, professor in the Strategic Research Department of
the Naval War College’s Center for Naval Warfare Studies, has assumed addi-
tional responsibilities as editor of the Naval War College Press, as of our next
(Winter 2005) issue, taking over from Dr. Catherine McArdle Kelleher, also of
the Strategic Research Department. Second, our associate editor, Patricia A.
Goodrich, retired late last winter after over twenty-six years of government ser-
vice, leaving the position (temporarily, we hope) vacant.
We wish Dr. Kelleher the best as she focuses once again on her research and
writing. To our colleague Patricia Goodrich we wish a relaxing and rewarding
retirement. For his part, Dr. Dombrowski is looking forward to working with the
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entire Naval War College Press community to continue its tradition of publish-
ing excellence in the service of the U.S. Navy and the wider national security
community.
NEWPORT PAPER 19
The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986 reproduces a
pathbreaking analysis by the Naval War College’s Dr. John B. Hattendorf. It was
originally published for a limited audience in 1989. New elements—a now-de-
classified national intelligence estimate, a comprehensively updated bibliogra-
phy by Peter Swartz, and a selective time line created by Yuri Zhukov under Dr.
Hattendorf ’s direction—have been added. Dr. Hattendorf ’s essay, with its sup-
porting materials, recounts a fascinating story and reflects the significant role
that the Naval War College, the Strategic Studies Group, and individual leaders,
past and present, played in this critical period of strategy making. The Evolution
of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986 is available online; print copies
can be obtained from the Naval War College Press editorial office.
NEWPORT PAPER 20
Captain Robert H. Gile (U.S. Navy, Ret.) has in Global War Game: Second Series
1984–1988 provided a service for the Naval War College, the U.S. Navy, and in-
deed, practitioners and historians of gaming around the world. This is the sec-
ond in a proposed series of monographs synthesizing the primary sources to
provide a concise, chronological summary of the prestigious Global War Games,
hosted in Newport from 1984 until after the fall of the Soviet Union. The first
monograph (coauthored with Bud Hay) was Global War Game: The First Five Years,
published as Newport Paper 4 in 1993; it is available electronically in Adobe Ac-
robat and in limited paper copies. Planning and research is under way to com-
plete the history of the Global series. Captain Gile’s invaluable effort captures
the methods, techniques, assumptions, analysis, results, and the all-important
“take-aways” of this widely known game series, important today for the history
of war gaming but even more so at the time, as a vital contribution to the think-
ing and strategy of the U.S. Navy, the other U.S. services, and its alliance counter-
parts in the later stages of the Cold War. Global War Game: Second Series 1984–
1988 is available online; print copies can be obtained from the Press editorial
office.
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